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PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
IN SOME OF THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS

MALTHUS AND HIS WORK

RICARDO'S LETTERS TO MALTHUS

DISTURBING ELEMENTS
IN THE STUDY AND TEACHING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

MORAL SENSE

by

JAMES BONAR, LL.D.

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1930

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TO

J. H. M.

FOR AULD LANG SYNE

PREFACE

By the inclusion of this volume the Library of Philosophy is fulfilling a promise of its original programme of forty years ago.

The subject is the rise, progress, and decline of a theory of moral philosophy which prevailed in this country for the greater part of the eighteenth century.

Founded by Shaftesbury, and built up by Hutcheson, it derived our moral perceptions from a special Moral Sense, interpreted on the analogy of the Five Bodily Senses.

The book attempts an account of those two leaders, and of their principal followers and critics. The followers include the doubtful supporter David Hume; the critics Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant.

The deduction of virtue from a Moral Sense seemed to leave the virtues other than moral in a precarious position. But the place of natural gifts and graces and of the intellectual virtues was a question not essential to the main argument of the text. It has been touched lightly in the Dialogue forming the Appendix.

J. BONAR

HAMPSTEAD
February 1, 1930

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MORAL SENSE

CHAPTER I

SHAFTESBURY

In our own time "the moral sense" means the recognition of the ordinary principles of morality. We are told, for example, that Denmark's abandonment of an army is "a powerful moral buckler against attack, and probably will be effective so long as there is a moral sense left in the world".[1] We read that "A National Debt is against the enlightened moral sense".[2] A book, mainly philological, bears the title *The Idea of God and the Moral Sense in the Light of Language.*[3] Edward Caird writes:[4] "The moral sense is jealous of the admission that good overreaches the antagonism between itself and evil." So we read:[5] "The moral sense of the better part of mankind has accepted certain conventions which are called International Law." Even in theology doctrines are sometimes rejected because "contrary to our moral sense". The phrase is now a popular generality. But in the early eighteenth century it denoted a special theory of the origin of Ethics —the theory that right decisions, if not indeed right principles, were due to a Moral Sense conceived as a special faculty. Such is a rough statement of the view associated with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, suggested by the first,

developed by the second, explained away by the third.

Many questions arise on the bald description of the theory. Does it mean that moral judgments are made by this special faculty "pronouncing lastly on each deed"? Is the faculty possessed full grown by all human beings? Does it guide us to principles of action or straight to the action itself?

We cannot dismiss a theory that sprang from the patient thought of strong thinkers by comparing it with the opiate of Molière,[6] which caused sleep by its soporific virtue. Yet it seems like that to most of us now. We seem to be told that men perceive moral distinctions because men have a power to perceive them, and posterity wonders how strong thinkers could adopt so weak a reasoning. We seem to be confronted with something like the "innate ideas" condemned in Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding.* We hear that the supporters of the theory were followers of Locke, and we wonder how they thought to escape his criticisms. When we are told by Kantian critics that the theory of a Moral Sense was "the only way to save 'the originality of our moral ideas' in consistency with the philosophy of Locke", we wonder if a special faculty would not be more odious to Locke than an innate idea, and more difficult to rescue from his arguments.

Locke writes:[7] "There is nothing more com-

monly taken for granted than that there are certain principles, both speculative and practical (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind, which therefore, they argue, must needs be constant impressions, which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties." Man has tendencies and appetites; he has also a capacity for knowledge evident from the fact that he comes to knowledge in due time. But, if innate ideas mean only the capacity to have the ideas, then all and sundry ideas are innate. The capacity, indeed, is innate, but the knowledge itself is acquired by experience.[8] Experience, however, shows that at first nothing more than the capacity is there. There are no innate principles in speculation. Even "whatever is, is", does not command universal assent. There are no innate practical principles, in the sense of principles of the knowledge required for the conduct of life. "Moral rules need a proof; ergo, not innate." [9] Locke does not seem to have heard of the attempted evasion of his argument by means of a Moral Sense, but if it be regarded as an intuition he had judged it in advance: [10] "If we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves without the intervention of any other, and this I think we may

call intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains in proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two. Such kind of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition, without the intervention of any other idea, and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of. Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition that in the next degree of knowledge, which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connections of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty." Yet he distinguishes "the knowledge we have by sensation, perceiving the existence of particular things" both from intuition and from reason.[11] He thinks that intuition has very narrow limits, which leave no room for moral intuitions. Thus the definitions and restrictions of Locke seem quite inconsistent with the admission of a Moral Sense.

His own theory of morals is sufficiently worked out to show that in his view reason created moral rules. Reason, however (to him), determines the will only through desire, and desire is for happiness "the utmost pleasure we are capable of"; good is pleasure, evil is pain.[12] "Moral good and evil is only the conformity or disagreement

of our voluntary actions to some law whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the lawmaker." [13] Moral rules therefore come, not from a voice within, but from a voice without. At every step we seem to go farther from the notion of a Moral Sense. Locke sums up his ethical position historically when he writes ("On the Keeping of Compacts") : [14] "If a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason: 'Because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us.' But if a Hobbist be asked why, he will answer: 'Because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not.' And if one of the old philosophers had been asked, he would have answered: 'Because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue—the highest perfection of human nature—to do otherwise.' " Locke comes nearest to the first two, Shaftesbury to the last.[15]

Shaftesbury in early life was closely bound to Locke. He was at one time under Locke's personal care, and they had been exiles in Holland together from 1686 to 1689. There was a mutual regard. But Shaftesbury had learned from other masters, including the "old philosophers", and in opinions Locke and he drew apart very early. Born February 26, 1671, in the London home of his grandfather, the famous first Earl of Shaftesbury (Dryden's Ahithophel), young Shaftesbury seems

to have been that statesman's special care. By the age of eleven he knew his Greek and Latin, taught to him by an Oxford lady, a schoolmaster's daughter.[16] After a short training at a private school he was sent by his father (the grandfather dying in 1683) to Winchester School for three years, and then to Italy, where he improved himself in the fine arts, then to Holland with Locke. On his return to England in 1689 he applied himself to study. He entered Parliament, as Member for Poole, in 1695. He distinguished himself there by a speech that at once failed and succeeded. When he stood up to speak on behalf of the Bill to allow counsel to men on their trial for treason, hitherto denied that general privilege of Englishmen, he forgot all he had meant to say, and found the value of "Locke's caution to him, not to engage at first setting in an undertaking of difficulty, but to rise to it gradually". Recovering himself, he said: "If I, sir, who rise only to speak my opinion on the Bill now depending, am so confounded that I am unable to express the least of what I proposed, what must the condition of that man be who is pleading for his life without any assistance, and under apprehensions of his being deprived of it?" The House was moved, and passed the Bill[17]—tradition transferred the incident to the better-known Halifax, but Halifax was no imperfect speaker in 1695. He was, besides, well known to Shaftesbury, to whose son he became godfather.

The son relates the story circumstantially, of his father and not of his godfather.[18]

Shaftesbury had little relish for politics, even when his Whig principles were triumphing. He left the House in 1698 and went incognito as "a student in physic" to Holland, where he met Bayle and others.[19] About that time he had finished *An Inquiry concerning Virtue*, presently printed without his consent by Toland, 1699.[20] In that year his father's death made him third Earl of Shaftesbury (hitherto Lord Anthony Ashley), and he was again drawn into politics.[21] But he "preferred tranquillity and a little study and a few friends to all other advantages of life and all the flatteries of ambition and fame",[22] and on Anne's accession (1702) he retired into private life. He was not richly left, but "richly poor" with an encumbered estate; and the life abroad suited his circumstances as well as his inclinations. His marriage in 1709, after a wooing as little emotional as his father's had been in 1669, gave him, not only the desired heir, but an affectionate and beloved consort who helped to prolong his days. He died at Naples, February 4, 1713 (O.S.).[23]

He counted it all joy to have been under Locke, especially for those three years 1686–89; but he comes near to saying that the pupil was worthy of the master.[24]

In a remarkable letter to Stanhope [25] he speaks of Locke as "my old tutor and governor whose

name is established in the world, but with whom I ever concealed my differences as much as possible". Though Locke, he says, did excellent service against the Schoolmen, he would have helped us more "if he had known but ever so little of antiquity", especially its philosophy. Shaftesbury is conscious of being better equipped in this particular. Against the false Aristotle of the Schoolmen he would set the true Aristotle of the Ethics and Politics, to whom man is a social animal, born for society and bound to come of it.[26] He thinks thus to elude Locke's refutation of innate ideas. The question, he says, is not whether the very philosophical propositions about right and wrong were innate, but whether the passion or affection towards society was such—that is to say, whether it was natural and came of itself, or was taught by art, and was the product of a lucky hit of some first man who inspired and delivered down the prejudice. "Connatural" is a better word than Innate. "The question is not about the time the ideas entered, or the moment that one body came out of the other, but whether the constitution of man be such that, being adult and grown up, at such or such a time, sooner or later [no matter when] the idea and sense of order, administration, and a God will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him."[27] In the *Moralists*[28] he is content to distinguish his own view calmly from the theory censured by Locke. In the same tract[29]

he says he would prefer "instincts", or better, "preconceptions" or "presentations" as the name for what is given by Moral Sense and Sense of Beauty—something "which nature teaches exclusive of art, culture, or discipline".

The Greek source of his inspiration is evident even in his earliest works, one of which at least (the *Inquiry*) is written in philosophical form. In a letter [30] he says of the *Moralists*, "that piece and that very subject [moral and political] is the hinge and bottom of all three and of the whole work itself". In another,[31] speaking of the *Characteristics* as we now have them: "The six treaties being parted into three volumes have accordingly a different genius and spirit each of them." The second (containing the *Inquiry concerning Virtue* and the *Moralists*) is "purely moral". The first is not so grave, still less the third, which is "after the comic or satiric way".[32] We are justified in looking to this second volume, with those two tracts, for his plain, unvarnished statement, so far as the writer could ever give such. Smooth, continuous exposition is not his habit. J. M. Robertson [33] speaks of his "gentleman-like discursiveness and want of visible method, in contrast with the businesslike progression of Locke". The judgment seems just. He leaves at times the impression, not only that he is careless of method, but that he has thoughts beyond the reaches of his soul, or at least of his powers of expression. Like Plato's myths, his illustrations do not add

so much to our comprehension as to our pleasure. If apprehension be touch and comprehension be grasp, we may say he often leaves us with a bare apprehension. From time to time he desired to speak to a wider audience than philosophers, and even wished, like Hutcheson, to preach righteousness to all and sundry. The tracts of his first and third volume are made deliberately lighter unto this end. The third volume, his letters tell us,[34] was written in haste, not so the first and second. But the first pieces of the first volume, on *Enthusiasm* and on *Ridicule*, are not in his serious vein, and cannot be used as we can use the two pieces of the second to establish any doctrine of his with precision. The *Inquiry concerning Virtue* or *Merit* in the second volume is perhaps his only perfectly serious writing, well headed *amoto quaeramus seria ludo*. As reprinted in the *Characteristics* it does not substantially differ from Toland's version of it in 1699,[35] and to that year, therefore, we may set down his ripe theory. The dialogue, entitled at first in a letter to Lord Somers (1705) *The Sociable Enthusiast, a Philosophical Adventure*, written to "Palemon", who was Somers himself, became later (1709) *The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody*.[36] When he finally comes to the point there, the point is seen to be the same as in the *Inquiry*. Philosophers had paid little attention; the author turns, therefore, to the laity. To the light and giddy gallants he becomes light and giddy, that he may gain their ear. He was aware that

if you talk with the multitude [37] you may be credited with no thoughts above them, as was the lot of Mandeville after him. He was, perhaps, less fully aware of the drawbacks of wit and humour in a philosophical argument, drawbacks which few but Plato and Pascal have overcome. He intended to be serious in the *Moralists*.[38] He prefixed the motto from Horace, *inter silvas Academi quaerere verum*, and a frontispiece showing the triumph of liberty. Such trappings were a serious matter to him.[39] Even when most solemn he was like our Matthew Arnold, the virtuoso, the high-brow, who lived for the fine arts and the kindred poetry and ethics.

He took his Horace so seriously that he discovered a complete autobiography in Horace's writings, while he thought that Horace (like Shaftesbury himself) often used another man's language to disguise his own thought. So, he thinks, Horace sets himself down first as Republican and Stoic, then as Courtier and Epicurean, finally as repentant Stoic, in spite of the wiles of the Court; [40] but speaking his mind (like Shaftesbury) in fables, and reaching the same conclusion: *oderunt peccare, boni virtutis amore*, and not avoiding the appearance of assumptions really not his own.

There is least disguise in the *Inquiry*. At the outset he separates himself from Cudworth,[41] though in a friendly manner, by making it plain that his main interest is ethical, not theological.

You can have morality, he says, without religion, though it is better to have both. Some men have religion without morality. Shaftesbury has a business in his head "which by nobody else is looked upon as a business, but with me [he says] is instead of all other business and diversion, that of learning to be an honest man and a friend".[42] All his aim is in plain sense to recommend plain honesty, which in the bustle made about religion is fairly dropped. "As in philosophy, so in politics, I am but few removes from mere scepticism, and, though I may hold some principles perhaps tenaciously, they are, however, so very few plain and simple that they serve to little purpose towards the great speculations in fashion with the world. I may sometimes be the more useful guide as a blind man in a fog." Cudworth,[43] on the contrary, was concerned with the great speculations, and his *Intellectual System of the Universe* was *eo nomine* the first "Philosophy of Religion". "The main thing which the book pretends to be in the meantime being the Philosophy of Religion." Professor Muirhead [44] has drawn attention to this passage, and reminds us that the ethical part, "Eternal and Immutable Morality", did not appear till 1731—forty-three years after Cudworth's death in 1688. Dr. Martineau thinks that when it did appear it added little to the system. Shaftesbury had no more than a general good will to the author. Cudworth is found by Professor Muirhead to contain the promise and potency of Kantian

idealism. In Ethics, however, he was so much occupied with the basis that he had little time left for the superstructure.

To Spinoza Shaftesbury confesses no obligation. Spinoza died in 1677, and Shaftesbury could hardly have been in Holland without hearing of his philosophy. Mr. J. M. Robertson [45] thinks the *Inquiry* is too finished a work to have been written by so young a man as Shaftesbury without such assistance as he might have got from Spinoza; and he points out coincidences in the ideas. Precocity in philosophy might seem impossible from the nature of the case; but Hume seems to have composed his *Human Nature*—by some considered his masterpiece—at six-and-twenty.[46] Bentham's *Fragment on Government* was printed in the author's twentieth year, but no doubt is not pure philosophy. Shaftesbury's son speaks of his father as writing a "rough draft" of his book at twenty.[47] A man so fond of confessing obligations to other writers, ancient and modern, would hardly have concealed this one. His debt to Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius, is much greater than to any contemporary, even in the way of reaction. Hobbes seems always in his mind, but in the background of it. Hobbes made ethics subject to politics; Shaftesbury would make it stand on its own feet, quite apart from politics, though not from the relations of man in Society, and in its first steps apart from religion, though not in the latter steps from what

he calls the natural religion [48]—namely, the idea of a cosmos or ordered whole.

So Shaftesbury begins in a way that recalls the exordium of the Ethics: "Every craft and every study seems to be aimed at some End", but is really a way of his own. He says that man as part of a whole bears signs of being made for that as his End, his good or evil being measured by the help or hindrance of the thriving of the whole.[49]

In modern language the unit in Ethics is not the individual; as the American professor says,[50] "the whole is simpler than its parts". Shaftesbury would not altogether assent. We must start with the individual and his affections, good or bad; [51] but we find him made up of relations to the whole, whether to the family, the nearest whole, or to the Cosmos, the farthest off, or seeming so in our first impressions. What is good for the whole is good for him; unless it is good for the whole it is not good for him. That gives us a test of goodness for all living beings; the test for man, the highest of them, will show us his "virtue or merit", the object of our inquiry. Not only does man have natural affections, but (unlike the animals) he reflects on them and pronounces them fair or foul. "The mind, which is spectator or auditor of other minds, cannot be without its eye and ear, so as to discern proportions, distinguish sounds, and scan each sentiment or thought which comes before it. It can let nothing

escape its censure. It feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and the disagreeable in the affections, and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as truly and really here as in any musical numbers, or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things. Nor can it withhold its admiration and ecstasy, its aversion and scorn any more in what relates to one than to the other of these subjects. So that to deny the common and natural sense of a sublime and beautiful in things will appear an affectation merely to anyone who considers duly of this affair." [52] "So that if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate, yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous; for thus and not otherwise he is capable of having a sense of right or wrong, a sentiment or judgment of what is done through just equal and good affection or the contrary." "I am ready [replied I] to own there is in certain figures a natural beauty, which the eye finds as soon as the object is presented to it." "Is there then [said he] a natural beauty of figures? and is there not as natural a one of actions? No sooner the eye opens upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no

sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt) than straight an inward eye distinguishes and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, or the despicable. How is it possible, therefore, not to own that as these distinctions have their foundation in nature, the discernment itself is natural and from nature alone?"

All (he says) allow the standard, though differing in the application of it from ignorance, interest, and passion. Virtue depends on a knowledge of right and wrong; nothing can be virtuous that is destructive of the principle that upholds society and the human species. Whether the teaching to the contrary be religious or not, it can never alter "the eternal measures, the immutable independent nature of worth and virtue". Even "the wickedest creature living" has this Moral Sense.[53] It can be corrupted, and corrupted more by a bad kind of theism than by atheism, for the right theism would suppose a God possessing the virtue constitutive of it; the wrong is a superstition that may teach the contrary, and therefore produce habits unfavourable to virtue. "Whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that He is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true." These virtues are not

due to any arbitrary decree of God Himself. Religion, then, may do great good or harm; atheism nothing positive either way.

Adam Smith had probably read and remembered the passage closely following: "Where the theistical belief is entire and perfect, there must be a steady opinion of the superintendency of a supreme being, a witness and spectator of human life and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the universe, so that, in the perfectest recess or deepest solitude, there must be One still presumed remaining with us whose presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most august assembly on earth. In such a presence, 'tis evident that, as the shame of guilty actions must be the greatest of any, so must the honour be of well-doing even under the unjust censure of a world." [54]

Shaftesbury thought a right ethics would be supported by a right religion, but must not lean on it as a sole support. Religion must not tempt to self-love and a calculation of future gain. The example of a good man does more than rewards and punishments. This is finely expressed in a letter "To a friend", who had told him of Locke's farewell message to Anthony Collins.[55] To Locke life had been "a scene of vanity" for which he hoped amends in a future life. Shaftesbury sets against this what would be his own message in a like case, in spite of troubles and rebuffs and bodily illness,[56] and he comes close to the spirit,

and even the words, of Spinoza.[57] "Our life, thank Heaven, has been a scene of friendship of long duration, with much good and solid satisfaction, founded on the consciousness of doing good for good's sake." "Thank Heaven I can do good and find heaven in it. I know nothing else that is heavenly. And if this disposition fits me not for heaven, I desire never to be fitted for it, nor come into the place. I ask no reward from Heaven for that which is reward itself. Let my being be continued or discontinued as in the main is best. The Author of it best knows, and I trust Him with it. To me it is indifferent, and always shall be so. I have never yet served God or man, but as I loved or liked, having been true to my own and family motto, which is 'Love, serve'." The burden of duty lay as consciously upon Shaftesbury as upon Marcus Aurelius, whose type of Stoicism he followed. In 1694 Shaftesbury writes to Locke that Socrates was unlike the Sophists in uniting philosophy with public service. "It was never known until more late days that to profess philosophy was not to profess a life, and that it might be said of one that he was a great man in philosophy, whilst nobody thought it to the purpose to ask, 'How did he live?'"[58]

Perhaps his consolation for the private man makes light of the evil that may be in the private man, and his consolation for the world makes light of the evil that is in the world. Our standard of goodness may have risen at the expense of our

orthodoxy; it was beginning to rise even in the days of Shaftesbury. To Mandeville the typical virtue was the virtue of the ascetic—a virtue of self-denial, with a view to the perfecting of the private man. In theory Mandeville would have said with Locke, "this life is a scene of vanity", and his famous motto, "private vices, public benefits", might be read as an antithesis to "private virtues, public benefits", readily manufactured out of Shaftesbury's *Inquiry*, "Virtue has no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment".[59]

That "virtue causes happiness and vice misery" is a persuasion that gives "that security and assistance to virtue which is required". We may hold Shaftesbury to be substantially in the right, and yet hold that his optimism, which afterwards infected Bolingbroke and Pope, made the riddle of the world too easy. As a Stoic, Shaftesbury had the courage of his opinions; not only would he have us try to bring "the whole world under one community",[60] but he thinks that community already there as a finished work, and all's right with the world. If there is no order in the great world, we should find it hard to believe in it for the little world of man. Leibnitz,[61] taking stand on his own metaphysics, monadology, and *theodicée*, concurs. They were aware of each other's work. It is significant that tracts on the origin of Evil became common about this time, as if it were felt that there were still problems left, settled by neither philosopher.

The *Inquiry* gives less prominence to these high topics than the *Moralists*,[62] and we get in the main the mere human ethics from the former. There seems little doubt that Shaftesbury was sincere in describing the volume of the *Characteristics* containing these two papers as the serious statement of his views by which he should be seriously judged.

The *Inquiry* has told us "what virtue is and to what character it belongs. It remains to inquire what obligation there is to virtue or what reason to embrace it."[63]

There would seem to be every reason, he says, if public interest and private are one. To show that they are one our author[64] sets Aristotle against Hobbes. Hobbes found them necessarily at variance; but Shaftesbury finds that they must support each other, and of necessity be balanced or in harmony, if man is to have his highest happiness.[65] The degree of passion is not to be raised indefinitely high; it is to be tempered to the middle point. Even "public affection" might be overstrained if private good, e.g. self-preservation, were sacrificed to it. Religion may be overstrained and become superstition. Even the lower animals have a balance of this sort which preserves their species; indeed, they keep it better than we do. Both in them and in man action and character depend on passions or "affections", by the balance of which both are governed.

Shaftesbury thinks to prove:

I. That to have the natural kindly or generous affections strongly and powerfully directed to the good of the public is the chief means of self-enjoyment, and to lack them is certain misery and ill.

II. That to have the private affections too strong, to have them beyond their right degree of subordination to the kindly and natural, is also misery.

III. And that to have unnatural affections, such as tend to the interest neither of the public nor of the private person himself, is to have the highest degree of misery.[66]

The pleasures of the mind are "greater" than those of the body; they are "superior" to the bodily, both in themselves and in their effects. He says this is "allowed by most people", and would be allowed by all if their experience were "thorough". Without mentioning Plato he accepts Plato's proof of this conclusion; the good man has tried both kinds. "But to be able to judge of both it is necessary to have a sense of each."

Assuming this difference in quality, he goes on to infer:[67] "That whatever can create in any intelligent being a constant flowing series or train of mental enjoyments, or pleasures of the mind, is more considerable to his happiness than that which can create to him a like constant course or train of sensual enjoyments or pleasures

of the body." By mental pleasures he understands practically all except the gross and sensual, not only the delights of letters, but all the pleasures of society, including those of friendship, love, conversation. Reflection on these delights increases the delightfulness of them, more especially when their effects have been the esteem and approbation of others. A good action has in this way even more delightful results than the solution of a problem, and the pleasures of sympathy "are so widely diffused through our whole lives that there is hardly such a thing as satisfaction or contentment, of which they make not an essential part". There is something of the kind [68] even in the band of robbers towards one another, and something of it even in unchaste love. *Homo homini lupus* means that man is to man as the wolf is to a sheep, not to another wolf. From community or sharing in the pleasures of others, and belief of meriting well from others, arise "more than nine-tenths of our life's enjoyment". So far as such enjoyment is imperfect or partial, having no regard to the larger whole, it is, without merit or worth, lacking "integrity of mind" (an integer being a whole), complete and disinterested devotion. "To have this entire affection and integrity of mind is to live according to nature and the dictates of supreme wisdom.[69] This is morality, justice, piety, and natural religion."

Here we have the language of the Stoic

philosophy, and it is suggested that our obligation to follow virtue is really due to our membership in the large society, the world, of which we are citizens.[70] He will try, he says, to put the case in homelier language,[71] telling of the part taken by reflection and reason in forming human affections and producing their effects. When a man reflects on an unjust action, and apprehends the evil of it, we have the phenomenon of Conscience, "the natural sense of the odiousness of crime or injustice". When he reflects on an act that is merely foolish or contrary to his own interest, the feeling is not the same, though the act may have been so hurtful that it brings a "sense of ill merit". He seems to suggest that (what would have been in later writers) the "sanction" is the agony of having committed the crime. To be without this agony a man must be without "sense of moral worth or goodness", or must have a depraved conscience, "a false conscience, or wrong sense of honour", in place of the true. Without natural affection a man loses "that sense and feeling which is proper to him as a man and suitable to his character and genius". Injuring others he ruins himself. What impairs one part of the "united structure and fabric of the mind" tends to impair the whole. This is Platonic doctrine; it is also traced by Mr. J. M. Robertson in the Book of Proverbs: [72] "The merciful man doeth good to his own soul, but he that is cruel troubleth

his own flesh." There is much common ground between the best moralists of all epochs.

He is confident that he has proved his points. "We have cast up all those particulars from whence (as by way of addition and subtraction) the main sum or general account of happiness is either augmented or diminished. And if there be no article excepted in this scheme of Moral Arithmetic,[73] the subject treated may be said to have an evidence as great as that which is found in numbers or mathematics. For let us carry scepticism ever so far, let us doubt, if we can, of everything about us, we cannot doubt of what passes within ourselves. Our passions and affections are known to us." To have affection towards the good of our species is as natural as for the stomach to digest. Even if life be all a dream, in this dream of life our demonstrations have the same force; our balance and economy hold good, and our obligation to virtue is in every respect the same. The "obligation", as Dr. Martineau remarks,[74] appears to be simply the balance of personal happiness in our favour. Here Shaftesbury, like the philosophers of his time, parted from Plato, whose Guardians, at least, were not to care whether they were happy or not.[75] Few will share his confidence that his description was exhaustive. If it were so, it would include the "why" in stating the "how". He may have explained (he has at least described) the attractiveness of virtue, scarcely the element

of obligation. His "moral sense" strikes in, either as something beyond scrutiny or, as he himself seemed to suggest, something of which the historical genesis needs to be indicated more fully. The analogy, he tells us, is not to a man's bodily sense, but to an animal's instincts.[76] The "moral sense" is not an innate idea, but a "preconception". When we reach a certain stage in society we find ourselves inevitably possessed of this new instinct. Locke's criticism has been only evaded in appearance; the "preconception", when it arrives, is supposed to be intuitive, though its arrival may be centuries in coming.

Edward Caird used to blame the holders of the theory for attributing to sense "a critical function", discerning good and evil. Wilson and Fowler [77] will have it that the moral sense is supposed by Shaftesbury to be confined to this judgment or discernment, the standard—namely, the tendency to promote public good—being a principle otherwise reached. This would mean that the Moral Sense is the guide in practice to right conduct, not to the general principles of all right conduct.

Shaftesbury, at least, whatever be true of Hutcheson, does not always make this matter plain. The "preconceptions" include "the idea or sense of order and proportion", than which "nothing is more strongly imprinted on our minds or more closely interwoven with our souls".[78] As the beasts have a "presentation"

we have a "preconception"; we have not their instincts, but we have better. This seems to suggest that Shaftesbury thought of the "preconceptions" as not only a guide for particular actions, but a fount of principles, like the idea of Order.

To compare this moral sense with the "daemon" of Socrates helps us little, for Socrates tells us this voice told him only what not to do, and ordinary men need positive guidance.

If we take Shaftesbury as holding the narrower view and set down the moral principle of the widest good, for example, as a reflection for reason merely, the Moral Sense would still seem to be necessary, in Shaftesbury's scheme, for the ratification of that principle. This ratification would surely be needed before decision was made that this or that action carried out that principle, and was therefore morally the right one in the particular cases.

Whatever was his mind on this point, he does not think of Reason itself as capable of doing the work of a moral sense, which therefore remains an intuition. He makes no scrutiny into reason itself, and has no theory of knowledge involving an element contributed by the reason itself—*intellectus ipse*. The "sense" of beauty and harmony, contributing such an element, might seem what others have called an intellectual virtue, not always present in man. He makes light of its occasional absence. To him goodness and beauty, art and ethics are near akin; and he finds that

we have an aesthetic sense as well as a Moral Sense, not derived from experience, but from "nature".[79] He is content to leave the passions to direct our action without making any full study of Will, or of a possible rationality of the passions. Like Aristotle, he believes that in his own society the passions, when controlled in due measure, produce virtues, virtues appropriate to the society, and lending support to what is best in the individual, the family, and the State—adding with the Stoics that they are in unison also with the Cosmos.

He is guided by Plato, Aristotle, and Marcus Aurelius. As the two Greeks had found their ethics in Greek society, Shaftesbury found his in the society of his own time and surroundings. His moral intuitions are the prevailing ideas of his time, raised by him into an ideal for men like himself. Mandeville says bluntly that he made it for the upper classes, men of leisure and high culture. There is a grain or two of truth in this charge. But whether the class in view be low or high, Shaftesbury's ethics make too little [80] of the struggle between good and evil in the ordinary member of it. Aristotle knew better how hard it was to be good, and how the struggle might often end in partial repulse, sometimes in total failure, as well as sometimes in victory. Shaftesbury seems to think that the choice of Hercules [81] occurs in the history of every man. He seems to assume the invincibility of goodness as others

the invincibility of truth. He had not himself lived much among bad men, either content to be one of them or, like Hutcheson, anxious that they should turn from their wickedness. Yet the passage above quoted in regard to the guilty conscience must weigh on the other side. He certainly had the idea of Good in a sense beyond animal pleasure. He had even the idea of progress; it is involved in his remarks on Locke and Innate Ideas, when he says that "sooner or later" the ideas will spring up.[82] A man must not do what will prevent him or his from becoming better; for all such ideas as this there seems no origin in the data of the senses, and yet such ideas come to us. The conclusion seems unavoidable that they come from within. Shaftesbury recognized this by making them come from a "sense". Not being able to trace any creative action of reason, all he found left to him was an instinct of nature.[83] Nature, however, is not our solution, but our problem. To explain by an unexplainable instinct of nature is to invite criticism; and it duly came, after an interval.

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3. H. Baynes, two volumes, 1895.

4. *Hegel*, in Philosophical Classics, 1883, p. 140.

5. William MacDougall, F.R.S., *Janus and the Conquest of War*, 1926, p. 89.

6. *Le Malade Imaginaire*, 1674. Argan's degree examination in Intermède III, end of Act III:

Opium facit dormire . . .
Quia est in eo
Virtus dormitiva,
Cujus est natura
Sensus assoupire.

7. *Human Understanding*, Bk. I, chap. ii, par. 2, p. 9 of edition 1824.

8. *Ibid.*, par. 5, p. 10, and Aristotle, *Ethics*, ii, 1: *οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν.*

9. Title of § 4, p. 23, in *Human Understanding.*

10. *Human Understanding*, IV. ii, par. 1, p. 392. Cf. T. H. Green's Introduction to Hume's *Human Nature*, Bk. III, p. 30, note.

11. *Ibid.*, III. ii, par. 2, p. 398. Cf. IV. xvii, par. 14, p. 522.

12. *Ibid.*, II. xxi, pars. 41, 42, p. 166.

13. *Ibid.*, II. xxviii, par. 5, p. 251.

14. *Ibid.*, I. iii, par. 5, pp. 23, 24.

15. Warburton, in his Dedication to Freethinkers in the *Divine Legation*, 1737, compares Locke, here, with his pupil to the disadvantage of the latter (p. xxviii; cf. pp. xiv, xix, xxvi).

16. See p. xix of the Biography by his son given in Dr. Benjamin Rand's *Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury* (Sonnenschein, 1900), pp. xviii–xxxi.

17. Rand, p. xxi. Macaulay, *History*, vol. iv, chap. xxi, pp. 127–8, of popular edition, 1866. Robertson (J. M.), *Pioneer Humanists* (Watts, 1907), p. 183. "Locke's caution", Rand, p. xxi.

18. Rand, p. xxi. Cf. p 428, letter to Halifax; p. 450, letter to Micklethwayt.

19. Rand, p. xxii.

20. Robertson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 206, 207. Rand, pp. xxiii and 405.

21. Rand, p. xxiv.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 393, date 1708. "Richly poor", Rand, pp. xxiv–xxv, 312, 315, 471, 472.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. xx, xxix, 332, 405, 535, and especially pp. 517, 518, 521. Fewer references would have served if Dr. Rand had provided an index.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 288, letter to Locke, March 3, 1692, on the writer's coming of age.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 413 *seq.*, November 17, 1709.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 414–15. Cf. to Ainsworth (pp. 403–5) with Robertson's correction of "denyer" for "danger". Read also "deos" for "deus", and "fecit" for "fect" (p. 404).

27. *Ibid.*, p. 403 ("connatural").

28. "In the *Moralists*", *Characteristics*, ii. 411. Cf. p, 307.

29. "In the same tract", *ibid.* and p. 412.

30. To Micklethwayte. 1711, Rand, p. 449.

31. To the same, *ibid.*, pp. 456, 457.

32. "The comic or satiric way," *ibid.*, p. 457.

33. *Pioneer Humanists*, p. 194.

34. "His letters." See Rand, pp. 437, 458.

35. *Pioneer Humanists*, pp. 206–7.

36. Rand, p. 336, note.

37. "With the multitude." Compare Berkeley, *Alciphron*, Dial. I. 32 of fourth edition, 1767. The first was in 1732.

38. *Characteristics*, vol. ii.

39. Rand, pp. 455 *seq.*, 468, 484, 496.

40. On Horace, to Pierre Coste, in Rand, pp. 355–6, date 1706. Cf., for the neglect of appearances, pp. 361, 365.

41. Cudworth. Cf. Rand, pp. 287, 328, especially p. 354, date 1705. For the main interest, *Characteristics*, ii. Inquiry, 6. Cf. pp. 57, 58.

42. To Locke, September 8, 1694, Rand, p. 296. Cf. *Life of Locke*, by King, quarto 1829, p. 186. Cf. to Somers, Rand,

p. 400, date 1709. ("All his aim", etc.) and to the same (as Teiresias), 1706, Rand, p. 367. Cf. also *Characteristics*, i. 292. "Super-speculative philosophy", "blind man in a fog".

43. *Intellectual System of the Universe*, published 1678, with imprimatur of 1671. "Philosophy of Religion" in Preface to the Reader, fourth page from end in first edition.

44. Professor J. H. Muirhead in *Mind*, April 1927, p. 161. Cf. p. 166. Dr. James Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. 403.

45. *Pioneer Humanists*, p. 207.

46. Hume's *Life*, by Hill Burton, 1846, i. 98.

47. Rand, p. xxiii.

48. *Characteristics*, ii. Inquiry, 7. Cf. pp. 9, 10.

49. Man made for the Whole. *Characteristics*, ii. Inquiry, 15. Cf. ii. Moralists, 291.

50. "Whole simpler than parts", quoted by Professor Irving Fisher in *J. B. Clark Economic Essays*, 1928, p. 159. It seems to reverse the Greek idea. That is hardly the intention of Shaftesbury.

51. "Start with the individual", *Characteristics*, ii. 22, top. "Virtue" our subject, *ibid.*, 28.

52. *Characteristics*, ii. 29 *seq.* Cf. Moralists, 414, 415, 416.

53. *Characteristics*, ii. 42. Cf. pp. 35, 36. Religion and atheism, pp. 49 *seq.* Cf. pp. 58, 59, 64.

54. *Contra mundum*, *ibid.*, p. 57.

55. Collins. See Rand, pp. 344–348. Letter dated from St. Giles, December 2, 1704.

56. Illness, etc., e.g. Rand, p. 318, date 1703: "Forced to retire hither into this country [Holland] to an air which was never found good except by very bad lungs."

57. Spinoza, *Ethics* (published 1677), Part V, Propos. xlii. On happiness and virtue: "Beatitudo non est virtutis praemium sed ipsa virtus; nec eâdem gaudemus quia libidines coercemus, sed contra quia eâdem gaudemus ideo libidines coercere possumus."

58. In Locke's *Life*, p. 188, letter of September 29, 1694, from St. Giles.

59. "True interest", etc., *Characteristics*, ii. 67.

60. "The whole world one community", Rand, p. 417. Cf. *Characteristics*, ii. Moralists, 287, i. Inquiry, 70.

61. Leibnitz. See J. M. Robertson's *Pioneer Humanists*, pp. 206, 207; Rand, p. 504.

62. "According to your high moral sense, friendship should be cosmopolitan", *Characteristics*, ii. Moralists, 240. Cf. note 24 *supra*.

63. *Characteristics*, ii. 77.

64. Hobbes pointed at by the reference to i. 90 in ii. 80.

65. The tempering and the balance. See Aristotle, *Ethics*, i. 7, compared with Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, ii. 88, 89, 94, 96, also 22, 86.

66. The list, *Characteristics*, ii. 98. Unnatural affections, pp. 163 *seq.* Pleasures of the mind, etc., *ibid.*, pp. 99–101, 103. Moralists, 226–7. Plato, *Republic*, ix. 582.

67. *Characteristics*, ii. 101–107, 109. *Homo homini lupus*, *Characteristics*, ii. Moralists, 320.

68. As Plato says, *Republic*, i. 352, 353.

69. "According to Nature", etc., ii. 110–114. Rand, p. 219: (Philosophical Regimen) natural concepts, προλήψεις, anticipations. Cf. note 76 *infra*.

70. Dr. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. 470, is generous to Shaftesbury here.

71. "Homelier language", *Characteristics*, ii. 114 *seq.* Conscience, *ibid.*, pp. 119, 120, 121, 125. Honour, p. 124. Remorse, *ibid.*, pp. 122, 128. Cf. pp. 124, 136. Impairing of the whole, p. 174. Cf. p. 134.

72. Proverbs, xi. 17. *Pioneer Humanists*, p. 208.

73. Moral Arithmetic, etc., *Characteristics*, ii. 78, 91, 173.

74. *Types*, ii. 468, 469.

75. Plato, *Republic*, iv, beginning.

76. *Characteristics*, ii. Moralists, 411.

77. *Principles of Morals* (Clarendon Press, 1886), p. 40.

78. *Characteristics*, ii. Moralists, 284, 307, 412.

79. "Aesthetic sense", *Characteristics*, ii. Moralists, 405, 412, 422, 425. "Had Mr. Locke been a virtuoso he would not have philosophized thus", Rand, p. 219. *Contra*, William Law, *Serious Call*, 1729, chap. vii, p. 93 (of edition 1802): "This man would perhaps be devout if he was not so great a vertuoso." (Both spellings occur.) For the Clubs of *virtuosi* in the seventeenth century, see Masson's *Milton*, vi. 391, 394. Petty belonged to them.

80. *Pioneer Humanists*, p. 222.

81. Judgment of Hercules, *Characteristics*, iii. 345 *seq.* It is the subject of a separate essay and illustrations.

82. Rand, p. 403.

83. Instinct of nature. *Characteristics*, ii. Moralists, 307, 412. Cf. Fowler's *Shaftesbury and Hutcheson*, 1882, p. 40. The longer and better half of this book is devoted to Shaftesbury. The bibliography is helpful, in both halves.

CHAPTER II

CRITICS OF SHAFTESBURY

THERE were few contemporary criticisms of Shaftesbury's book in his own country, but there were two very famous attacks on his system soon after his death. Mandeville dealt with his ethics directly and explicitly. The *Search into the Nature of Society*, added to the *Fable of the Bees*,[1] begins thus: "The generality of Moralists and philosophers have hitherto agreed that there could be no virtue without self-denial; but a late author, who is now much read by men of sense, is of a contrary opinion, and imagines that men without any trouble or violence upon themselves may be naturally virtuous. He seems to require and expects goodness in his species as we do a sweet taste in grapes and china oranges, of which if any of them are sour we boldly pronounce that they are not come to that perfection their nature is capable of. This noble writer (for it is the Lord Shaftesbury I mean in his *Characteristics*) fancies that, as man is made for society, so he ought to be born with a kind affection to the whole, of which he is a part, and a propensity to seek the welfare of it. In pursuance of this supposition he calls every action performed with regard to the public good virtuous, and all selfishness, wholly excluding such a regard, vice. In respect to our species he looks upon virtue and vice as permanent

realities that must ever be the same in all countries and all ages, and imagines that a man of sound understanding, by following the rules of good sense, may not only find out that *pulchrum et honestum* both in morality and the works of art and nature, but likewise govern himself by his reason with as much ease and readiness as a good rider manages a well-taught horse by the bridle." Our daily experience, on the contrary, shows that it is not the good qualities of man "that make him beyond other animals a sociable creature", and that it is impossible "to raise any multitudes into a populous, rich, and flourishing nation", and keep them so without evil both natural and moral, and that there is no *pulchrum et honestum* either in morals or in art about which there has been at all times and in all places agreement. Even our art depends on a "happy deceit", for we do not really perceive distance, but infer it by the guesses of experience.[2] Shaftesbury was wrong in distinguishing high and low pleasures:[3] "We ought to dispute no more about men's pleasures than their tastes." Shaftesbury has neglected the poor, the low, and the lawless; but we cannot know human nature by a study confined to the leisured classes.

Yet Mandeville himself writes: "I don't expect the approbation of the multitude. I write not to many, nor seek for any well-wishers but among the few that can think abstractly, and have their minds elevated above the vulgar."

Mandeville has a system of his own, perhaps as vulnerable as that of Shaftesbury. Mr. Robertson has done justice to it in a chapter of the *Humanists* with which (in the language of Gibbon) he has reason to be "least dissatisfied"; and Mandeville is shown to have merits above his reputation. Here we are not so much concerned about the whole system as about one feature of it. What does Mandeville say about the notion of a Moral Sense? He does not reflect on it *eo nomine*, but in the passage above quoted he picks out, as if Shaftesbury's, expressions involving it: "naturally virtuous", goodness discerned as a "sweet taste in grapes", "permanent realities". Mandeville is probably right in declining to make something new out of the word "sense" in the phrase "moral sense". But Mandeville's paraphrase, "man of understanding", "following the rules of good sense", "governing himself by his reason" as a horse by his bridle, suggests the instinct improved by practice, but beginning as an instinct. The new phrase Moral Sense, however, if not in Shaftesbury's own pages, yet with later writers, suggested a new interpretation of moral perceptions. How much and how little of these could be counted intuitive might be debated. Mandeville's hint that there was an analogy with the "New Theory of Vision" might be expanded to show a fairly close resemblance. The perception of distance by the eye seems intuitive; Berkeley convinced the scientific world

that it was otherwise,[4] the supposed intuition being formed gradually by observation and reasoning. The parallel ceases here; the optical results are uniform perceptions acquired by all normal men without difference or dispute, whereas the perceptions of ethical distances are admittedly not identical beyond dispute. Here, however, we are going beyond Berkeley himself.

A large part of Berkeley's *Alciphron* is devoted to Shaftesbury. It bears the title: *Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, in seven dialogues, containing an Apology for the Christian Religion against those who are called Free Thinkers*", whom he describes [5] as "the very same with those called by Cicero Minute Philosophers (*minuti philosophi*) which diminish all the most valuable things"—in life, men's thoughts, views, and hopes, reducing all knowledge to sense, conduct to the level of the lower animals, life itself to the term of bodily existence. Shaftesbury classed himself among Free Writers,[6] but if he was therefore to be one of Berkeley's minute philosophers or subtle sceptics it might be hard to say who was the true believer. The positions attacked by Berkeley are not always the most vulnerable; he resents, for example, the idea that ethics at any stage of it could be studied apart from religion, religion involving theology.

In Berkeley's "Advertisement" or general Preface he does not expressly brand Shaftesbury with the ill name. He speaks of "the apprehension

of a certain admired writer that the cause of virtue is likely to suffer less from its witty antagonists than from its tender nurses", who might kill it with much cherishing, and who "make it a mercenary thing by talking so much of its rewards". Reference is duly given to the *Characteristics*.[7] Berkeley was thinking first of Shaftesbury's paradox [8] that Ridicule is the test of truth. This may be deemed a vulnerable position; the case against mercenary religion is not so easily refuted. Berkeley's grave handling of Shaftesbury's pleasantries, "first thoughts are better than second in morals", "this man for my money", show that if the critic had every other virtue under heaven he had not the saving intellectual virtue of light-hearted humour, or the power to endure it in an opponent.

Berkeley admits that all the Minute Philosophers are not equally open to his charges; Shaftesbury is not as Mandeville.[9] But he exaggerates when he describes Mandeville's ideas as if they were anarchy in morals, and no less when he interprets Shaftesbury's separation of ethics from theology as if it meant that the best qualified moral philosopher was an unbeliever in religion. When we allow with Berkeley himself that the perception of distance is an acquired perception, we are not denying that it is a perception at all. Berkeley in the *Alciphron* takes much less pains than in the *New Theory of Vision* to state the opponent's case at its best, and make concessions

to him when facts demand it, as if pleased to be on common ground.

But the description of Shaftesbury's positions, put into the mouth of the chief "freethinker" (Alciphron himself), is not unfair. "There is an idea of beauty natural to the mind of man. This all men desire, this they are pleased and delighted with for its own sake purely from an instinct of nature. "It strikes at first sight, and attracts without a reason",[10] and so it is with moral excellence. There is a natural taste drawing men to it and to society with their fellows apart from all self-interest. "It is an object, not of the discursive faculty, but of a peculiar sense which is called the Moral Sense, being adapted to the perception of moral beauty as the eye to colours or the ears to sounds."

To this Euphranor answers that inward feeling is an uncertain guide in morals, leading men different ways by passion, while they would be more surely led by reason and judgment, balancing low and high pleasures and present and future losses, to find that "in all lights" virtue is man's true interest. "For the knowledge of myself or the faculties or powers of my own mind I should have looked at home. And there I might have looked long enough without finding this new talent, which even now, after being tutored by you, I cannot comprehend." [11] Let us rather begin with the concrete objects of sense, and "by the help of these sensible things as a scale

or ladder ascend to moral and intellectual beauty". Beauty is made up of true proportions, which are judged, not directly by the senses, but by the reason through the means of them. Beauty, therefore, is an object of the mind, not of the eye, and has constant reference to the uses and purposes of the beautiful things. In the same way moral beauty must depend on the ends and designs shown in the government of the world, the noblest end being the happiness and well-being of the whole.

This is not far from the manner and the thought of Shaftesbury himself. Berkeley admits the stoical element in Shaftesbury, but thinks it is put in too eclectically, the writer taking certain tenets which suited him and rejecting others, which were not to his mind.[12] Shaftesbury (he thinks) does not see that it is as impossible for ordinary men to make the Good of the Whole their chief end without regard to rewards and punishments hereafter as it is to have an ordered society here below without police. "The generality of mankind obey rather force than reason, and are influenced rather by penalties than the beauty of virtue." These are the words of Aristotle himself.[13]

The general stoical doctrine is described with praise by Berkeley, as by Shaftesbury; pleasures are distinguished as high and low, and this distinction, which had been Plato's, was also Shaftesbury's. When Berkeley ridicules the Soliloquy or Advice to an Author for its idea of a double

personality in each of us, it is the critic who is vulnerable.[14]

A calmer criticism would be that in the case of moral conflicts we do not need to personify the passion in order to make the conflict real; we are simply finding out that there is something in us greater than our passions, and we must distinguish *that* from *them*. In Plato, too (*Republic* and *Phaedrus*, for example), we have anger, appetite, and reason expostulating with each other. But when we appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober we are still left asking ourselves, How did the sober Philip get his judgment? Was it not from a current ideal of justice and morality into which he and his subjects had been bred, though few would claim to have lived up to it? The prudent man of Aristotle did probably no otherwise than the prudent man of to-day—namely, express the highest morals of his highest civilized society. All things are opinion, *πάντα ὑπόληψις*, is a saying of Aurelius that figures in this particular essay, the Soliloquy. Whether the "opinion" is wayward or not would depend on our conception of civilization, whether its development had been wayward or not. Shaftesbury, if he fully followed Aurelius, was bound to believe it was anything but wayward. This does not mean that he must believe all men are wise, but that the whole of humanity may be far wiser than any individual parts of it, and the wisdom lay there to be discovered by the wise among the individuals, and

that there is a movement forward. Among beasts there seems to be no movement forward resulting from an endeavour after a common higher good, though there may be from the extinction of the feeblest in the struggle for existence.

Such comments concern both Shaftesbury and his critic, Berkeley, who had some important views in common. Butler is not in the same sense a critic at all; but, though Shaftesbury and he agree more than they differ, they are not master and disciple.

Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham, 1750, was born 1692 and died 1752. He gave his *Sermons* in the Rolls Chapel in 1725, seven years before Berkeley's *Alciphron*, and published his *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* in 1736. His partiality to Shaftesbury appears often in hidden references, the discovery of which clears up his text; and there is more than a general agreement between them. He is in general agreement when he treats ethics as provisionally independent of theology, founded on the study of human nature, its passions and affections, studied by introspection in the way now called psychological. Samuel Clarke, a contemporary, had begun "from inquiry into the abstract relations of things".[15] Butler begins his Ethics with the constitution and course of human life, as he begins his *Analogy* with the constitution and course of nature.

He is in general agreement with Shaftesbury's

view of man's relation to the larger world, and to the "life according to nature" of the Stoics. He is in particular agreement concerning the Moral Sense: "Call it conscience, moral reason, or divine reason, whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or as a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both." The terms are not Shaftesbury's, but the idea is the same. He proceeds to say that this faculty "upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, determines itself to be the guide of action and of life in contradistinction from all other faculties or natural principles of action, in the very same manner as speculative reason *directly* and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood; and at the same time is attended with a consciousness *upon reflection* that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it".[16]

The last position, usually regarded as Butler's distinctive doctrine, amounts to the claim of a double power for the moral sense. There is conjoined with moral intuition a moral reflection, giving (what is absent in Shaftesbury) a moral imperative.[17] Butler finds Shaftesbury's deliverances of the moral sense too nearly on the same level one with another, and Shaftesbury's description of conscience does not include this feature of imperativeness; he does not (it is hinted) observe that, if it were only a question of all having some influence or other, the lowest

passions have that. Very different is Butler's notion. "You cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, superintendency, direction"; "to preside and govern, from the very constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." This last phrase, perhaps the most famous in Butler, has more energy than clearness till we follow Gladstone's reference to Butler's ideal government of the world described in the *Analogy*.[18] The words of the *Sermon* and of the *Analogy* imply that there is no such government realized now. We part from the optimism of Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and Pope. It is pathetic to read [19] that rational animals do not always prevail over irrational, and even "good men over the face of the earth cannot unite, as for other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each other's characters".

It would seem that the moral imperative has the right, but not the strength; it can be defied or evaded in this life. The imperative is, of course, not on any theory a military word of command the same for all; nor a Table of Commandments to be obeyed in the *ipsissima verba*. The Moral Sense has, in Edward Caird's words, "a critical function"; it is a living power, adapting itself to circumstances, a display of life in action with all the diversity of individuality therein implied. Union of all men in an ideal

moral commonwealth does not seem to flow of itself from such a moral sense conceived as prevailing universally. We might as easily suppose the moral sense to be generated by (instead of generating) a moral government or ideal commonwealth, conceived as successfully established. Butler allows that no more than beginnings of the conversion of the world to such a moral government are to be seen; but he thinks there are enough to show the possibility, and he looks forward (hesitatingly) to the eventual establishment of it. He thinks that there is "a tendency" towards it from the very nature of virtue within the individual man. For the foundation of our own morals as individuals we do not need to wait for such a far off divine event. Like the Gentiles of his text [20] we have the law within us, and can do "by nature" the things contained in the law. Every normal man acknowledges the supremacy of conscience; and the power exerted by conscience is different in kind from the power exerted (for it is exerted) by evil. The power of conscience is towards construction; evil is destructive and builds nothing. "We are so made that well-doing gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances; ill-doing, as such, in none"—"there is no such thing as the approbation of vice". In a passage dealing expressly with Shaftesbury, and his concession that one case (of invincible atheism)[21] is "without remedy", Butler says confidently: "Though a man should

doubt of everything else, yet he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue, an obligation implied in the very idea of virtue, in the very idea of reflex approbation."

This reminds us of the proof of Deity from the inclusion of existence in the *ens realissimum*; it seems to bring Butler nearer to Samuel Clarke. The rigour of the obligation is not tempered or made more palatable (as it is in Shaftesbury) by the idea that benevolence is the main, if not the only, feature of the divine government of the world. If it were the only feature (says Butler) the hand of justice would be stayed; there would be no punishment of evil,[22] whereas a righteous judge would reward the righteous and punish the wicked. "Benevolence and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one's own character or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to everything but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting." This may conceivably be a reference to Shaftesbury's not too serious description of Christianity (compared with Judaism) as a good-humoured religion, or to the charge made in the days of Julian against a particular version, or perversion, of Christian doctrine, which made repentance too easy a refuge for a wicked man.[23]

Shaftesbury, even when most serious (in the *Moralists* and the *Inquiry*), was not precise in his use of terms. Butler rightly lays it down that in morals we are dealing with acts or actions,[24] not with the affections or passions except in relation to the acts or actions. Butler sees that self-love, which he allows may side with conscience, is not (as we might hastily gather from Shaftesbury) simply the satisfaction of the particular desires, but it is a general regard for welfare. The appetites themselves are not first of all for pleasure,[25] but for an object craved, and only incidentally afterwards for the pleasure felt in the satisfaction of the craving. Butler himself is not substantially clearer in regard to the relation of self-love and conscience. He seems to be doubtful how far the "reflection", which he makes alternative to conscience, will carry him, and how far self-love owes its "superior nature" to a good principle at all. He is on firmer ground when he tells us that in the lower animals there seems to be no moral conflict just because there seems to be no reflection.[26] "The generality of men obey these instincts in the mass, both the bad and the good." "Brutes the like; but their nature has no discords." Brutes follow their strongest desire quite naturally.

Wilson and Fowler speak of Butler's conscience as that of the untutored, unreflecting man. He may be untutored, but hardly, so long as he is a man, unreflecting. The conscience in him proceeds "on a survey". Gladstone thinks the

"conscience, exercised habitually, tends to act instinctively, and without recognition of any reflective operation". But this habitual exercise would mean that the intuition was not instinctive, but acquired. As Burke says in his book on *The Sublime and Beautiful*, the fact that we read with ease is no proof that reading is a separate faculty. The dominant view of Butler seems to be that which lays more stress on the instinctive intuition "intervening magisterially". He stands by the "moral sense" rather than by the reflection that would give it away. In the famous sermon on Balaam, he repeats and applies Shaftesbury's dictum that first thoughts are the best in morals; the second thoughts (he says) are an endeavour to explain away the sin. "In all common ordinary cases we see intuitively at first view what is our duty, what is the honest part; this is the ground of the observation that the first thought is the best." [27]

If we were really guided by a Moral Sense, we should say with Shaftesbury that we act "from our nature, in a manner necessarily and without reflection". Butler's alternative (conscience or reflection) seems to preclude this course; and this impression of it is strengthened by the famous Sermon on Resentment, where Shaftesbury, who was, indeed, in this case inconsistent with his own general position, is expounded and expanded. To Butler resentment is, in modern language, the pathological foundation of justice. Controlled, it is a virtue; when indulged beyond the Aristotelic

mean, it is a vice. In both cases (as Butler remarks) it seems opposed to the benevolence characteristic of virtue. Butler is trying to find out, quite in the modern spirit, what is the rational element in the passion of resentment; for we may so interpret his question, to what end this passion was given to us. He implies that in this case second thoughts are the better, for "settled anger" is raised by "our reason and understanding which represent to our mind injustice or injury", as if the hasty kind (though he does not entirely condemn it) is likely to go too far. "Settled anger is properly a resentment against injury and wickedness"; "it is one of the common bonds by which society is held together"; it goes out against an intended injury, and is therefore a moral feeling, the suppression of which would hinder justice.

Shaftesbury had been before Butler. In the *Moralists* he had written, on the same subject, that no one would seek to be revenged on a stone or a madman. "Therefore there is a just and unjust, and belonging to it a natural presumption or anticipation on which the resentment or anger is founded. For what else should make the wickedest of mankind often prefer the interest of their revenge to all other interests, and even to life itself, except only a sense of wrong natural to all men, and a desire to prosecute that wrong at any rate? Not for their own sakes, since they sacrifice their very being to it, but out of hatred to the imagined wrong and from a certain love

of justice which even in unjust men is by this example shown to be beyond the love of life itself."

Butler has worked out the idea more fully, but Shaftesbury keeps more closely to the Moral Sense. Butler shows that the Moral Sense or intuition gives us what is a pardonable, perhaps praiseworthy, impulse, which becomes a virtue when tamed by reason. In his own curious phrase it becomes a "sentiment of the understanding"; and there seems little of the intuitional element left in it.

It is not surprising that Francis Hutcheson, who built up the most elaborate doctrine of a Moral Sense, should have owed more to Shaftesbury than to Butler. In those days when contemporaries were rarely mentioned by name, Hutcheson may have been intended, as well as Shaftesbury, by Butler when he writes in the *Analogy* that "some of great and distinguished merit" have tempted readers into the error of identifying virtue with benevolence.[29] Of the two, Hutcheson, perhaps, was the chief offender.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER II

Critics of Shaftesbury

1. Vol. i. 371 *seq.* Cf. vol. ii. 105 in second edition, 1723. The first, under the title *Fable of the Bees*, was in 1714.

2. An evident reference to Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision* (1709). Berkeley was still living. The verses of Mandeville, out of which grew the book, date from 1706; the prose, in its first form, eight years later.

3. *Bees*, i. Remark O, p. 157 (on Pleasures); ii. 30, on the Poor, cf. pp. 20, 108. Not writing for the vulgar, i. 247. Remark T, "A sweet taste", *Bees*, i. 371.

4. Berkeley on Vision. Cf. J. S. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, ii. 85 *seq.*, on Samuel Bailey, who had rejected Berkeley (1842). For the parallel in the text, compare David Hume, *Human Nature*, Green and Grose, ii. 160.

5. *Alciphron*, first edition, 1732. The description of free-thinkers as Minute Philosophers (*minuti philosophi*) occurs in Dialogue I. (p. 23 of fourth edition, 1767).

6. Shaftesbury a "free-writer", *Characteristics*, Inquiry, ii. 7. Rand, 307.

7. Berkeley, *ibid.*, "Advertisements", A. 3. Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, I. i. iii. *Freedom of Wit and Humour* (written 1709), p. 97 of edition 1732. *Letter concerning Enthusiasm* (written 1708), I. i. 21 *seq.*

8. References to Ridicule, *Alciphron*, Dialogue III. 138. Cf. Warburton, *supra*. Pleasantries criticized, *Alciphron*, pp. 130, 138.

9. Not as Mandeville, *Alciphron*, pp. 111, 112.

10. *Alciphron*, pp. 112, 113, 116.

11. Euphranor, who is Berkeley, in *Alciphron*, p. 118, Dialogue II. Cf. pp. 121, 122–8. Plato, *Republic*, iii. 492, etc.

12. *Alciphron*, p. 136, cf. p. 135.

13. *Ethics*, x. 10 (9), 4 and 10.

14. Pleasures differing in quality, etc. *Alciphron*, Dialogue I, p. 43. Plato, *Republic*, ix. 582–3. Double personality, *Alciphron*, Dialogue V. 221. Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, i. 151, especially 157, 169. Bismarck (in Ludwig's *Life*, translation, 344) thought there were not two men within him, but a great many.

15. Bishop Joseph Butler, Preface to *Sermons*, § 7. Nature, *ibid.*, §§ 9, 10. Cf. *Sermons* I and II.

16. Moral Sense: *Analogy*, Appendix, Dissertation II: Of the Nature of Virtue.

17. Sermon II, Human Nature, § 20. "Had it strength", etc. *ibid.* § 19.

18. "Ideal government of the world", *Analogy*, Part I,

chap. iii. Cf. Dissertation II. Gladstone edited the *Sermons* in 1896. "Return to the earth, our habitation" are the words in the *Analogy*. So Milton, *Par. Lost*, iii. 23: "Standing on earth, not rapt above the Pole", etc.

19. *Analogy*, I. iii. Cobden had a more robust optimism: "In this world the virtues and the forces go together; and the vices and the weaknesses are inseparable." Speech of November 24, 1863, quoted by John MacCunn in *Six Radical Thinkers* (1907), p. 127.

20. Sermon II. Romans ii. 14.

21. "Invincible atheism", Butler, Preface to *Sermons*, par. 22; Shaftesbury, *Char.* II, *Inquiry*, iii. par. 3, p. 69.

22. "Punishment of evil." Cf. Preface, par. 25, where Shaftesbury is expressly quoted. Also *Analogy*, Part I, chap. iii, and Dissertation II. Fifthly (on Benevolence).

23. Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, vol. iii. 118, 123 (humour); vol. iii, chap. ii. 63–4, etc. Cf. vol. i. on Enthusiasm, pp. 22, 26, 29, 33, 39, 55. "Charge made in days of Julian", Gibbon, chap. xv, section iv.

24. Shaftesbury sometimes says so too, e.g. *Characteristics*, vol. iii. Misc. iv, chap. ii. 215. Compare Butler, *Analogy*, Dissertation II: "the object of this faculty is actions", and Sidgwick's comment, *History of Ethics* (1886), p. 197, note.

25. Appetites not for pleasure. Sermon I, Human Nature, par. 6. Note (Gladstone Edition, p. 40), Sermon XI, Love of our Neighbours, § 8. Cf. Sermon II, Human Nature, §§ 16, 17.

26. Reflection: *Sermons*, Preface, § 17. Cf. Sermon II, § 13. Brutes quite naturally follow their strongest desire. "Untutored conscience": Wilson and Fowler, *Principles of Morals*, p. 54. "On a survey": Sermon I. § 7. Gladstone: in note to § 8. Sermon I. p. 42. "Intervening magisterially": Sermon II. § 10.

27. Balaam, Sermon VII, near end. Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, i. Wit and Humour, pp. 129, 132.

28. "Without reflection", *Characteristics*, i. 129. Butler on Resentment: Sermon VIII. Matthew v. 43, 44. Shaftesbury

on Resentment: *Characteristics*, vol. ii. Moralists, § iii. 420. "Sentiment of the Understanding": Butler, *Analogy*, Dissertation II.

29. Virtue not identical with benevolence. Butler, *Analogy*, Dissertation II. Cf. Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 197. Hutcheson's *Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue* had been published in 1725, and the *Analogy* of Butler in 1736, with the two Dissertations, I on Identity, II on the Nature of Virtue. The passage quoted in the text occurs on p. 318 of the first edition. These writers, he says, would have the whole of virtue to consist in the endeavour to promote "the happiness of mankind in the present state", whereas happiness is not our concern, but that of the ruler of the world.

Hutcheson had laid it down in the *Inquiry* that the universal foundation of the moral sense is benevolence (Section IV. i. 196).

CHAPTER III

HUTCHESON: "INQUIRY", 1725

FRANCIS HUTCHESON, the second son of an Ulster Presbyterian minister of Scotch descent, studied at Glasgow six years (1710–15), and after some years of ministerial work in Ireland became teacher and pamphleteer in Dublin, whence he returned in December 1729 to his old University of Glasgow as "Professor of Philosophy". He may be said to have transferred ethical discussion from England to Scotland, as the latter country was to furnish the leaders in ethical debate for the next two generations. Philosophy tries to abstract from nationality; but there are now and again national peculiarities traceable in the Scotch School of Moralists, as there were touches of Athens in Plato and Aristotle.

Hutcheson himself, in his first book, *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, 1725, tells us [1] he got his "first hints" from the great writers of antiquity and from Shaftesbury. The very conjunction of Beauty and Virtue may have been the first hint. He introduces his subject by showing that there is some sense of beauty natural to man, though not to be called an innate idea. Like Shaftesbury he was haunted by the shade of Locke. This sense "determines the mind to be pleased with forms, proportions, resemblances, theorems"; and there is "another

superior sense, natural also to men, determining them to be pleased with actions, characters, affections. This is the Moral Sense." He ignores the occasional absence of both, even in civilized men.

He admits that he may have exaggerated men's agreement about beautiful things, and it may have crossed his mind that he had done the same with morals. He points out that both the sense of beauty and the moral sense come into our knowledge later than the perceptions of the external senses, and that some have thought both to be entirely the work of education and custom. One of his first tasks must be to show that the internal senses, like the external, can do their work antecedently to any education or custom; and that when the fit occasions arise the perceptions arise, in the same natural way as the perceptions of pain and pleasure in connection with the external senses, these latter having the advantage of being earlier in the field. That neither of the two internal perceptions is "innate" appears from the fact that they are passive (which excludes in advance any Kantian notion of a contribution from within). In the case of beauty, for example, "the internal sense is a passive power of receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is uniformity amidst variety." Custom creates no new faculty, but makes the action of the old go more smoothly; and we must have had the old, say the musical ear, in the first

instance. Education through the association of ideas may create prejudices and enlarge comparisons, but cannot make us perceive qualities in objects which we have not senses to perceive without its aid. No education and no teaching by example will give a blind man the power of perceiving colour or a deaf man harmony.

If we call mere advantage or interest natural good,[2] then moral good is distinguished from it by belonging to rational agents; otherwise a ploughed field and a benefactor might receive equal approbation from us. Moreover, we distinguish the feeling we have towards the rational agent that does us service without intending it, or even unwillingly, from the feeling we have towards him who designs our good in it. So a just sentence passed on ourselves and perceived to be just does not cause hatred of an action that is the cause to us of natural evil. Also, if we look at actions in others which come obviously from humanity and desire of public good, we approve such actions, though they may have occurred in a distant land or time. We approve them when they tend to the natural good of mankind without any regard to our own self-interest.

All this is because we have a Moral Sense; and self-interest will not bribe this moral sense to declare otherwise. It declares what is good or evil in abstraction from our interest, whatever Mandeville may say. We may rejoice at present

in the destruction of pirates; but suppose them cast on a desert island no longer able to threaten us; then we should no longer desire the death of such sinners, but rather that they turn from their wickedness and live to be good men and citizens. "This plainly evidences that we scarce ever have any sedate malice [settled malice] [3] against any person or delight in his misery. Our hatred is only from opposition of interest."

"As the Author of Nature has determined us to receive by our external senses pleasant or disagreeable ideas of objects according as they are useful or hurtful to our bodies, and to receive from uniform objects the pleasures of beauty and harmony, to excite us to the pursuit of knowledge and to reward us for it, or to be an argument to us of His goodness, as the uniformity itself proves His existence whether we had a sense of beauty in uniformity or not—in the same manner He has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our action and to give us still nobler pleasures, so that while we are only intending the good of others we undesignedly promote our own greatest private good. We are not to imagine that this moral sense, more than the other senses, supposes any innate ideas, knowledge, or practical proposition; we mean by it only a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions when they occur to our observation, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them, even as we

are pleased with a regular form or a harmonious composition without having any knowledge of mathematics, or seeing any advantage in that form or composition, different from the immediate pleasure."

There can be no moral good or evil ("all seem to agree") except in actions and affections towards God or our fellow-men. Mere self-denial has no moral good in it; prudence in pursuit of private interest as little. Self-love sometimes pursues the same object as benevolence; but in that case, though the benevolence of the action is not the less where the agent would have produced just as much public good without the self-love, it is so where he would not; we must deduct the effect of the self-love before we estimate the amount of benevolence.[4] An interested benevolence is not strictly benevolence at all. "When a man's benevolence is hurtful to himself, then self-love is opposed to benevolence, and the benevolence is proportioned to the sum of the good produced added to the resistance of self-love surmounted by it." He wisely adds that in most cases we never know the proportions in which the two enter into human actions. We judge of others by ourselves. "The human nature is a lovely form, and there is no such thing as disinterested malice." God evidently acts for the happiness of His creatures; but there is no way of proving that it is for His advantage to do so unless we can prove the Manichaean God.[5]

We cannot say that all virtue is pursued because of the accompanying pleasure,[6] for this means that it is first known to be virtue in order to be pursued at all, and have advantage drawn from it; and besides there are virtues without any pleasure in them. "The very frame of our nature determines us to sorrow, anger, jealousy, or pity; we are moved to remove the causes of them, not by pleasure, but by uneasiness, which continues till they are removed." But if we simply acted to avoid a pain we should shut our eyes to them. Any pleasure there is in them is in the calm reflection which subsequently approves the good action. There is a disinterested passion first, and the pleasure may or may not come afterwards.

Some people say that while parents pursue the good of their children even though it gives them no personal advantage, that is because in reality they are one with the children; the children are part of the parent, and in helping them the parent is helping himself. Quite so, says Hutcheson, "This is indeed a good metaphor, and wherever we find a determination among several rational agents to mutual love, let each individual be looked upon as a part of a great whole or system, and concern himself in the public good of it." In the same way he turns off Mandeville's remark [7] that parents love their children more when they show signs of intelligence: by all means let our love for the great world be increased in just this way. He applies the same reasoning to what we

call patriotism; to him it is "national love and the dear idea of a country". Certainly the following deliverance is too strong from Butler's point of view: "Nor shall we find anything amiable in any action whatever where there is no benevolence imagined, nor in any disposition or capacity which is not supposed applicable to, and designed for, benevolent purposes." He goes on to say that, as the agent himself is part of the whole or rational system for which he is acting, his self-love is within limits not contrary to his benevolence, though in reality indifferent ethically; for he himself is part of the public for whose good he is supposed to act.

He is feeling his way to what was afterwards called Utilitarianism: "In comparing the moral quality of actions in order to regulate our election [our choice] among various actions proposed, or to find which of them has the greatest moral excellency, we are led by our moral sense of virtue to judge thus: that in equal degrees of happiness, expected to proceed from the action, the virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to whom the happiness shall extend (and here the dignity or moral importance of persons may compensate numbers), and in equal numbers the virtue is as the quantity of the happiness or natural good; or that the virtue is in a compound ratio of the quantity of good and number of enjoyers. In the same manner the moral evil or vice is as the degree of misery and number of sufferers; so that

that action is best which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, and that worst which in like manner occasions misery." [8]

This seems to be the first deliberate use in ethical history of the famous Utilitarian formula. The qualification, that the happiness caused shall be also intended, is conveyed in the words "expected to proceed from the action". In a later sentence it is more expressly given, "no good effect which I did not actually foresee and intend makes my action morally good". The other qualification (importance, dignity, etc.) would not please all Utilitarians. It is to be remarked that with Hutcheson the Utilitarian formula is only one out of many. "Regard for the Whole" or for the Public Good—a reminiscence of Shaftesbury—may be a greater favourite. Still, it is set down clearly and emphatically that actions commended by our Moral Sense are those that "have the most universal unlimited tendency to the greatest and most extensive happiness of all the rational agents to whom our influence can reach".

He takes another step. From this idea of moral good in actions is formed the idea of moral good in "dispositions, whether natural or acquired, which enable us to do good to others". "Abilities",[9] such as penetrating judgment, tenacious memory, quick invention, powers of endurance, contempt of death—all such may be called natural abilities rather than moral qualities, and whether they are

good or bad depends on their use for the public good or public mischief. "A veneration for these qualities any farther than they are employed for the public good is foolish, and flows from our Moral Sense grounded upon a false opinion; for if we plainly see them *maliciously* employed, they make the agent more detestable."

This surely implies that the unenlightened Moral Sense can go wrong, and leave us in wrong judgments both of ourselves and others. Hutcheson provides as a safeguard the following axioms:[10]

1. The moral importance of any agent, or the quantity of public good produced by him, is in a compound ratio of his benevolence and abilities.
2. The moment [amount] of private good or interest produced by any person to himself is in a compound ratio of his self-love and abilities.
3. When, in comparing the virtue of two actions, the abilities of the agents are equal, the moment of public good produced by them in like circumstances is as the benevolence.
4. When benevolence in two agents is equal and other circumstances alike, the moment of public good is as the abilities.
5. The virtue, then, of agents or their benevolence is always directly as the moment of good

produced in like circumstances, and inversely as their abilities.

6. "The entire motive to good actions is not always benevolence alone." "In most actions we must look upon self-love as another force, sometimes conspiring with benevolence", and sometimes opposing it.

He is now facing the dilemma that troubled Butler, who became aware that to abstract from self-love altogether is to create, not an ideal, but simply an unreal ethics. Hutcheson, however, may be thinking more of Hobbes and Mandeville. He had already told us that self-love is necessary for the good of the whole within certain bounds, and the want of it is universally pernicious.[11] It is not to him the only end. "I know not for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue which flows from instincts or passions; but how do they help themselves? They say 'virtue arises from reason'. What is reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by the common moralists is the happiness of the agent himself, and this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct toward the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct toward private happiness? And is there not the same occasion for the exercise of our reason in pursuing the former as the latter? This is certain, that, whereas we behold the selfish actions of

others with indifference at best, we see something amiable in every action which flows from kind affections or passions toward others, if they be conducted by prudence, so as any way to attain their end." Our passionate actions—"are not always self-interested, since our intention is not to free ourselves from the uneasiness of the passion, but to alter the state of the object". Reason is as necessary to our finding the means to public as to private good. Instinct (which is a "determination previous to reason") gives us both these ends. But "all mankind agree" that the universal foundation of the Moral Sense is benevolence—not self-love. We cannot wholly reject self-love, for we might injure the public by injuring ourselves. "Self-interest may be our motive in choosing to continue in this agreeable state, though it cannot be the sole or principal motive of any action which to our Moral Sense appears virtuous."

The diversity of manners among men is no disproof of their disagreement about the chief end, though it certainly tells against innate ideas. It comes from the fact that moral sense wears a different appearance because of the different national dispositions. In Sparta, freedom seemed a great good and war a very small evil. "The same sense of moral good in benevolence" appears in a nation of less warlike and courageous men, and their striving after public good, though just as real, took a different form. Even the murder

of old people in savage nations was from a mistaken notion of public benefit.[12] We do not say there is no such thing as reason because men are sometimes led into stupid actions. "If a deformed or weak race could never by ingenuity and art make themselves useful to mankind, but should grow an absolutely insupportable burden so as to involve a whole state in misery, it is just to put them to death." Hutcheson in such passages seems to explain away benevolence into public interest. "The absurd practices which prevail in the world are much better arguments that men have no reason than that they have no moral sense of beauty in actions." The crimes of history are not due to any delight in malice, but "generally [to] an *injudicious unreasonable enthusiasm* for some kind of *limited virtue*". Sometimes inferior theologies have the same kind of regrettable result, prejudice overcoming the instinctive benevolence. But if it is a prejudice in favour of benevolence, as when children listening to a story side with the good people even before they have been taught which are the good and which the bad,—then Hutcheson claims it as a confirmation of his main position.

He finds another confirmation in Honour and Shame,[13] which Adam Smith as dogmatically would have referred to sympathy. Why should a man delight in the good opinion of others where he reaps no external advantage, and why feel miserable from their ill opinion where no mischief

comes to him? "Were there no moral sense or had we no other idea of actions but as advantageous or hurtful, I see no reason why we should be delighted with honour" and uneasy with shame. These feelings really presuppose that there is a moral sense, and our fellow-men expect us to live up to it. It is not created by the public opinion; it creates the public opinion. Honour is paid to a man who loves the public and tries to serve it, even if he fails in the attempt.

Most of all does the principle appear in the feats of art and science and literature where the joy of sharing our pleasures is one we would share with all the world: "The objects which furnish this pleasure are of such a nature as to afford the same delights to multitudes, nor is there anything in the enjoyment of them by one which excludes any mortal from a like enjoyment.[14] So that, although we pursue these enjoyments from self-love, yet, since our enjoyment cannot be prejudicial to others, no man is imagined in any way inhumanly selfish from the fullest enjoyment of them which is possible."

The highest pleasures [15] are those of following the dictates of our moral sense, and the highest pains in disobeying them. But (it will occur to many readers) all this eulogy of the moral sense does not tell us of obligation to follow it. He answers there is naturally an obligation of all men to benevolence; obligation meaning "a determination, without regard to our own interest, to

approve actions and to perform them, which determination shall also make us displeased with ourselves and uneasy upon having acted contrary to it", quite apart from any law, human or divine. "No mortal can secure to himself a perfect serenity, satisfaction, and self-approbation but by a serious inquiry into the tendency of his actions and a perpetual study of universal good according to the justest notions of it."

It needs no "higher criticism" to observe on this that mere uneasiness, even if we confine it to the spirit, has other causes than moral, e.g. a mistaken reckoning or imprudent step in business. It is a general name for absence of peace of mind, or, positively, for any disturbance or fear of disturbance.

Obligation (he goes on) may also denote a motive, not of the first kind, but of wise self-interest, sufficient to determine all who are pursuing their aims wisely to a certain course of action. In this meaning, too, we have an "obligation", a determination to approve virtue, and this, too, without any law or sanctions of law, or any inducements of ignorant self-love. "Let the obstacles from self-love be only removed and nature itself will incline us to benevolence." Reason and reflection, no doubt, may help to remove such obstacles, and the sanctions of divine law may help us to recover our moral sense; "but virtue itself or good dispositions of mind are not directly taught or produced by instruction—they

must be originally implanted in our nature by its great Author, and afterwards strengthened and confirmed by our own cultivation". The moral sense is no more or less "an occult quality" than the power of moving the body by the will. So far from getting it by laws, we test the laws themselves by means of it, and we call the Creator good by exactly the same test.[16]

From Moral Sense, too, comes our notion of Rights,[17] which are simply a "faculty of doing or demanding what tends to the General Good"; the "perfect" being those the violation of which would make human life intolerably miserable; the imperfect where the consequences are less serious, e.g. the right to another man's charity.

What of the "rights of property"? They arise because with increased numbers labour is necessary, and for the support of the whole there must be such a "tenor of conduct" as will promote industry. "It is well known that general benevolence alone is not a motive strong enough" to call it forth. "Self-love is really as necessary to the good of the whole as benevolence." The right to our lives and to the fruits of our labours are "perfect rights". "That tenor of action which would take away the stronger ties of benevolence, blood, friendship, gratitude, or the additional motives of honour and advantage from our minds, and so hinder us from pursuing industriously the course which really increases the good of the whole, is evil, and we are obliged to shun it."

We see here the basis of economic teaching more fully laid down by Hutcheson himself afterwards, and by his pupil Adam Smith in far larger measure. But we need not follow our author into his political deductions, or his theological, which form the end of the *Inquiry*.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER III

HUTCHESON: "INQUIRY", 1725

1. Writers of Antiquity. Preface of *Inquiry*, p. xxii.

Shaftesbury. Preface of *Inquiry*, p. xv.

Moral Sense. Preface of *Inquiry*, pp. xvi, xvii, section vi. p. 82 (of second edition, 1726), pp. 126–8, 130, 134 *seq.*

Association. Section vii, pp. 90, 92, 93, 94.

2. Good, natural, etc. *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120, 121.

3. Settled malice, *ibid.*, pp. 143, 144, 145.

4. Amount of Benevolence, *ibid.*, p. 141. Cf. p. 175. "The moment of good to any person [in case of a Gift] is in a compound ratio of the quantity of the good itself and the indigence of the person [receiving]. Cf. p. 140.

5. God's "advantage", *ibid.*, p. 150.

6. Pleasure and virtue, *ibid.*, pp. 152 *seq.*

7. Mandeville, *ibid.*, pp. 130, 158. Butler, *ibid.*, p. 162.

Gratitude, *ibid.*, pp. 158 *seq.* Cf. p. 218: Though gratitude is natural, parents have usually more affection to the children than the children to them. Part of the whole: pp. 166, 172, 173.

8. "Greatest happiness for the greatest numbers." Section iii, pp. 177, 178, 189. Cf. p. 180.

9. Natural Abilities, *ibid.*, p. 182. In "maliciously" the italics are his. The similar question of Intellectual Virtues is discussed elsewhere.

10. Axioms, *Inquiry*, pp. 183, 184. Cf. *On the Passions*, section 2, p. 38, etc. The employment of Mathematics by Hutcheson may be due to the example of William Wollaston (1659–1724), *Religion of Nature Delineated*, 1722, section iii, pp. 43, 44 (of edition 1726), or to the author's memories of Simson, his old Glasgow professor. It was a feature of Hutcheson that attracted Thomas Reid. See *Francis Hutcheson*, by Professor W. R. Scott (1900), p. 121.

11. Self-Love, pp. 172 *seq.*; "I know not for what reason", pp. 192, 193, 194, 196. Benevolence, p. 196.

12. Diversity of opinions, pp. 201, 202, 204. He quotes Shaftesbury on the good in savages, and on the prejudices against foreigners due to party spirit. (*Inquiry*, pp. 203, 204, 206, 207.) Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, i. 110. Wit and Humour. "Limited virtue", pp. 210, 211. Italics his own. Cf. pp. 214, 215.

13. Honour, p. 201. Public Opinion, p. 223. Cf. pp. 225–7. Mandeville makes "virtue the offspring of flattery begot upon pride" (quoted *Inquiry*, p. 227, note).

14. "Excludes from a like enjoyment."

> O gente umana, perchè poni il cuore
> Là 'v'è mestier di consorto divieto?
>
> (Why put your enjoyment where it cannot be shared?)
> DANTE, *Purg.* xiv. 86, 87.

15. Distinction of pleasures in quality. Section vi, p. 242 *seq.* Obligation. Section vii, pp. 166 *seq.*

16. We call the Creator good by the same test, pp. 274, 275. See *infra*, Hume's letter to Hutcheson.

17. Rights, pp. 277–86.

Economics, pp. 278, etc.

Politics, pp. 294 *seq.* Theology, pp. 300–4.

CHAPTER IV

HUTCHESON: "PASSIONS", 1728

In 1728—that is, on the eve of his election to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow—Hutcheson published *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense.* He abides by the disinterestedness [1] of virtue, while he thinks he can show the pleasure of it to be "the greatest we are capable of", and therefore "it is our interest to follow it". He assumes the general proofs and illustrations of the Moral Sense given in the *Inquiry.* He regrets that many have been prejudiced against it by the received idea that there are just five senses. They neglect what Hutcheson has named the internal senses, which bring the number up to seven or ten. They are not simply reflections on the data of the external.

He admits he has tried more especially to bring out "the fair side of the human temper", and hints that there is something left to be said for the side that is not fair. He seems conscious that the psychology of the *Inquiry* did not go deep enough.

The result is a more elaborate classification of the "passions" and "affections". When the two are not distinguished, they are feelings aroused mediately [2] by reflection on the feelings caused by the pleasant or unpleasant bodily or mental

stimulus. When they are distinguished, a passion is such a mediated feeling, of a confused character and excessive degree of power over us: "a confused sensation either of pleasure or pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily motions, which keeps the mind much employed upon the present affair to the exclusion of everything else, and prolongs or strengthens the affection sometimes to such a degree as to prevent all deliberate reflection about conduct". This recalls Aristotle and his hopelessly wicked man (ἀκόλαστος), or Butler, to whom, as to Aristotle, passions may be good under control that are bad in excess. In the polemic against Wollaston and Clarke and the Intellectual School [3] of Moralists generally, which is the main part of the last section of the *Passions*, he really rejects Aristotle in refusing any idea of a chief End as a general rule of action; each particular pleasure is desired without further view as an ultimate end in the selfish desires.[4] Every "spectator" approves the pursuit of public good more than private, but from a moral sense, "not for any reason or truth". "There can be no exciting reason previous to affection"; "all exciting reasons presuppose instincts and affections, and the justifying [reasons] [5] presuppose a moral sense". It is the general position of Locke's school, bluntly expressed in Hume's dictum "reason is and always ought to be the slave of the passions".[6] In Hutcheson, reason comes in, but in the form of reflection.

There are signs in the *Passions* that Hutcheson has learned from Butler to give a larger place to reflection than in the *Inquiry*; he sometimes seems to have learned also the distinction of appetite and "calm desires"[7] from desire for pleasure, as not set on pleasure, but set on an object, whether vaguely or clearly known. But he is not consistent; there are passages directly contrary. He may have learned from Butler to speak of the "balance of passions". But even in the *Passions* he does not arrange his hierarchy of the passions by supposing, like Butler, a moral imperative in the Moral Sense. "Ought is a confused word." There is even an admission that the moral sense may differ in individuals as the sense of taste differs. He procures his graduation by the high place assigned to Benevolence. The idea derived from Shaftesbury that virtue has in it essentially the tendency towards the good of the whole, in the sense of the widest system of sensitive beings, was formulated at the end of the *Inquiry* as the desire of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Here the unifying principle is benevolence in its widest sweep. "In governing our Moral Sense and desires of virtue nothing is more necessary than to study the nature and tendency of human actions, and to extend our views to the whole species, or to all sensitive natures,[8] as far as they can be affected by our conduct." "It was observed above how admirably our affections are contrived for good in the whole.

Many of them, indeed, do not pursue the private good of the agent; nay, many of them in various cases seem to tend to his detriment by concerning him violently in the fortunes of others, in their adversity as well as in their prosperity. But they all aim at good, either private or public, and by them each particular agent is made in a great measure subservient to the good of the whole. Mankind are thus insensibly linked together and make one great system [9] by an invisible union. He who voluntarily continues in this union and delights in employing his power for his kind makes himself happy. He who does not continue this union freely, but affects to break it, makes himself wretched; nor yet can he break the bonds of nature. His public sense, his love of honour, and the very necessities of his nature will continue to make him depend upon his system and engage him to serve it, whether he inclines to it or not. Thus we are formed with a view to a general good end, and may in our own nature discern a universal mind, watchful for the whole." It is no cursed spite that makes us born to set things right.

So he would trace, even in the external senses, general laws pointing in the same direction, bodily pains warning against bodily dangers, just as mental troubles, like remorse and anger and pity, are paternal admonitions of nature to keep us in the right way. Our passions are by nature balanced against each other like the muscles of

the body. We have reason and reflection to guide us to make the best of things; and as a rule men make the best of them. We are far from the perfection of the human race, but we are on the way to it.[10]

In the *Passions* we begin to hear more of perfection as an end of morality. We only wonder why he did not maintain that there was a sense of perfection, for he has now a long list of internal senses and has no scruples in adding to it.

The Moral Sense is now one of a large company of senses [11] co-operating with each other. "Every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently of our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain", is to be called a sense. First, we have the assortment of the external senses (sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell), imperfect as it is. Second, there is what was called in the *Inquiry* the Sense of Beauty, an internal sense. Third (presumably internal, though not here expressly called so), the Public Sense, *sensus communis*, giving pleasure in the happiness of others, uneasiness at their misery. Fourth, the Moral Sense, by which we perceive virtue or vice in ourselves or others, occasioned by reflection on our own or their affections, tempers, sentiments, or actions, involving the agreeable perception called approbation, or the disagreeable called dislike. Fifth, a sense of Honour, giving pleasure in the approbation or gratitude of others, for any good actions we have done and shame from their dislike, condemnation,

or resentment of injuries done to them—quite apart from the apprehended consequences of the actions. He says there might be added others, such as "decency, dignity, suitableness to human nature".

No doubt it is the first step that costs; to explain the first instinct and first internal sense might be to explain them all; we are no nearer explanation when we multiply the senses to be explained.

Our author is at least aware of the complexity of his subject, and how the Senses (if the word be allowed) touch each other: "The pleasures of sight and hearing are more esteemed than those of touch or taste; the pursuits of the pleasures of the imagination are more approved than those of simple external sensations. Plato [12] accounts for this difference from a constant opinion of innocence in this sort of pleasure, which would reduce this perception to the moral sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such reflection upon their innocence, but that there is a different sort of perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another class of sensations." This would, indeed, give us a sense worth all the rest—a sense judging the other senses. It is not very different from Plato's distinction of quality between pleasures. Plato based it on experience, the experience of the Philosopher who had tried them all; and Aristotle's Prudent Man might judge with the same authority, when he defines the Mean. The result would be the verdict of an "internal

sense", though in all but the Prudent Man or the Philosopher it would be the internal sense of somebody else. But when we fall back on the authority of another we are bound to ask, What gave him that authority? It is not merely Hutcheson's "public sense", for the Prudent Man is supposed to know a little more than his fellows; and to Aristotle his sense is not distinctive, but acquired—acquired by the discipline of his civic life.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER IV

HUTCHESON: "PASSIONS", 1728

1. Disinterestedness. *Passions*, Preface, p. v of edition 1730. Cf. p. 208 and its reference to Hobbes.

Greatest Pleasure. Preface, p. viii. Moral Sense, pp. ix, x, xi, and the long note of p. 3 on Classification of the Senses.

2. Mediately. The term is not Hutcheson's; he expresses the same idea by a description, pp. 28, 29.

3. Intellectual School. See *Passions*, last section called Treatise II. Illustrations, pp. 205–300.

4. He could hardly reject all Ends in the face of the Shorter Catechism, and as a matter of fact he drops into the expression frequently, especially in the *System*.

5. Grotius had distinguished the reasons of war into the *justificae* and the *suasoriae*.

"We will call them", says Hutcheson, "the exciting and the justifying" (p. 216). The chief passage of Grotius, who refers the distinction to Polybius, is Book II, chap. i of the treatise *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, and it begins as follows: "Veniamus ad causas bellorum, justificas intelligo—nam sunt

et aliae quae movent sub ratione utilis [of advantage], distinctae interdum ab iis quae movent [incite] sub ratione recti" (edition Utrecht, 1773, p. 182). For "causas suasorias", see Book II, chap. xxii, p. 669.

6. Slave of the passions. Cf. Professor W. R. Scott, *Life of Hutcheson*, pp. 207, 213, 217.

7. Calm desires, etc. *Passions*, pp. 7, 30, 33, 61, 54, 53. Professor Scott, p. 202.

"Ought" Passions, p. 244. Cf. p. 284.

Admission of differences, pp. 234, 235. Scott, p. 208.

8. "All sensitive natures." *Passions*, p. 191. So Bentham. But Brutes have no moral sense, and therefore (as well as by revelation) we rightly have dominion over them. Hutcheson, *System*, vol. i, book ii, chap. vii, p. 312. Cf. p. 316.

9. "One great system", etc. *Passions*, section vi, pp. 177–83.

10. "On the way" to perfection. *Ibid.*, p. 200. Cf. p. 159: "our own perfection".

11. "Other senses", *ibid.*, pp. 3–6. In the *System*, vol. i, book ii, chap. v, "natural rights" are multiplied dogmatically in the same manner.

12. *Hippias Major*. For the quality of pleasures, see *Republic*, ix, and compare, *supra*, Shaftesbury, *infra*, Kant.

CHAPTER V

HUTCHESON: "THE SYSTEM", 1755

THESE are standing difficulties and standing criticisms not confined to any one work of Hutcheson. The treatise on the *Passions* compared with the *Inquiry* shows how far he was from finality, even in his own opinion, and also how stoutly with all reservations he abode by his belief in the Moral Sense. We shall find this borne out by his largest and most systematic work, in two large quarto volumes, *A System of Moral Philosophy*,[1] published from the original manuscript by his son in 1755, nine years after the author's death, but left ready for publication some years before that event, say 1734 or 1735, and edited by his colleague Leechman, Professor of Divinity. It was not simply compiled from college lectures; it was prepared, on the basis of such lectures, for the public at large.

The book was reviewed in the old *Edinburgh Review* of 1755, a short-lived but famous venture in which all Scotland's fine wits took part, except David Hume. The review forms article 2 of Number 1, January to July; and the reviewer agrees with Editor Leechman that the book "has the air of being dictated by the heart no less than the head". Blair thinks the style leaves something to be desired, though allowance must be made for the absence of the writer's final

revision. We are free to form our own impressions.

The *System* may have contained rather more than the lectures and in a more formal dress. The subject is arranged in books, chapters, and sections. The first Part of the first Book includes an inquiry concerning the constitution of human nature and the Supreme Good; Chapter I is on human nature and its powers, understanding, will, and passions; Chapter II on "the finer perceptions or senses", sense of beauty and imagination, honour, and the moral sense, ending with a curiously unfavourable view of men as they are: "The general tenor of human life is an incoherent mixture of many social, kind, innocent actions, and of many selfish, angry, sensual ones, as one or other of our natural dispositions happens to be raised and to be prevalent over others." Chapter III is on the ultimate determinations of the will and benevolent affections; Chapter IV (ending Part I of Book I) deals more at large with the Moral Sense or faculty of perceiving moral excellence and its supreme objects. Chapter V (beginning Part II of Book I on the Supreme Happiness of Mankind) relates to the sense of Honour and Shame and their support of the Moral Sense. Chapter VI considers how far our feelings, etc., are in our power. Chapter VII compares enjoyments one with another; Chapter VIII making similar comparison of tempers and characters. The *caveat* of the opening paragraph

(chap. i, p. 1), "without any aids of supernatural revelation", does not forbid Natural Religion, and accordingly we have in chapters ix and x observations on our duties towards God and the ways of approaching Him, after a short survey of Evidences of His Being.

Book the Second, Part I, gives us "a deduction of the more special laws of nature and duties of life previous to Civil Government and other adventitious [artificial] states." The second Volume (as distinguished from the author's "Books") continues the same subject in Part II of Book II, and we come into discussions of Contracts, Commerce, Coin, natural rights, and mankind in a system of "natural liberty"—the favourite phrase of the author's disciple, Adam Smith; while the Third Book treats "of Civil Polity", this time not as antecedent to the historical institution of that name, but as descriptive of it, and leading to the various modern discussions of political philosophy. Hutcheson shows himself for his day an "advanced thinker" and friend of "liberty" in all forms. His biographer, Leechman, in his Preface [2] has stated his friend's final ethical position on the whole quite fairly. Shaftesbury, he says, has represented "personal happiness" as the one ultimate end of the agent's cool and deliberate pursuit. "But Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine is far otherways [*sic*]; according to him, there are three calm determinations in our nature—namely, the calm desire of our own happiness, the calm

desire of the happiness of other beings, and the calm desire of moral perfection, each of them alike ultimate. These are sometimes in conflict; at least the desire for personal happiness may often conflict with the other two, in which case "the moral sense never fails to dictate" the voluntary sacrifice of personal happiness, whether to the social happiness or to the moral perfection. Strictly speaking, it may be remarked, the last should be "perfection" without qualification, for Hutcheson is following Aristotle's definition of happiness (p. 9), and contemplating "a calm, settled desire of the perfection of all our active powers and of the *highest* enjoyments". "Dictate" (above) seems to bring us near to Butler's imperative. Hutcheson stops short of this; but his biographer could quote passages like the following: "Where the moral sense is in its full vigour, it makes the generous determination to public happiness the supreme one in the soul, with that commanding power which it is naturally destined to exercise." Usually Hutcheson is content with such phrases as the following: "The moral faculty at once points out and recommends the glorious, the amiable part", "and this by an immediate undefinable perception; it approves the kind ardour of the heart in the sacrificing even life itself, and that even in those who have no hopes of surviving, or no attention to a future life in another world."

He speaks of the Will [3] without defining it.

"There is a natural propensity to action in most animals", men included. "Many of the natural determinations of the will are abundantly explained by such as treat designedly upon that subject." We are told little of its relation to desire and pleasure, and may assume that he accepts Aristotle and Locke, but hardly for first principles. "The chief happiness [he says] of any being consists in the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature desires and is capable of." It must be admitted that perfection in Aristotle's sense gets less than its due share of attention; our author does not regard Aristotle's intellectual virtues as virtues at all, yet to Aristotle one of them was the supreme good. But Hutcheson's "ultimate" is borrowed from Aristotle. "The good experienced man is thus the last measure of all things."

Perhaps we are expecting too much from the Moral Sense. It is not set forward as a universal oracle or key to all mysteries. Is it to be like the inward monitor of Socrates, warning us not to do, rather than dictating what is to be done? [4] By treating his monitor as a mystery, Socrates avoided the need of explaining it philosophically. Hutcheson certainly would make more use of his Moral Sense than this; it approves, points out, and recommends. It is so positively a guide that it helps us to decide which of three ultimates is really ultimate. To find our way through the rest we are to use our reason, otherwise treated as ethically inferior to

the Moral Sense. Reason [5] is a power that "judges only about the means or the subordinate ends; about the ultimate ends there is no reasoning. We prosecute them by some immediate disposition or determination of soul, which in the order of action is always prior to all reasoning, as no opinion or judgment can move to action where there is no prior desire to some end." The end is so conceived by him that it involves the distinction of higher and lower pleasures, separating Hutcheson, not indeed from the Greeks, but from the modern utilitarian of the stricter type "who shakes his head and says they are all the same". In taking the means towards the end he brings to the aid of the Moral Sense the sense of Honour,[6] and indeed a hierarchy of such supports. This seems to imply that, though we do not reach the ultimate end without the Moral Sense, the other internal senses help us in using the means towards the highest ultimate. The sense of dignity and decency seems specially allied by nature to the intellectual virtues, however prone our author to give them a lower place than the moral. Universal good will to all is his supreme virtue; without an approach to it there can hardly be virtue, and with it we best approach Deity itself. "This is the condition our nature can be raised to by due culture", when by attention we present to our minds the proper objects fit to excite such calm determinations. The ordinary good man does not rise so high, and the ordinary bad man may not

even have a calm rational self-love at all. Those are the best judges who have full experience; superior beings might have discernment of all good things without experience. We might see in this attitude of Hutcheson's a recognition that the Moral Sense is a power which may be brought out by degrees. This reminds us of Locke's idea of the "capacity" which he allows as against the innate idea disallowed. But Hutcheson prefers to connect it with the notion of the governing mind strengthening our moral faculty, and disposing us to band the whole phalanx of internal senses together in order to bring ourselves to moral perfection. There are no affections absolutely evil in themselves, and we may train ourselves to bring out the good in them. We have a self superior to that exaggeration of the passions which is evil. We have a "sympathetic sense, called compassion", which may help us, though it needs watching. We have a "propensity to action" which we share with most animals, and "an implanted instinct towards knowledge". We may make the Habits, with all their limitations, our help and not our hindrance, and we have a "natural impulse" oi society. Hutcheson had early found an ally tn Laughter,[7] which, unlike Hobbes, he considered to be naturally more full of good nature and sympathy than of malice and insolent exultation. He may have thought the point too small to be introduced here.

It may be thought that with such a supply of

good instincts men could hardly go wrong. But our author is painfully aware that they often go wrong; and he thinks the reinforcement of Moral Sense by Religion [8] is necessary if they are to make improvement. "If we can in any way reason concerning the *original nature* [the great First Cause] from what we feel in our own, or from any of our notions of excellency or perfection, we must conceive in a Deity some perceptive power analogous to our moral sense by which he may have self-approbation in certain affections and actions rather than the contrary."

Even when Hutcheson had not put his case so directly, Hume had touched the weak point with his critical needle when he asked: How far can we extend our rules of morality to the Divine Being? In a remarkable letter to Hutcheson, Hume [9] writes: "I wish from my heart I could avoid concluding that, since morality according to your opinion as well as mine is determined merely by sentiment, it regards only human nature and human life. This has been often urged against you, and the consequences are very momentous. If you make any alterations in your performances, I can assure you there are many who desire you would more fully consider this point if you think that the truth lies on the popular side. Otherwise common prudence, your character and situation forbid you to touch upon it. If morality were determined by reason, that is the same to all rational beings; but nothing

but experience can assure us that the sentiments are the same. What experience have we with regard to superior beings? How can we ascribe to them any sentiments at all? They have implanted those sentiments in us for the conduct of life like our bodily sensations, which they possess not themselves." So in the letter to Mure, of Caldwell, Hume says: "the Deity is not the natural object of any passion or affection. He is no object either of the senses or imagination, and very little of the understanding, without which it is impossible to excite any affection." About one hundred years afterwards the Utilitarian, J. S. Mill, who was of the same school of philosophy as Hutcheson, was indignant that Dean Mansel should not take the word "goodness" to mean the same thing in God as in men. Hutcheson did not think this at all obvious when he introduced his conjecture of a "perceptive power analogous to the moral sense". What follows may be his answer to Hume in his altered "performance": "The Deity must have powers perceptive of happiness immediately." "Such a [perceptive] power must bring a large addition of happiness, and that of the noblest sort, along with it; and, in an omnipotent mind, cannot be inconsistent with any other perfection or source of enjoyment. The ultimate determinations or affections of the divine being,[10] which can be approved by himself, must either be that toward his own happiness or a desire of the greatest universal misery. The

desire of his own happiness cannot be the sole ultimate desire or determination, because the desire of the happiness of other beings distinct from himself would be another source of sublime pure happiness, distinct from the former but perfectly consistent with it, in a mind which always has it in its power to gratify this desire to the utmost, without obstructing any other source of happiness. The approbation and delight in this kind determination must be quite excluded from the divine mind if there is no such original determination in it. And 'tis inconceivable that the original mind can want any source of pure enjoyment or happiness, consistent with every other sort of excellence, while yet in other beings formed by the counsels of that which is original we experience such sources of happiness." The desire of universal misery is impossible to a being original and omnipotent, where there could be no idea of misery at all "but what is suggested by his knowledge of the perceptive powers he has granted to his limited creatures, and the laws of sensation to which he has subjected them. That cannot be supposed the object of an original desire, the idea of which is not perceived by some original faculty of perception immediately suggesting it." If omnipotence desired misery, it might have had it everywhere, which we know is not the case. The happiness predominates, and the ills exist only to secure that the laws of the mechanism of the world shall be observed.

This anthropomorphism seems to underrate both good and evil. We need not have paused over it except to show that the moral sense has even more difficulties when transferred to another world than when confined to this. The question of Hume was not of the goodness of the all-ruling mind, but of the analogy of its goodness to ours. Has the moral sense any meaning for superior beings? Our author answers in another place that we do not even see all that goes on in our own world—call it our neighbour's world. But why, then, are we trying to see what is going on in the other, the World Beyond both us and our neighbours? Can we really believe that in that other, as in our own, virtue means praise or blame for certain sentiments? Leechman, his editor, seems to think that we are under a divine law, which is external in the same way as the moral sense is internal—the latter being really peculiar to us but co-operating with the higher law, and being a practically effective guide to us when we lose sight of the higher. This is really to admit the difference Hutcheson struggles to deny.

Hume's letter makes the far deeper suggestion that Reason would be the same in both worlds. But Hume himself was not led by it to alter his premises, which were Hutcheson's own; he was content to carry them to their logical conclusion. Hutcheson was more concerned to convert men to goodness [11] than to be thoroughly perfect and faithful in his logic. But if the

logic is not sound the faith is weakened by the exposure of the unsoundness.

At a later date [12] Hume deals with the question as follows: "The standard of the one [Reason], being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible even by the will of the Supreme Being; the standard of the other [Taste], arising from the internal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that supreme will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature and arranged the several classes and orders of existence."

This answer would give more satisfaction to Mansel than to Mill; but there seems no other possible on the premises.

Comparing Hutcheson with Shaftesbury, who gave him his cue, we find little or no attempt in Shaftesbury to rise into such high regions of mystery. The men are a complete contrast in birth, nurture, and proclivities. A critic may well be afraid to condemn out of hand a theory that made appeal to men of such unlike characters, careers, ways of thinking, and prejudices. Hutcheson's biographer, Leechman, thinks that Hutcheson was always more concerned to make men good than to develop a theory of goodness. Hutcheson thought Hume's tone too cold for the moralist; Hume replied he was not a moralist, but a moral philosopher. Hutcheson did not separate them, and we hear of him helping his students to prepare sermons. Shaftesbury, too, had

preaching at heart; philanthropy was in the blood; if political history never repeats itself, family history, our Eugenists tell us, invariably tends to do so. Shaftesbury was always anxious to reach men and make converts, and by no means for mere fame. It is true, as critics remarked, that he never forgot he was one of the intellectually elect—a virtuoso; and Hutcheson, a man of the people, wrote distinctly for the people.

In their special doctrine, Hutcheson owed more to Shaftesbury than his contemporaries always remembered. By the time when Hutcheson became best known, Shaftesbury was half forgotten, and there is little mention of him in the collected lectures of Hutcheson himself. Shaftesbury might have been grieved for a moment by this neglect; but would then have taken it playfully; he would probably have congratulated his successor on his formula of greatest happiness, and his courage in using the phrase Moral Sense everywhere. Shaftesbury uses it for the most part furtively in headings. He would have bantered Hutcheson on his preference of the Latin authors; Hutcheson might have found his "greatest happiness" in Marcus Aurelius, but he writes of Shaftesbury's favourite Greeks as if he were a medieval schoolman dependent on Latin translations. Shaftesbury revels in a "gay wisdom", and his favourite motto for everyday use is *Ridentem dicere verum quid vetat?* Hutcheson's seriousness does not always penetrate more deeply than the light shafts of his predecessor.

Their appeal is to different temperaments, and it is no disparagement of either to say that an eager reader of the one will not have the same relish for the other.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER V

HUTCHESON: "THE SYSTEM", 1755

1. *A System of Moral Philosophy*, in Three Books. The price of the *System*, in two volumes, 4to, boards, one guinea. The printers and publishers were Robert and Andrew Foulis, the Elzevirs of Scotland. Robert had owed his first start to Hutcheson, his old professor. See Professor Scott's *Life of Hutcheson*, pp. 81, 82. The Catalogue of the Foulis Exhibition held at Glasgow, 1913 (Maclehose, 1913), p. 5, tells us that the printing works were at first within the College. There were exhibited, *inter alia*, Hutcheson's *Synopsis Metaphysica* from Adam Smith's library, with his bookplate (Foulis Catalogue, No. 77, p. 13), and the *Vindication* of Hutcheson's orthodoxy, 1738, by several of his scholars, among whom are Robert and Andrew Foulis (No. 188). There was also exhibited a medallion of Hutcheson (No. 188*a*); and No. 189 refers to the letters of Hutcheson concerning Robert Foulis, given in Professor Scott's *Life of Hutcheson*. For a description of the *System* and the genesis thereof, see *Life*, chap. xi.

The second edition of the *Edinburgh Review* (of 1755), published in 1818, contains a list of the contributors, and ascribes the review to Blair, and to Adam Smith the Letter to the Authors in No. ii, pp. 63 *seq.* In this Letter we read (p. 72 of first edition, p. 129 of second edition): "Mr. Hobbes, Mr. Lock, and Dr. Mandevil, Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Butler, Dr. Clarke, and Mr. Hutcheson have all of them, according

to their different and inconsistent systems, endeavoured at least to be in some measure original." The spelling is not worse than Meggens for Magens, in the *Wealth of Nations*, I. xi. (Digression on Silver).

The Preface to the second edition of the *Edinburgh Review* is usually set down to Sir James Mackintosh, whose own ethics may be found in his *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, 1830. Add two good notes in the *Life of Mackintosh* by his son, 1836, vol. ii, pp. 365, 366.

2. Leechman's Preface is dated December 24, 1754. He gives the ethical position in said Preface, pp. xlv, xlvi. Compare the text, vol. i, pp. 75–77. Aristotle seems contemplated in vol. i. 9, section vi, on desire of perfection.

3. The Will. i. pp. 7, 8, 21.

Men included, etc. See title on margin, amplified by the text, p. 21. "Such as treat", etc. Perhaps Locke is in view, or Aristotle, *Ethics*, iii. (2), 5. Happiness and pleasure, i. p. 7; cf. p. 100. Intellectual virtues, etc., pp. 29, 121, 237.

4. The Moral Sense, to our author, is not negative merely, but, like Pope's Conscience in the *Universal Prayer* (1738), faces both ways:

> "What Conscience dictates to be done,
> Or warns me not to do."

Bacon (*Advancement of Learning*, Book ix, p. 370, Bohn's edition) thinks that the "light of nature" is "rather to reprehend vice than to give a full information of duty". See letter to *The Times* of November 18, 1929, by Professor Elliot Smith.

5. Reason's part: *System*, vol. i, p. 38.

Distinctions of quality: *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 61. Compare Plato, *Republic*, viii. 562: *ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις*, he, the Democratic Man, *ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἁπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἰσοῦ*.

6. Allied with Honour, p. 64. Cf. *Republic*, iv. 440, 441, where *τὸ θυμοειδές* plays a similar part in relation to Reason. Intellectual virtues, i. p. 68 (cf. Scott, p. 220). Deity itself,

ibid., i. pp. 64, 66, 68, 69; cf. p. 121. Calm determinations, i. pp. 77, 78. Sense capable of being trained, *ibid.*, p. 150; cf. pp. 19 (compassion), 147, 195. Instincts, pp. 23, 32, 34. "Our Commander recalls us by the same voice which intimated to us our station and its duties", i. p. 298 (Bradley's cue).

7. Laughter. See his *Reflections upon Laughter and Remarks upon the Fable of the Bees*, 1725. Cf. Scott, p. 35, and *infra*, John Brown.

8. Religion, i. pp. 168, 192, 211, etc. Cf. chap. ix. v. pp. 174, 175.

9. Hume, in letter dated March 16, 1740, given in Hill Burton's *Hume*, i. p. 119. Cf. Scott, pp. 123–4, and Hutcheson, *System*, vol. i, p. 121.

Letter to Baron Mure, *circa* 1744, given in Hill Burton's *Hume*, i. p. 162. It dealt with a sermon of Leechman, Hutcheson's colleague and editor.

10. "Affections of the Divine Being." *System*, vol. i, Book i, chap. ix, pp. 175, 207 (cf. p. 121). God is superior to the passions; He has none. Cf. pp. 176, 177, 178, 196. Leechman's view is given in Preface, p. xxxvii, note. There is an emphasis on the instantaneousness or immediateness of the divine perception, which is thought to make the analogy a close one. It is worth while to compare Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, p. 451: *ποῦ χρὴ τίθεσθαι ταῦτα ποῦ δ'αἰνεῖν, ὅταν, τὰ θεῖ' ἐπαινῶν, τοὺς θεοὺς εὖρω κακούς.*

(Quoted by Lewis Campbell, on *Oed. Col.*)

11. "Convert men to goodness." His *Compends*, English or Latin, had this purpose. He used to help students with their sermons. Cf. Scott, pp. 84, 137.

12. "Hume's later deliverance." Appendix I of the *Principles of Morals* (first edition, 1751), in *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary* (p. 472 of the 4to edition, 1758).

CHAPTER VI

MINOR CRITICS OF THE THEORY

JOHN BROWN, of Newcastle (1715–1766), might have made himself a link between Shaftesbury's followers and Hutcheson's if he had possessed more of "the philosophic mind". But that mind is surely lacking in a critic who sets down every writer a plagiarist who builds on the work of another. This is really the very way in which philosophy grows; and Shaftesbury was right in using others, say Plato and Aristotle, as his materials. He himself came to be so used by others, and the new building was never quite the same as the old.

That a refutation of him should appear nearly forty years after his death is sign of an influence working slowly and surely as Shaftesbury himself had desired but not expected.

Essays on the Characteristics, by John Brown, M.A., appeared in 1751. The author, a Cambridge man, gained far more fame six years later by his *Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times*. According to Brown's *Estimate*, "except in a few minds of uncommon greatness, public spirit exists not",[1] and the people are degenerate and effeminate. Both books had a vogue which later generations cannot well understand. In the earlier he recognizes and even exaggerates the influence of Shaftesbury. "The noble writer's *Characteristics* are now the standing oracle in the office, the shop, nay, as

I am informed sometimes, even in the cobbler's stall."[2] He gives high praise to the Soliloquy, and thinks Shaftesbury "eminent" in the field of imagination, "considerable" in knowledge, but in judgment "neither eminent nor considerable". "By my fay, he cannot reason." He gets credit quite wrongfully for originality in philosophy; his talent was for art. "We cannot but think that had you studied the writings of that great and excellent man [Locke] whom you so weakly deride, your volumes, whatever they had lost in bulk, would have gained in weight and splendour."

From this we gather that Brown himself is building upon Locke; and we presently find that, like Locke, not having a metaphysical basis for his ethics, he introduces a theological. Leslie Stephen [3] considers the main aim of the writer to be a defence of Christianity, Warburton suggesting it to Brown on the ground that Pope believed Shaftesbury's *Characteristics* to have done more harm to Christianity than any other book. Brown certainly speaks extravagantly of Warburton's *Divine Legation* "that inestimable treasure [*sic*] of all true knowledge". But he does not confine himself to theology. His dedication tells us that he is writing to criticize the works of a very celebrated writer, who took it into his head to oppose the solid wisdom of the Gospel by means of the visions of "false philosophy". "As his at best is but the cause of Wit and Eloquence, all the support he could give it was only to tell us

how Plato wrote, mine being that of truth and Christianity." He attempts, however, a general review, unlike Hutcheson and Hume, who assimilated Shaftesbury without writing a treatise upon him. Hume's *Human Nature* in 1739 "fell dead born from the press". John Brown's *Essays on the Characteristics* passed through four editions before meeting their death. Of his three Essays, the first is devoted to Shaftesbury's supposedly serious thesis that Ridicule is a test of truth; the second to Shaftesbury's theory of Virtue; the third and last essay deals with Revealed Religion and Christianity.[4] We need not linger over the first.[5] The subject is one where Shaftesbury was certainly vulnerable if taken seriously. "Ridicule", says Brown, "is made the test of what is rational instead of Reason being made the test of what is ridiculous." The noble author has invented "a new faculty, ridicule, in place of reason", and says, "the sense of ridicule always judges right", whereas (says his critic), being a passion, it never judges at all.[6] Its intimations, says Brown, are sometimes mischievous—it helped to cause the death of Socrates; they are sometimes obscure, as when Swift in the *Tale of a Tub* leaves us wondering which of all the opinions caricatured are supposed by Swift to be the right ones.

Brown's second or properly ethical discussion is: *On the Motives to Virtue and the Necessity of Religious Principle.* Though Shaftesbury himself warned us

that some parts of the *Characteristics* are more serious and authoritative than others, Brown draws on all alike. He drops quite happily on the important passage: "The mind cannot be without its eye and ear, so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound, and scan each sentiment and thought which comes before it." All good, says Brown, but Shaftesbury has not given us a criterion; he is simply telling us that virtue consists in acting virtuously. Clarke and Wollaston are open to the same censure, no more and no less. They say we are to act by right reason; what is the criterion of the rightness? Brown observes that even Shaftesbury finds his "beautiful actions are such as tend to public interest; and Brown's own criterion is Happiness. It is to be remembered that he was writing after Hutcheson, and echoes him in the sentence: "Virtue is the voluntary production of the greatest public happiness." Mandeville thinks the variation in morals, from age to age and from people to people, is as great as the variation in taste. He would, no doubt, bring Brown's "happiness" under the same condemnation; notions of happiness differ from age to age, but Brown thinks there is a constant element. Men in all ages count food good and poison bad. They agree also that virtue and vice are different, and that the former produces happiness as surely as food produces health. And this happiness is at the bottom of our distinction of vice and virtue. Virtue is not

disinterested, as even Hutcheson, "the most ingenious" of Shaftesbury's followers, had held. To love virtue for its own sake is to suppose it, by a metaphor, a living creature; and to suppose virtue admirable apart from its consequences is to forget that it is an affection, a mode of pleasure or pain. Hume should not tell us that "pleasure is from virtue, not for the sake of it". The pleasure is the passion itself, neither prior nor posterior to it. The individual is moved to the practice of virtue by the constitution of his nature, which unfortunately is not constant.[7] We are not, therefore, to assume that all private happiness is fulfilled in private ends, in the man's self alone. Hobbes and Shaftesdury and the Stoics talk as if there were, separately existing, entirely selfish and entirely unselfish passions; in nature they are mixed. The fact is that every philosopher (before our author) has taken himself as a model: Shaftesbury judging by his own good life and Mandeville by his own sensual. Brown admits that many men seem blind to what we call the higher affections.[8] Shaftesbury more hopefully thinks all can be reached by all eventually. This is not true, says Brown, of musical taste, nor is it of moral. Brown therefore concludes that men must not be left to depend on sense; they must fall back on Reason. The principle of Honour, of which Shaftesbury speaks so much, tends to the elevation of a few like Shaftesbury himself rather than to the happiness of all, he being far

too contemptuous of the crowd of ordinary men, and even of the clergy.

Man's instinct is fortunately supplemented by laws for the good of all, making private interest coincide with public welfare. Laws, however, do not reach the heart, only the outward action; hence we must have religion and belief in God to do that for us. Tucker [9] and Paley after him, were to take the same line—theological utilitarianism. "Religion proposeth true happiness as the end and consequence of virtuous action; this is granted. It proposeth it by such motives as must influence self-love, and consequently hath given the best means of procuring it." Shaftesbury is wrong in thinking that there is anything servile in religion as a motive. Equally wrong are those who object to our dwelling upon the happy consequences of virtue in this life. But the power of the senses and imagination over us is so great that nothing but the vivid image of some greater good or evil in futurity can strengthen us to resist it. There is too little of this resistance in England now—a theme he was to develope later in the *Estimate*.

There are hits at particular tenets of Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury throws doubt even on Natural Religion. Butler seems to Brown right as against Shaftesbury in believing in actual punishment for sin. The noble lord's defence of enthusiasm provokes [10] the remark that learning may make a man mad, but such writers as he think that

madness may make a man learned. Brown is jealous, for virtue's sake, of the Friendship, so glorified by Shaftesbury, because (he says) the love of one may extinguish the love of all. The passage where Brown draws attention to our general dependence on other people's authority for our ordinary rules of daily life is to some extent an anticipation of Newman's *Grammar of Assent*; but the credit, such as it is, must go to Shaftesbury.

Besides Brown, whose book preceded his by a very few years, Richard Price stands high among the minor critics of the Moral Sense; but to him it means Hutcheson's, not Shaftesbury's, theory. Prolix and seldom quite convincing in any of his various contentions, Price [11] is seldom foolish; and he had singular success in stirring fruitful discussions in other men. His *Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* appeared first in 1758, and reached a second edition in 1768. He takes side with Cudworth, groping like him after Kant; in philosophy critical of Locke, in ethics deferring to Butler, in both polite to Hume, though seldom in agreement.

The theory of a Moral Sense is hit hard.[12] "What judges concerning the perceptions of the sense and contradicts their decisions cannot be itself sense, but must be some nobler faculty." "One sense cannot judge of the objects of another; the eye, for instance, of harmony, or the ear of colours. That, therefore, which views and compares

the objects of *all* the senses and judges of them cannot be sense. Thus, when we consider sound and colour together and observe in them essence, number, identity, diversity, etc., and determine their reality to consist, not in being properties of external substances, but of our souls, this must be done by a sharper eye than that of sense." Hutcheson would have been quite right if he had said we have immediate perception of moral right and wrong through reason and not sense. "Substitute equality and inequality and suppose the inquiry to be concerning the original and foundation of these. He that should derive our ideas of them from a sense would be undoubtedly mistaken, if he meant anything more than that they were immediately perceived." "How much more proper and determinate it is to say that the *agreement* between two quantities is their *equality* than [like Wollaston] that their equality is the *agreement* between them! But how unreasonable would it be to conclude, as in the parallel case has been done, that therefore equality and inequality are perceived by an implanted sense, and not at all objects of knowledge!"

Such arguments will meet us again. It is enough to say that Price's book, like Brown's, testified to the interest taken throughout the middle of the century, just after the death of Hutcheson, in the subjects which that author had brought into prominence a generation before Hume's writing had succeeded in gaining the public ear. Recog-

nition once gained, Hume's appearance on the scene in any such discussion was an instant challenge: "Like the clash of arms in the council-hall when the word for war has gone forth."

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER VI

Minor Critics of the Theory

1. Brown became Vicar of Newcastle 1761, and ended his own life 1766. "Public spirit exists not." *Estimate*, p. 64.

2. *Essays*, iii. section viii, second edition, 175, p. 389; cf. p. 398. On the Soliloquy, p. 109. On Locke, p. 399.

3. Leslie Stephen: *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. ii, p. 44.

Warburton. Brown, *Essays*, p. 353.

Bentley (*Phileleutheros Lipsiensis*) gets hardly less homage, pp. 275, 364–6.

4. It is the longest of the Essays, extending from p. 241 to p. 408. Ridicule has 107 pages and Virtue 130 pages.

5. Ridicule, pp. 68, 93, 101.

Virtue, pp. 110, 111, 113, 115–117, 129. Happiness, p. 134; cf. p. 158. Hutcheson's *Inquiry*, 1725.

Brown, pp. 143, 162, 163, 164, 168. The passage criticized in Hume is from the Essay on the Dignity of Human Nature. *Moral and Political Essays*, third edition, 1748, p. 125. The other reference to Hume, p. 385, is on a matter of style.

6. So Edward Caird on the Moral Sense and its "critical function".

7. Human nature constant or inconstant. Brown, pp. 168, 170, 172, 174, 177.

8. Blindness of certain men to certain affections, pp. 177, 178, 179, 187, 193. Shaftesbury writing for the few: Brown, pp. 203, 403, 405.

Aid of laws, p. 200.

Religion, p. 210; cf. pp. 213, 216. Nothing servile, pp. 219, *seq.* The words on page 116 are Brown's.

Hint of the *Estimate*, p. 237; cf. p. 225.

9. Tucker: *Light of Nature*, 1768.

10. Much learning making mad, pp. 300, 301. See Acts, xxvi. 24.

Butler *versus* Shaftesbury, pp. 248, 255.

Friendship, p. 332. Authority, p. 236, 257.

11. Born 1723, died 1791. See *Newmarch Lectures*, March 1929, University College, London.

12. *Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, second edition, pp. 18, 19. On Hutcheson, pp. 57, 59, 60, 216, 217.

CHAPTER VII

HUME: "HUMAN NATURE"

DAVID HUME, born in Edinburgh April 26, 1711 (O.S.), was the second son of the laird of Ninewells, Chirnside, Berwickshire. He was entered at the University of Edinburgh in the year Adam Smith was born, 1723, but took no degrees, though he says in his own *Life* of himself that he "passed through the ordinary course of education with success".[1] He was never a professor, in spite of two attempts to gain a chair. But as early as seventeen he thought to become a discoverer in philosophy, and put aside law, which had been chosen for him. A singular letter,[2] addressed about 1734 to a London physician (identified by Hill Burton as Dr. Cheyne), gives a long account of his bodily and mental condition at that time. He suffered from hypochondria, which fell on him in September 1729; and after telling his symptoms and how the illness disturbed his aims, he describes what the aims were. He had found "that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity laboured under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending more upon invention than experience; everyone consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and of happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend".

"Little more is required to make a man succeed in this study than to throw off all prejudices either for his own opinions or for those of others."

But Hume was distressed to observe in himself a lack of neatness and elegance of writing. He wrote the letter just before going to Bristol,[3] where he addressed himself to a life of business, being without the idea "common to dunces in all countries that a man of genius is unfit for business". But business did not suit him at Bristol, and he went to France in course of the year, first to Paris then to Rheims, then to La Flèche in Anjou, where he lived two years, discussing miracles with the Jesuits and writing his *Treatise of Human Nature.* The place was associated with Descartes. It is probably the scene of the pretty story by Henry MacKenzie (of the *Man of Feeling*) about Hume's kindness and humanity. He came back to London in 1737, and wrote to Kames in December about the "philosophical discoveries" to appear in his book. He had meant to get Bishop Butler's opinion on it, but Butler was out of town.

In January 1739 the first two volumes (on the *Understanding* and the *Passions*) were published (by John Noone, of Cheapside) with the sub-title, "An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects". The third volume (of *Virtue and Vice* in general) followed in 1740, with Longmans as publishers. This volume was submitted to Hutcheson, who

thought Hume's tone in it too cold for a moralist. Hume altered little or nothing, being, as he said, not an artist, but an anatomist.[4]

He had done in this book exactly what John Brown, of Newcastle, afterwards had missed in Shaftesbury. He had "paid attention to Locke". "To pursue the original interpretation so that all might know what is left of reality" was his endeavour in his book.[5] He had tried to be more definite in his distinctions than Locke, who had described ideas as "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks". To Hume an idea is simply a weaker impression, and the impression is a sensation, external or internal. The test of an idea is the impression, and, if no corresponding impression can be shown for it, the idea is unmeaning. Abstract ideas must come from particular impressions. Hence Hume rejects "infinite divisibility", "infinite space", a self apart from particular perceptions, and finds no impression corresponding to the idea of cause. "By impressions I mean our stronger perceptions, such as our sensations, affections, and sentiments; and by ideas the fainter perceptions, or the copies of these in the memory and imagination." He hopes that "our reasoning concerning morals will corroborate what has been said concerning the understanding and the passions".[6]

Is it by impressions or is it by ideas that we distinguish between vice and virtue? Not by ideas, which would be reason. "Morals excite passions

and produce or prevent actions"; reason is not a principle of action. He had shown this in his second volume, on the *Passions*, where occurs the famous phrase, "Reason is and only ought to be the slave of the passions".

This was only the conclusion of a brilliant discussion on "The Will and Direct Passions", in which he tries to show that human action is determined by human character as rigorously as any physical action by physical causes; this makes it so important to judge a man, not by isolated acts, but by the general bent of him. In a letter to Hutcheson he speaks as if Hutcheson had insufficiently recognized this fact.[7]

Hume was perfectly aware that he was stating a paradox. He was going against all previous moral philosophy in disputing the "pre-eminence of reason above passion". "Nothing [he says] can oppose or retard the impulse of passion but a contrary impulse."[8] Reason is "wholly inactive"; it compares ideas and infers matters of fact, and demonstrative reasoning discovers only relations. The relations of matters of fact given by internal impressions are not moral any more than the relations of external impressions; the similar matters of fact among animals or even plants are not moral, yet they are given to us in the same manner, as data of the senses. Morality begins when the feelings come in; it is not an affair of reason. "Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colours, heat, and cold, which

according to modern philosophy are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind; and this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences, though like that too it has little or no influence on practice." [9] He claims in his title-page to be introducing "the experimental method of reasoning into Moral Subjects"—experimental meaning the close following of experience.

The section immediately following the last quotation from the text bears the title, "Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense",[10] and the text tells us vice and virtue are not ideas but impressions; actions do not please us because they are virtuous; it is their pleasing that makes them so. Pleasure, however, is an abstract term comprehending very different sensations, as the term goodness is applied to good music and a good bottle of wine. The virtuous pleasure is of a peculiar kind, making us award praise or blame. Moreover, such pleasures have always a relation to the object of the passion concerned, ourselves or others.

Whence comes this peculiar sense? The type or constitution of such sentiments is not always original or primary, wherever it occurs; in some cases they are derivative, just as in physical science we find derivative and primary principles. To call them natural is to use a vague term, all depending on the contrasted term, as the contrast

is either with the miraculous, or the unusual, or the artificial. One thing seems true: that we must not say virtue is natural and vice unnatural. The final position (for all, it presently appears, except Justice) is this: "Virtue is distinguished by the pleasure and vice by the pain that any action, sentiment, or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation." We are left with the question *why* any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness.

The answer is not the same for all the virtues.[11] Hume tells us that some have a natural basis, others are in a sense artificial. For example, parental affection and the virtue of benevolence or humanity, though not original principles, grow up without any feeling of duty. It is a natural proclivity to help offspring. Hume, taking such virtues as a general type, says broadly that there must be some other motive than virtue for the first beginning of virtue. There are in human nature "distinct principles which are capable of producing the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious".

This whole passage, which forms the beginning of the section on Justice, is illustrated by the important letter to Hutcheson, dated from Ninewells, September 17, 1739, in answer to criticisms made by Hutcheson on the MS. of the third volume of *Human Nature*. In the postscript of this letter [12] Hume writes: "You are a great admirer

of Cicero as well as I am. Please to review the fourth book, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, where you find him prove against the Stoics that if there be no other goods but virtue 'tis impossible there can be any virtue, because the mind would then want all motives to begin its actions upon, and 'tis on the goodness or badness of the motives that the virtue of the action depends. This proves that to every virtuous action there must be a motive or impelling passion distinct from the virtue, and that virtue can never be the sole motive to any action. You do not assent to this, though I think there is no proposition more certain or important. I must own my proofs [in the MS.] were not distinct enough and must be altered." What he printed was, in spite of Hutcheson, substantially the same.

"It may be established as an undoubted maxim that no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality." [13] Hume's proof is twofold. First, in such virtues as parental affection, there arises an admittedly virtuous action that has not virtue for its motive. So later he says, "the affection of parents to children seems founded on an original instinct". In such cases, be it remarked, he could hardly maintain that all desire was for pleasure. Secondly, it is less clearly stated, but is frequently implied in the *Human Nature*, that there is need of the judgment of another than the agent to

pronounce on an act and treat it as commendable before it could become a virtue. In the first beginnings of virtue (*unde officii principium nascatur*) the Moral Sense would be the sense, not of the Agent, but of the Spectator. This is the aspect of the "undoubted maxim" on which Green enlarges.[14]

Hume himself refuses to apply the maxim to all virtues without exception. "Our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural." There are some virtues which "produce pleasure and approbation", not by a moral sense, "but by means of an artifice or contrivance which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind; of this kind I assert Justice to be"; the sense of Justice is derived from an artifice.[15] There is no good instinct leading a man to restore borrowed money, for example. This sense of honesty is acquired in a civilized state by the institutions of a civilized state. So later in the Essays we are told that, if "nature by an instinctive sentiment" distinguished Property, we should need ten thousand different instincts to deal with objects of the greatest delicacy and nicest discernment. Natural propensities work rather against justice than for it. Men love their own children, but "there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind [16] merely as such, independent of personal qualities of services, or of relation to our self". What seems so is the effect of sympathy, and is extended by us to all sensible creatures. Neither public benevolence (regard for all men's happiness)

nor private (regard for my own) can be the original motive for Justice.

It is Aristotle's Particular Justice, of the Ethics, that is in view, not the General; it is Right, not Righteousness. This Particular Justice is to Hume natural only as all obvious and necessary inventions may be so called; but it is an invention.

Hume had written to Hutcheson:[17] "I have never called Justice unnatural, but only artificial. *Atque ipsa Utilitas justi prope mater et aequi.* Grotius and Pufendorf, to be consistent, must assert the same." It will be discussed by and by, in relation to Adam Smith's *Moral Sentiments*, whether Hume's arguments do not carry him farther than he allows himself to be willing to go. For the present we follow his own thread of thought.

Men, he says, are by no means wholly selfish, but their benevolence is narrow; "the generosity of men is very narrow".[18] The redeeming artifice of Justice is devised because of the obvious advantage men see in it; it is a way of making the goods of the outer world as secure from the attacks of other men as are the goods of the mind and even of the body. So "the judgment and understanding" save us from the awkward consequences of the affections, and we join with others in agreement to leave their possessions alone if they will leave ours alone. It is no formal convention or promise, but simply "a general sense of common interest". "Whether the passion of self-interest be esteemed vicious or virtuous, 'tis

all a case, since itself alone restrains it; so that, if it be virtuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same effect." This holds of allegiance and law of nations, as well as modesty and good manners. In this attitude Hume is not far from Mandeville; and he goes on to say that, if men were supplied with all goods in the same abundance as with air and water, "or if everyone had the same affection and tender regard for everyone as for himself, justice and injustice would be equally unknown among men. It is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants that justice derives its origin."[19]

It was "a concern for our own and the public interest which made us establish the laws of justice; and nothing can be more certain than that it is not any relation of ideas, which gives us this concern, but our impressions and sentiments without which everything in nature is perfectly indifferent to us and can never in the least affect us. The sense of justice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions." This might seem to show that self-interest is a datum or impression of the internal sense. But this is exactly the aspect of Justice which is not to Hume moral at all. We are not dealing with a Moral Sense, but with an artificial convention made by a self-interest that, on his showing, has no moral sentiment in it at all.

Why, then, if so unlike the rest, is Justice generally set down as a virtue? The answer [20] as given in his second volume (*On the Passions*) is that "honour and custom and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience and produce in some degree the same effects". The answer as given in his third volume (*On Morals*) is that it becomes a sentiment of right and wrong, because by Sympathy we observe the mischief done to Society by the violation of it, especially in the case of others. "We partake of their uneasiness by Sympathy; and as everything which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey,[21] is called Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue, this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice, and although this sense in the present case be derived only from contemplating the actions of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The *general rule* reaches beyond those instances from which it arose, while at the same time we naturally *sympathize* with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. Thus *self-interest is the original motive* to the establishment of justice; but a *sympathy with public interest* is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue."

In this instance, at least, the Moral Sense has been explained away. The sense of justice is not direct and instinctive, but indirect, whether as an obligation of self-interest or a sympathy with

sufferers from wrong. Some speak as if Justice found a moral support in a natural obligation to keep a promise.[22] But, antecedently to human society and its conventions, a promise cannot have any meaning at all. It is not a resolution to myself directed to myself, for such would be no obligation. Nor is it a desire of mine, for it may be even contrary to my desires. Nor is it Will, for it regards the future, and the Will regards only the present. It must then be the willing of the existence of the obligation arising from the promise; we bind ourselves to observe it.

But morality depends on the sentiments, not the will. When the action or quality of the mind pleases "after a certain manner"[23] we say it is virtuous; when the neglect of it displeases us we say we are under obligation to perform it. But we can no more change our sentiments than the motions of the heavens, or render any action moral or immoral by our will: "the will never creates new sentiments". A new obligation, therefore, cannot be created at all, and a promise is "naturally" unintelligible.

Hume then recurs to his paradox.[24] There must be some "actuating passion or motive capable of producing the action", and this cannot be merely the sense of duty, for that implies an antecedent obligation [we might say as its root in nature]. *Ex hypothesi* none such arises until, as in parental affection, the natural passion has acted and actuated. In a footnote he puts the case

in a slightly altered form. "Morality is supposed to consist in relation. Every new imposition of morality, therefore, must arise from some new relation of objects; and consequently the will could not produce *immediately* any change in morals, but could have that effect only by producing a change upon the objects." The universe cannot be so changed, and promises have no *natural* obligation; we cannot by will create a new obligation. It is a sophism to say that the act of will is itself a new object.

The obligation in promises is, like the obligation to respect property, simply the artificial one of self-interest.[25] We cannot abolish the selfishness and ingratitude of men; the best we can do is to outwit them by making men see the advantage of an "oblique and artificial" satisfaction of appetite provided in the machinery of a civilized society. Not that there cannot be disinterested sacrifice and real gratitude in the world; but we keep the word promise for the "interested commerce" of men, and the morality of that promise arises artificially from "public interest, education, and the artifices of politicians". Promises, when all is said, are like Justice—a human invention for the convenience of society, not in themselves real or natural. Hume even compares them to the mystical forms of Catholic transubstantiation and the transmission of clerical orders. He goes so far as to say that though legal rules and rights may be granted to have "a

tendency to public good", this does not make them the less artificial; and if men had really strong natural regard for public good they would not have needed them. A feature in which Justice differs singularly from Virtue is the exactness of its rules, which may be said to be unmistakably one thing or another (a man has a right to a property or he has not); degrees are hardly admissible; whereas virtues and vices run insensibly into each other and it is hard to draw the line.[26]

In the final chapter of Part III we should expect him, after all he has said, to magnify the differences. But he takes pains to show that sympathy, which is the whole explanation of the morality of Justice, may be a part of the explanation of the morality of the other virtues—those, namely, that are "natural" because having a root in natural passion.[27] As we find that they also tend to the public good, such tendency helps out our natural praise or blame in their case. In Justice such tendency is the sole cause of morality; here in the others we have: first, the natural motive in an original passion ratified by the Moral Sense;[28] second, the tendency to public good ascertained afterwards. Moral Sense is left with little to do, and we are in doubt whether our author is levelling Justice up to the others or levelling the other virtues down. It occurs to him, however, that there are virtues and vices (say purity and impurity) which a man may have by himself

without Society. "There are other virtues and vices besides those which have this tendency to the public advantage." Still, moral distinctions arise "in great measure" in this way.[29]

A difficulty occurs: Sympathy varies with distance,[30] we have more of it with those near to us, little with foreigners; but the moral qualities are approved or their opposites disapproved in the same measure for Chinese and English; they are therefore not due to sympathy. True, he answers, the approbation or its opposite is due to moral sense—"a moral taste, and certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of particular qualities or characters". The approbation does not vary, but the degree of pleasure does; we cannot feel it as keenly for an ancient Greek as for one of ourselves. The sentiment varies, though not the esteem.[30] But in fact we all know that we are liable to such variation according as we are near or far in regard to persons and things around us, and we make to ourselves a general rule and place ourselves in thought at a point of view where our judgments are stable, as we correct our judgment of a beautiful thing removed to a distance by representing to ourselves what it would appear when near. At least we ought to try to do this; Reason requires such an impartial conduct, but it is seldom we can bring ourselves to it, and our passions do not readily follow the determination of our judgment. The Reason able

to oppose passion is "nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection".

Again, he says, people object that sympathy interests us in the good of mankind, and where the good is not actually attained but only intended, we should expect the approbation to lapse if it depended on the sympathy. But, he answers, if we see everything ready to produce the effect, we anticipate the production of the effect; where a character is fitted to be beneficial our imagination does the rest. "General rules create a species of probability which sometimes influences the judgment and always the imagination."

He seems here to be using for his explanation the very features that need explanation. We are not told how on his principles there can be such a thing as a general rule.[31] Generality would be on his principles neither an impression nor an idea. The "reflecting judgment" figures in his analyses in spite of his attempts to put Reason aside. "Moral good and evil are certainly distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason. But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind and of particular persons. My opinion is that both these causes are intermixed in our judgments of morals, after the same manner as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty—though I am also

of opinion that reflections on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence and determine all the great lines of our duty." What is called goodness, including generosity, friendship, liberality—in short, "a propensity to the tender passions"—acts as a regulator of the other qualities of a man—courage, ambition, judgment, and capacity, which are "indifferent in themselves to the interests of Society, and have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind according as they are directed by these other passions".

The chapters on "natural abilities"[32] give the other side of the matter. Hutcheson counts "penetrating judgment, a tenacious memory, a quick invention, patience of labour, etc., contempt of wealth, etc.", rather to be called natural abilities than moral qualities. Adam Smith thinks Hutcheson went too far in this, and he really comes close to his friend Hume. Mackintosh sides with Hutcheson. Hume's view is expressed by him in a letter to Hutcheson himself. Hume claims that in this the Ancients were right as against some Moderns. He thinks that "natural abilities" may deserve the name of virtues. If the criterion be that such qualities produce pleasure either in the possessor of them or in the observer of them or both, it would be hard to exclude them. Indeed, although he often uses the reservation "produce pleasure *after a certain manner*", he seems to believe this would apply equally to the natural abilities. The others

have their several peculiarities; Caesar's virtues are not Cato's. Nor are the natural abilities without theirs. "Good sense and genius beget esteem; wit and humour excite love."

It is urged, he says, that the other virtues are always voluntary, and the natural abilities involuntary. But neither is quite true; bravery is in the ancient list of virtues, and owes much to upbringing and training. A character may degenerate, and resistance to temptation becomes more and more impossible—that is, more and more involuntary in proportion to the degeneracy. And it is not true that a quality is never virtuous unless voluntary; it may produce as much pleasure to the spectator when involuntary.

He claims to have shown us earlier [33] in his book that though there is a Will (*voluntas*) there is not a free will, whether in actions or in thought. So now "our actions are more voluntary than our judgments, but we have not more liberty in the one than in the other". Some find a plausible reason for the distinction between virtues and natural abilities in the influence of rewards and punishments. These may help to make men just and careful in behaviour; they cannot, it is said, make men wiser and more prudent. Yet Prudence, though a "natural ability", stood highest in the Ancients' list of virtues.

Hume had written to Hutcheson: "Upon the whole I desire to take my catalogue of virtues from Cicero's *Offices*, not from the *Whole Duty of*

Man.[34] I had, indeed, the former book in my eye in all my reasonings."

The *Human Nature* goes on to say that the "natural abilities are esteemed because of the tendency to be useful to the person who is in possession of them"; prudence, on the whole, leads to prosperity. It is consistent to say, as he does in the *Verbal Disputes*, "that we owe a duty to ourselves is confessed even in the most vulgar system of morals, and it must be of consequence to examine that duty in order to see whether it bears any analogy to that which we owe to society. It is probable that the approbation attending the observance of both is of a similar nature, and arises from similar principles whatever appellation we may give to either of these excellencies." The *Human Nature* had really discussed the point: "Wit and eloquence are valued because they are immediately agreeable to others. Good humour is loved and esteemed because it is immediately agreeable to the person himself", and only by sympathy to us.[35] The fault of offending against cleanliness is really a vice, though a small vice; and meets with disapprobation simply because it excites an uneasy sensation in other people. In such cases, and in wit and eloquence, "we must have recourse to a certain sense which acts without reflection, and regards not the tendencies of qualities and characters". Some moralists will explain virtue entirely by this "certain sense". "Nothing but a particular inquiry [a close

philosophical analysis like Hume's] can give the preference to any other hypothesis." But such an inquiry shows that "almost all" the virtues have such tendencies of qualities and characters, and that the ground of the approbation is the advantage resulting from them.

This passage throws light on Hume's general theory, which turns out to be that, though the Moral Sense is the first beginning, the utility (a phrase used repeatedly in this Conclusion) accounts for the full formation of the ordinary virtues, and also of those referred to natural abilities. In Memory, which seems only a natural ability,[36] there is a sympathy on the onlooker's part with the utility of it; and the evident pleasure felt by the possessor in the exercise of it bestows merit.

Which then of the two is in Hume's view the explanation of moral distinctions—the utility or the sympathy? He has left the two alongside of each other. The answer seems to be the answer given in connection with justice, where there is supposed to be no natural instinct, no original Moral Sense: "Justice is certainly approved of, for no other reason than because it has a tendency to the public good. And the public good is indifferent to us, except so far as sympathy interests us in it. We may presume the like with regard to all the other virtues which have a like tendency to the public good. They must derive all their merit from our sympathy with those who reap any advantage from them, as the virtues which

have a tendency to the good of the person possessed of them derive their merit from our sympathy with him."

Out of Hume's materials it might be possible to construct (1) a theory like Hutcheson's, explaining morality by a Moral Sense, which ratifies acts tending to Public Good; or (2) a theory like Adam Smith's, which explained morality by Sympathy without a Moral Sense; or (3) a theory explaining it by Utility alone, as was done by Bentham. Hume professes to retain all three, leaning on each other. It may surprise us to find the sympathy receiving greater homage from him than the utility, when the course of his argument seemed to leave it the place of an adjunct, an *ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι*. On the contrary he keeps hold of Pleasure, precisely what Aristotle reduced to an *ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι*—the pleasure felt by a man recognized, through the observer's sympathy, as doing acts tending to public advantage, and praised for it. Sense, Sympathy, Utility, but the greatest of these is Utility: would have seemed his foregone conclusion. He regards it as obvious that self-love or private utility is no foundation, but does not show us how [37] to pass from "each for himself" to "each for all". He did not see the possibilities lying in Hutcheson's Greatest Happiness.

What specially pleases in the *Human Nature* is the frankness of the writer. Hume writes as if he were anxious to reveal his thoughts; in the later writings as if anxious to conceal them, or

at least to conciliate the Public (who would not buy *Human Nature*) by adapting his utterance to their powers of apprehension. Fortunately for his permanent fame, the philosophic world has refused to forget his first work where he spoke his mind freely. "It is absolutely the last word of the philosophy of Locke", says Thomas Hill Green.[38] Hume had an inkling of his own merit, but he wrote in his Essay on the Rise of Arts and Sciences: "A man's genius is always, in the beginning of his life, as much unknown to himself as to others." It must have been with mixed feelings that at the close of his life he so described the fate of his first effort: "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my *Treatise of Human Nature*. It fell *dead-born from the press*,[39] without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots. But being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country. In 1742 [*sic*] I printed at Edinburgh the first part of my *Essays*; the work was favourably received, and soon made me entirely forget my former disappointment." In the "Advertisement" or Preface to those *Essays*, published anonymously in 1741 (not 1742) in one volume, he calls himself a new writer, anxious concerning the success of his work. Hill Burton says he desired the former to be blotted out.[40] In the *Essays* he would bring us out of the atmosphere of philosophical disputation into that

of the *Spectator* and *Craftsman*. Not that, like Faust, he would leave it for himself. At the beginning of his Essay on Commerce,[41] after saying that "shallow thinkers fall short of the truth, abstruse thinkers go beyond it", he proceeds to praise the latter at the expense of the former, and evidently includes himself among the abstruse. But he is going to try to come down to the level of the ordinary reader, and only occasionally betrays the desire to raise the ordinary reader to the speculative attitude. There is little in this volume of *Essays Moral and Political* that would be beyond the intelligent reader of Addison and Steele; and the author disclaims system; each Essay is to stand by itself. Of course it was not possible for successive Essays on Politics as a Science, the first Principles of Government, Parties, Liberty, and Despotism, Dignity of Human Nature, to be without their common element. Some of Hume's most characteristic principles are delivered under this disguise of popular philosophy. It is here[42] we are first told that Government is founded on Opinion, and that "the virtuous sentiment or passion produces the pleasure and does not arise from it".

It may be that even in the opening Essay on Delicacy of Taste and Passion he had himself in mind. The essay contrasts the supersensitive passionate nature, too "delicate" on the side of passion, always feeling or fancying slights, with the finely sensitive artistic judgment, equally

delicate and keenly penetrative, on the side of reason. But perhaps "'twere to consider too curiously to consider so".

In the *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*, by Mr. Hume, author of the *Essays Moral and Political*, 1748, we have a return to philosophical argument less disguised; but the form of separate Essays is retained.

He writes about this book to his friend Gilbert Elliot.[43] "I believe the *Philosophical Essays* contain everything of consequence relating to the Understanding which you would meet with in the Treatise [of *Human Nature*], and I give you my advice against reading the latter. By shortening and simplifying the questions I really render them much more complete. *Addo dum minuo.* The philosophical principles are the same in both; but I was carried away by the heat of youth and invention to publish too precipitately. So vast an undertaking planned before I was one and twenty and composed [in France] before twenty-five must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred and a hundred times." He does not here refer specially to morals; that was the subject of a book published in the same year as the *Philosophical Essays*, 1751: *An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, "the full development [says his biographer], so far as it was made by Hume, of the Utilitarian system". The reservation is necessary.

"In the same year [as the *Political Discourses*]

was published in London my *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, which in my own opinion, who ought not to judge on that subject, is of all my writings historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best. It came unnoticed and unobserved into the world."

In the *Essays* there is no change in his general position.[44] He follows Shaftesbury, he says, in holding that the "social passions" are the most powerful of all and influence the other passions. "I may perhaps treat more fully of this subject in some future speculation"—no doubt in the *Principles*.

He was soon writing to Hutcheson on equal terms.[45] In a letter to him early in 1743, after comments on Hutcheson's latest book (*Institutio Compendiaria*), he adds: "I must own I am pleased to see such just philosophy and such instructive morals to have once set their foot in the schools. I hope they will next get into the world and then into the churches. *Nil desperandum Teucro duce et auspice Teucro.*" Their points of agreement seemed to him more important than their differences, if we can take the letter seriously.

In the *Philosophical Essays*, 1751, he praises Hutcheson for teaching us that "morality is nothing in the abstract nature of things, but is entirely relative to the sentiment or mental taste of each particular being, in the same manner as the distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the particular feeling of each sense or organ. Moral perceptions, therefore, ought not to

be classed with the operations of the understanding, but with the tastes or sentiments." Butler has proved that the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment, and all passions may be disinterested.[46] "Surely [he says] moral philosophy is of some importance." Yet he would persuade us in the *Principles* that our conclusions in moral theory affect us as little in practice as discoveries in physical science affect us in the ordinary conduct of life.

The first of the *Philosophical Essays*, dealing with the Different Species of Philosophy, states the case for the "easy and obvious species which deals with man chiefly as an active being". It is contrasted with the "accurate and abstruse", where Aristotle (perhaps not seriously) is held up as an awful warning: "The fame of Cicero flourishes at present; that of Aristotle is utterly decayed." [47] Though he thrusts in an apology for the abstruse, the essay seems really an apology for his own desertion of it in the *Moral and Political Essays* of 1741, which the Public found easier to read than the *Human Nature* of 1739–40. The study of faculties of the human mind can proceed without metaphysics; "Nor can there remain a suspicion that this science [the psychological] is uncertain and chimerical unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation and even action. It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, e.g. perception, reflection, will, under-

standing, imagination, and passions, "which fall within the comprehension of every human creature".

He was leaving Philosophy for History (1754) with reluctance. In view of his strong assertion in the *Life*, written "a few months before his death", we must regard the *Principles* and not the *Essays* as his last word on Moral Philosophy.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER VII

HUME: "HUMAN NATURE"

1. Hill Burton, *Life of Hume*, 1846, vol. i, chap. i. Compare *Life of David Hume written by himself*, p. 4.

Two attempts: Logic, Glasgow, 1751, and Edinburgh about the same time. Hill Burton, i. pp. 350, 345–6.

Law: *ibid.*, i. pp. 27, 31, 41. His father died in Hume's infancy.

2. Letter to London physician. According to Hill Burton, this was Dr. Cheyne, a specialist in such cases. See Hill Burton, i. pp. 31, 35; cf. pp. 38, 43. The depression was not singular for the time of life, eighteen to twenty-three—J. S. Mill's occurred in the twentieth year. Hume observed in himself, *inter alia*, a lack of neatness and elegance of writing (*loc. cit.*, pp. 35, 36).

3. Bristol episode: *loc. cit.*, p. 38; cf. p. 29. "Common to dunces", etc. Essay on Eloquence, *Essays*, vol. ii, p. 24 (1742).

La Flèche: *loc. cit.*, pp. 57, 58–61.

Return: *loc. cit.*, pp. 63, 65.

Hutcheson: *loc. cit.*, pp. 110, 111.

4. Not an artist, but an anatomist: *loc. cit.*, p. 112. Cf. *Human Nature* (Green and Grose edition), ii. p. 374, conclusion.

5. Locke: Green's Introduction, p. 161. Distinctions: Hill Burton, i. pp. 70, 76, 80. Cf. Green, *loc. cit.*, p. 170. Cause: Hill Burton, i. p. 84, points out a likeness to Joseph Glanvill's *Scepsis Scientifica, Confest Ignorance the Way to Science*, 1665.

6. Morals and Understanding: *Human Nature*, iii. "Of Morals", Advertisement and Part I. The way is prepared by his vol. ii, "Of the Passions", where occurs (Section III) the famous phrase quoted in the text, edition Green and Grose, p. 195, of their second volume. He even hints that reason is only a calmer kind of passion, p. 214; cf. pp. 235, 236.

Will and Direct Passions: *Human Nature*, ii. Part III (Green and Grose), pp. 181 *seq.*

7. General bent: cf. *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), vol. ii, pp. 192, 197.

We might quote William Law, *Serious Call* (first edition, 1728), p. 81 of fourteenth edition, 1802: "That which is a reason for a charitable action is as good a reason for a charitable life." Hutcheson in the *Inquiry*, second edition, p. 116, Moral Good and Evil, section iii, had written: "We denominate the character from the prevailing principles", without dwelling on the point so much as Hume or bringing out Law's particular turn of it.

8. Contrary impulse: Dr. Thomas Chalmers long afterwards made current "the expulsive power of a new affection". He may have been prompted by this passage of Hume (Green and Grose), p. 194, second volume. Hume knew he was uttering a paradox (Green and Grose), pp. 191–3.

9. Little or no influence on practice: (Green and Grose), *loc. cit.*, p. 245. There is a different application of Science, p. 160: "Those who are acquainted with the metaphysical part of Optics and know how we transfer the judgments and conclusions of the Understanding to the Senses will easily conceive this whole operation [change in the emotion without any change having occurred in the object]."

Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision*, 1709, must have been in his mind. Cf. p. 359: "Correcting the appearance by reflection [we] arrive at a more constant and established judgment concerning them."

10. Moral Sense: (Green and Grose), *loc. cit.*, pp. 246–51.

11. Not the same for all the virtues: *loc. cit.*, pp. 253–6, 259, 293. For remoter parallels, see Green's *Introduction*, ii. pp. 39, 40.

12. Hill Burton, i. pp. 114, 115. Cf. *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. p. 253. The passage of the *De Finibus* may have been the following: "Sit hoc ultimum bonorum quod nunc a me defenditur; apparet statim quae sint officia, quae actiones. Vobis autem quibus nihil est aliud propositum nisi rectum atque honestum, unde officii, unde agendi principium nascatur non reperietis." Book IV of *Ciceronis Opera*, 4to, Basel, p. 1089, 1 (1687).

13. Hume's proof: (Green and Grose), vol. ii, p. 253. "So later", viz. in the Dissertation on the Passions prefixed to the *Principles of Morals*, 1751, p. 216 of edition 1768, section iii, note.

14. Green, *Introduction*, ii. p. 66.

15. "Artifice or contrivance": *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. pp. 252 *seq.* "So later in the *Essays*": *Principles*, section iii, "Of Justice", edition 1758, p. 418; edition 1768, vol. ii. p. 280.

16. "Love of Mankind": *Human Nature*, ii. (Green and Grose), p. 255. Cf. pp. 257 foot, 260. Cf. as to other sensible creatures, p. 255.

17. To Hutcheson: September 17, 1739. Hill Burton, i. p. 113. He quotes Horace, *Satires*, I. iii. l. 98. He might have gone on to l. 111: Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est. For Hume's other references to Utility, see *Human Nature*, ii. (Green and Grose), pp. 274, 353, 356, 360, 369, 371. It has a larger place in the *Essays*.

18. Benevolence and Justice: *loc. cit.*, pp. 261 *seq.*, 337, 358 (cf. Green, *loc. cit.*, p. 163).

19. When Justice superfluous: Cf. Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, p. 357, of Government. Cf. *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. p. 295.

20. On the Passions: (Green and Grose), vol. ii, p. 105. On Morals, *ibid.*, p. 271.

21. General survey: *ibid.*, p. 271. Cf. "by the survey or reflection", p. 334. Italics his own (3rd vol. 1st ed., 1740, pp. 75, 76).

22. Promise: *ibid.*, pp. 285 *seq.*

23. "After a certain manner"—a reservation really involving a distinction of quality. It is seldom omitted by Hume, who must have been well aware it provided another problem.

24. Morally good yet without moral motive: *ibid.*, pp. 286, 287; cf. pp. 293, 299.

25. Self-interest and sentiment: *ibid.*, pp. 264, 288 *seq.* Compare Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, I. ii, where the two friends approach each other.

26. Hume is here following Aristotle, e.g. *Ethics*, ii. p. 9, v. p. 3, though not named; and he is not far from Aristotle in arguing (pp. 298, 299) that natural morality is unlike justice in being "susceptible of the same variations which are natural to the passions" it springs from; it is a respecter of persons and characters: we should say it is an affair of relativity. In justice there is supposed to be no variableness.

27. Natural passion: *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. p. 215.

He allows the existence of direct passions due, not to "good and evil, or, in other words, pain and pleasure", but to a "natural impulse or instinct which is perfectly unaccountable", e.g. the desire of punishment to our enemies and of happiness to our friends, hunger, lust, and a few bodily appetites—producing good and evil, but not like the other affections proceeding therefrom. Cf. Green's *Introduction*, ii. pp. 33, 44.

28. Moral Sense: See *supra*, and cf. Green and Grose, ii. p. 346.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 338. This would falsify the dictum that the exception tests the rule.

30. Sympathy varying: pp. 340 *seq.* to 359.

31. "A general rule", etc.—or even a relation. Green, *Introduction*, i. p. 174; cf. pp. 184, 250.

32. Natural abilities, Intellectual Virtues: *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. pp. 358–72. Hutcheson, *Inquiry*, fourth edition, 1738, p. 186. Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, pp. 464–8. Mackintosh, *Dissertation*, p. 99. Letter of Hume: Hill Burton, i. pp. 113, 114. It is dated September 17, 1739. A certain manner: *Human Nature*, ii. (Green and Grose), pp. 362 *seq.*; cf. p. 365 ff.

33. "Earlier", viz. "Of the will and direct passions", *Human Nature*, *loc. cit.*, p. 181 ff. "So now", etc. *Principles*, Part III, pp. 364 ff.

34. *Whole Duty of Man*, a famous epitome of proper conduct, published 1659, and ascribed to Richard Allestree and Dr. Fell. Mentioned by Sheridan, *Rivals*, 1755, I. ii. Lydia to Lucy. Hume repeats his pleasantry in Appendix III to his *Principles*, 4to, 1768: "Of some verbal disputes", a discussion of the question. After referring to *De Officiis*, i. p. 6, he quotes a long list from *De Oratore*, ii. p. 89, of the talents included under "aliae virtutes quae in ingenii aliqua facultate aut animi magnitudine [positae sunt]", and adds: "I suppose if Cicero were now alive it would be found difficult to fetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems or persuade him that no qualities were to be admitted as *virtues* or acknowledged to be a part of *personal merit*, but what were recommended by the *Whole Duty of Man*" (pp. 402, 403). The italics are his own.

In his *Essay*, 1742, vol. ii, p. 51, on the Middle Station of Life, he unguardedly supposes a distinction of Genius and Capacity from Virtue and Usefulness to the Public.

35. "Only by sympathy to us." *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. pp. 365 *seq.* This contrast reappears in the *Principles* with some variation of terms. See *Principles*, 1768, ii. p. 400.

36. Memory. Cf. Green, *Introduction*, i. pp. 126, 245, 278.

37. Martineau, *Ethical Theory*, ii. p. 308.

38. *Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life. North British Rev.*, March 1868; *Works*, iii. p. 106.

Arts and Sciences: *Essays*, second edition, 1742, vol. ii, No. 5, p. 97. But in *Human Nature*, i. (Green and Grose), p. 550: "I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries."

39. Hume, *Life by himself*, p. 8.

Pope, *Epilogue to Satires*, Dialogue ii. l. 226 (Birkbeck Hill, *Letters to Strahan*, note on page xx of *Life*):

> "All, all but truth, drops dead-born from the press,
> Like the last gazette, or the last address."

Pope, *Moral Essays* (Epistle III) is quoted in the Essay on Avarice:

> ". . . an equal fate betides
> The slave that digs it, and the slave that hides."

40. Blotted out: Hill Burton, *Life of Hume*, i. p. 273. The only book successful on first publication (Hume says in his *Life*, p. 16) was the *Political Discourses*, 1752.

41. Essay on Commerce, p. 149 of 4to edition, 1758 (first in 1752) of *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, as a subhead of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*.

42. Essay V, p. 49; Essay XIV, p. 171 (edition 1741).

43. Delicacy of Taste. Cf. *Philosophical Essays*, 1751, Essay I, p. 8. "Accuracy is advantageous to beauty and just reasoning to delicate sentiments." So Essay XXVI, Standard of Taste, pp. 139, 140–4 (edition 1758).

The *Essays, Moral and Political*, contain, in their second edition in two volumes still anonymous, 1742, four essays on philosophers—the Epicurean, Stoic, Platonist, Sceptic, taken as standing types of character. There is no attempt to form a system. Hume is not to be identified with one more than another. Hill Burton, *Life*, i. p. 345. Of the famous

"commit it then to the flames", at the end of the *Philosophical Essays*, he would have said: "Certainly, I was posing as a Sceptic; it was not my only pose."

It is curious that in his *Life by himself* he gives the wrong date for his first *Essays* (one volume), giving 1742 instead of 1741. Hill Burton, i. p. 337; cf. pp. 271, 272, 341, 344, 350. Hume is not a good authority for the dates of his own books.

The letter to Elliot is of 1751, after March 10th.

44. "No change." He says so in the *Essays*, first edition, 1741 (Dignity of Human Nature), p. 169.

45. Letter to Hutcheson. Hill Burton, i. pp. 146–50, January 10, 1743.

46. Passions disinterested. Essay I, p. 15, note; but compare Principles, 1768, in *Essays*, vol. ii, pp. 245–6.

47. Utterly decayed. *Philosophical Essays*, second edition, 1751, p. 4; cf. pp. 13, 14. The list of Editions of Hume's Essays given by Grose (vol. i, 1875, p. 85) is not perfect, but the task was difficult.

CHAPTER VIII

HUME: "PRINCIPLES OF MORALS"

THE order of arrangement is roughly the same in the *Human Nature* and in the *Principles of Morals*, issued December 1751. First comes the Understanding, and it was the subject of the first volume of the *Treatise of Human Nature*. Then came in 1757 a Dissertation on the Passions, a reduced and amended version of the second volume of the *Human Nature*. In that second volume of *Human Nature* there were three "Parts" (Pride, Love, and Will) and thirty-four sections. The Dissertation on the Passions in the new book has only six sections, framed mainly from the old materials.[1] Hume himself is aware that it approaches the perfunctory. "I pretend not to have exhausted this subject. It is sufficient for my purpose if I have made it appear that in the production and conduct of the Passions there is a certain regular mechanism which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy." [2]

This is really a plea for Psychology, which had not yet received its name in the Universities; and he would like us to understand that the whole of the Dissertation is provisional. What Green says of the first volume of the *Treatise of Human Nature* applies to the second, and even to the third; the corresponding parts of Hume's later

version are "excerpts from the *Treatise*, rewritten in a lighter style, and with the more difficult parts of it left out".[3] The Dissertation on the Passions in the later version, for example, mentions and dismisses in a sentence the influence of Space and Time on the imagination and passions.

In the first part, "Concerning Human Understanding", there is a new section on Miracles, which showed that the author was quite willing to startle his readers so long as he could make them understand him. Everybody was supposed to understand the language of ethics, and there was no need for a sensational novelty on that head in the new Dissertation. We have instead a mild intimation [4] of what was coming in the *Principles*: "The most probable system which has been advanced to explain the difference between vice and virtue is that, either from a primary constitution of nature or from a sense of Public or Private interest, certain characters upon the very view and contemplation produce uneasiness, and others in like manner excite pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction produced in the spectator are essential to vice and virtue. To approve of a character is to feel a delight upon its appearance, and to disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness." And this uneasiness comes "from their very nature", like the "taste" of true and false wit, which we know without being able to explain.

So briefly in the "Conclusion of the Whole" he tells us that Virtue is the possession of mental qualities either directly or indirectly agreeable to a person himself or to others. The word Sympathy is now seldom used by him; he speaks more of Humanity. "The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind." "The humanity of one man is the humanity of everyone." Hume is looking for a general rule or plan of behaviour among respectable citizens. He describes a Pilgrim's Progress of such, well fitting the "Moderates" as opposed to the "Highfliers" of the eighteenth century,[5] and justifying his praise of Hutcheson (*supra*). He was no doubt himself the Pilgrim: "The constant habit of surveying ourself [*sic*], as it were in reflection, keeps alive the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets in noble natures a certain reverence for themselves as well as others, which is the surest guardian of every virtue. The animal conveniences and pleasures sink gradually in their value, while every inward beauty and moral grace is studiously acquired and the mind is accomplished in each perfection which can adorn or embellish a rational creature. Here is the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted. Here is displayed the force of many sympathies. Our moral sentiment is itself a feeling chiefly of that nature. Our regard to a character with others seems to arise only from a care of preserving a character with ourselves, and to obtain this end we find it necessary to prop

our tottering judgment on the correspondent approbation of mankind."

This is perhaps his highest flight of ethical rhapsody, and he owes it to Hutcheson that he has included Perfection, thereby going beyond Behaviour. He goes beyond Hutcheson, and reverts to Aristotle in regard to the talents and intellectual virtues. He refuses [6] to believe in a universal standard of morality any more than of taste, devoting a "Dialogue", following the Appendices in the *Principles*, to that subject. He winds up one chapter of his "Conclusion of the Whole" by a characteristic repudiation [7] of dogmatic certainty. "I cannot at present be more assured of any truth which I learn from reasoning and argument than that virtue consists entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself possessed of them or to others who have any intercourse with him. But when I reflect that, though the bulk and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated, though the motions of the tides have been accounted for, the order and economy of the heavenly bodies subjected to their proper laws and Infinite itself reduced to calculation, yet men still dispute concerning the foundation of their moral duties—when I reflect on this, I say, I fall back into diffidence and scepticism, and suspect that an hypothesis so obvious, had it been a true one, would, long ere now, have been received by the unanimous suffrage and consent of mankind."

Such sceptical periods may be literally artifices, not intended to disguise Hume's own position, but only to enable ordinary folk (if they like) to use his sanction for adopting a different position. We have the same artifice in the Essay on the Populousness of Ancient Nations and in the Dialogues on Natural Religion. After pointing plainly to a certain conclusion he tells us to be in no hurry to adopt it.

The Moral Sense is retained by him to furnish the peculiar kind of agreeable feeling that goes with virtue; it is essential, not to all, but to most virtues. Common humanity or sympathy translates them in terms of society, morals being essentially a social phenomenon. A feature of nearly all virtues is their Utility, not in the sense of private, but of public advantage. In the case of one virtue—Justice—Utility is the sole origin and explanation; in the case of the rest it is found almost always present and guiding us in perplexities.[8] Hume is plainly inclined to regard this Utility as the really dominating element in morality, but he is not a Utilitarian so far as he does not make it sole ruler.

Possibly recalling a famous *caveat* in Bacon,[9] he could avoid the tendency to follow one simple principle and see nothing else anywhere; the Selfish School saw nothing but self-love, whereas disinterestedness was constantly showing itself. Adam Smith, too, complains of that tendency; but both he and Hume dwell on the desirableness

of simplification whenever it suits their argument. In the present case Hume is willing to allow the two principles, reason and sentiment, to concur. Discussions about the lawfulness of an act would certainly seem to us "reasonings" of a sort. The final appeal, Hume says, is to the moral sense, but the way is prepared for it by reflection and discussion; even our notions of beauty are modified by reflection, and so are our notions of morality. There is such a thing as "a just calculation and a steady preference for the greater happiness". Reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and "humanity" makes us prefer the useful and beneficial. For all that, he says, it is an abuse of terms to ascribe rules of conduct to mere reason and reflection; they are really due to calm passions and propensities.

It is as if he had suddenly remembered the need of safeguarding his own particular metaphysic; but he continues the same line of reasoning, leaving us to make the reservation for ourselves. "If usefulness be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self, it follows that everything which contributes to the happiness of society recommends itself directly to our approbation and good will. Here is a principle which accounts in great part for the origin of morality." "It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient that this is experienced to be a principle

in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes, and there are in every science some general principles beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general."

We may take it that to Hume, accordingly, Utility is the chief general principle, and it is there he is willing to stop, to avoid "infinite regress".[10]

Hume's view of Ethics may be paralleled with his view of Aesthetics. He tells us: "Though it be certain that beauty and deformity, no more than sweet or bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external, it must be allowed that there are certain qualities in objects which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings."[11] He adds that "general rules are of use, being drawn from established models and from the observation of what pleases or displeases". In his contrast of Ancient and Modern morals he not only shows how they differ, but implies by his language that we have improved on the Ancients. There is the same idea about a Standard in Art; it is not altogether a matter of caprice.

In the *Treatise of Human Nature* (more than ten years before) he had written that Beauty, like Wit, cannot be defined, and is discerned only by a Taste or Sensation: "Beauty is such an order and construction of parts as, either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the

Soul. The natural tendency of deformity is to produce uneasiness or pain. This pleasure or pain is of the very essence", reinforced, where external objects are concerned, by convenience and utility. This subject of Beauty is introduced incidentally into a discussion of Pride and Humility. Hume had been saying that the Reflective impressions include (*a*) the calm and (*b*) the violent. Among the calm is the sense of beauty; among the violent love, pride, grief. The two kinds are combined when, for example, a man is proud of his beautiful house; it belongs to himself, the aim or object of his passion is really Self; beauty, inhering in the subject embodied in the aim, causes the pride. It is a double relation of ideas and impressions. The pride is not only natural, but original [instinctive], the self being everywhere the aim or object. The causes, on the other hand, are not original but various, having their common element in the pleasure they produce. They are conjoined because the cause of the passion (say pride) is connected with the aim or end of the passion—namely, Self; it is my house. Not that pride invariably brings pleasure; disturbing causes come in, and there is an influence of custom and general rules.

The Essay tells us that, in the judgment (apart from Self) of the beauty of works of art, practice, experience, and patient attention are necessary to discernment. Absence of prejudice is necessary in the critic of literary works of art, though not to be

expected in the writer thereof. The allowance to be made between difference of ancient and modern manners has its limits. You may excuse the poet and not relish his composition. "We are displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so confounded, and whatever indulgence we may give the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his sentiments or bear an affection to characters which we plainly discover to be blameable." "The case is not the same with moral principles as with speculative opinions of any kind"—the latter being in continual flux. "Where a man is confident of the rectitude of that moral standard by which he judges, he is justly jealous of it." "No religious principles can ever be imputed as a fault to any poet while they remain merely principles, and take not such strong possession of his heart as to lay him under the imputation of bigotry or superstition. Where that happens, they confound the sentiments of morality and alter the natural boundaries of vice and virtue. They are therefore eternal blemishes, according to the principles above mentioned."

It appears that in Hume, if not so clearly as in Burke,[12] the "Understanding" plays a part as well as the Sentiment. "With regard to the sciences and liberal arts, a fine taste is in some measure the same with strong sense [good sense], or at least depends so much upon it that they are inseparable."[13] We are told, too, that the arts and sciences can only arise in a free government.

Both in ethics and in aesthetics Hume sometimes allows himself to forget that all was to be a matter of sentiment.

But unless his mention of "the surprising" as a special class of qualities [14] could be strained to include it, he does not touch in Aesthetics on the Sublime as well as the Beautiful; and something like the same omission appears in his Ethics. He writes to Adam Smith [15] that he has sent the just published *Moral Sentiments* to "Burke, an Irish gentleman, who wrote lately a very pretty *Treatise on the Sublime*". Though Hume had read Longinus, the Sublime was not much in his thoughts. Burke's influence was to appear in Hume's kinsman, Kames; and Gibbon writes that "The Surname of Ilderim, or lightning [given to Bajazet I], is an example that the conquerors and poets of every age have *felt* the truth of a system which derives the sublime from the principle of terror." Burke's principle of terror [16]—the notion of the sublime as connected rather with Pain than with Pleasure—must have repelled Hume, and Burke rejected Utility as the cause of beauty. Hume sees no virtue as Butler saw it in Resentment. He admits unselfish action because of common humanity, but makes light of heroic or saintly virtues. Faults, he says (and therefore, presumably, Virtues also), differ only in degree: "A blemish, a fault, a vice, a crime, these expressions seem to denote different degrees of censure and disapprobation which are, however, all of them at the bottom pretty nearly of the

same kind or species." [17] Such a blemish as vanity is said to detract little from the virtues of great men: "Vanity is so nearly allied to virtue, and to love the fame of virtuous actions approaches so near the love or virtuous actions for their own sake."

This is certainly a modest view of the Dignity of Human Nature. After this, it does not surprise us to find that Hume finds no virtue in remorse.[18] He would flee as far as possible from the terrors of the law, from Puritanism into Respectability.

At the end of his *Principles* [19] he tells us, "A gloomy, hare-brained enthusiast after his death may have place in the calendar, but will scarce ever be admitted when alive into intimacy and society except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself." "As every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is in common life admitted under the denomination of virtue or personal merit, so no other will ever be received where men judge of things by their natural unprejudiced reason without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion." Self-denial and the whole train of monkish virtues "serve no manner of purpose".

"To a Cromwell, perhaps, or a De Retz, discretion may appear an aldermanlike virtue, as Dr. Swift calls it; and being incompatible with those vast designs to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might really in them be a fault or imperfection." After this slight con-

cession he goes on: "But in the conduct of ordinary life no virtue is more requisite, not only to obtain success, but to avoid the most fatal miscarriages and disappointments." Posing as Epicurus, he doubts if there is a "particular reward for the good and punishment of the bad beyond the ordinary course of events".

His ideal does not seem to go much beyond the tranquil, respectable life of harmless comfort, such as he had himself lived, with fame to give it piquancy. Though Adam Smith "always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit",[20] the two friends were not of one mind on the theory of the *Moral Sentiments*.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER VIII

HUME: PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

1. "Old materials." It even repeats the misquotation from Horace, *Epodes* 1. 19: implumibus *pullus* (faithfully retained in Green and Grose) for *pullis*.

2. The last words of the Dissertation, p. 231.

3. Excerpts, etc. *Human Nature* (edited Green and Grose), i. Preface, p. vi.

Space and time, *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. pp. 205 *seq.*

Dissertation, section vi. Cf. *Introduction*, T. H. Green, pp. 192 *seq.*

4. Intimation, § 6.

5. "Moderates" and "Highfliers." See Alexander Carlyle of Inveresk's *Autobiography*, edited Hill Burton, 1860, chap. vi. The Moderates actually quoted Shaftesbury (p. 236), *circa* 1750. There was one sensible Highflier, John Bonar of Cockpen (p. 237).

6. Pages 478–489, edition 1758. There are reservations in the *Essay* (*ibid.*) on the Standard of Taste, p. 138.

7. Repudiation of Certainty, p. 463. Compare the remarkable passage in *Human Nature* on the Understanding (Green and Grose, i. pp. 544 *seq.*). "After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings I can give no reason why I should assent to it; and feel nothing but a *strong* propensity to consider objects *strongly* in that view under which they appear to me" (p. 545). Italics in text as in first edition, vol. i, p. 460.

8. For exceptions, see Section on the Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves, pp. 448–54. On Utility, p. 427 [cf. *Human Nature*, ii. (Green and Grose), p. 197: "Men often act knowingly against their interest", etc.]. Disinterestedness, reason, and reflection: pp. 399–442; cf. p. 468.

9. *Novum Organum*, Aphorismus XLV: Intellectus humanus ex proprietate suâ facile supponit majorem ordinem et aequalitatem in rebus quam invenit. Cf. Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, p. 452, as noted in *Philosophy and Political Economy* (Library of Philosophy, Allen & Unwin), p. 173; cf. p. 151. See also Adam Smith's criticism of the Epicureans, *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, ii. p. 281.

10. "Infinite regress." Aristotle, *Ethics*, i. 1. (2).

11. "Aesthetics", Essay XXVI. Of the Standard of Taste, pp. 139 *seq.* of edition 1758. (On improvement, *ibid.*, p. 485.) Compare *Human Nature*, ii. (Green and Grose), pp. 95, 96; cf. p. 76 *seq.* Of our moderns, Bernard Bosanquet, *History of Æsthetic* (1892), p. 179, and Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (1924), *Art Production*, pp. 18–20, have treated the subject of Art and Utility—the former in connection with Hume's distinction of beauty of imagination and beauty of physical form.

12. Burke: *Sublime and Beautiful*, Preface on Taste (added in edition 1757), pp. 25, 26. The first edition was in 1756.

13. Hume: *Essays*, on Delicacy of Taste (1742, vol. i). Compare Essay XIV, Rise of Arts and Sciences, 1742, vol. ii.

14. *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), ii. pp. 106, 201.

15. Letter of April 1759, in Hill Burton, ii. p. 55.

Longinus: See *Essays*, 1758, pp. 449, 551.

Kames: *Elements of Criticism*, 1761; see Bosanquet, p. 203.

Gibbon: *Decline and Fall*, chap. lxiv.

16. Burke: *Sublime and Beautiful*, Part I, sections vi and vii; Part II, the whole. Utility, *ibid.*, iii, vi.

17. *Essays* (4to of 1758, p. 440). Cf. Verbal Disputes (in edition 1768, vol. ii. pp. 406, 407).

The passage on Vanity is in the first *Essays*, 1741 (Dignity of Human Nature), p. 170.

18. Remorse: *Human Nature* (Green and Grose), vol. ii, chap. i, section viii, p. 95.

Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, 1797, § 34 (Hartenstein's edition, 1868, vol. vii, p. 265) warns us against mere Pity (Barmherzigkeit) as adding by our suffering to the sum total of suffering in the world: "Es kann aber unmöglich Pflicht sein die Uebel in der Welt zu vermehren." Spinoza has the same sentiment, *Ethics*, Propos. L.

19. "A gloomy, hare-brained enthusiast", etc.

Essays, 4to, 1758, p. 459; cf. pp. 488, 425 (section vi. Of Moral Qualities useful to ourselves).

"Posing as Epicurus": *ibid.*, p. 361 (section xi. Of a Particular Providence).

20. Letter to Strahan, November 9, 1776, published with the *Life* in that year, p. 62, (conclusion). Given by Birkbeck Hill in his *Letters of Hume to Strahan* (Clarendon Press), 1888, *Life*, p. xl.

CHAPTER IX

ADAM SMITH: HIS THEORY

ADAM SMITH did not himself hold the theory of a Moral Sense, but as a student at Glasgow[1] he was introduced to philosophy by the champion of that theory, and "if he was any man's disciple he was Hutcheson's". He had later the advantage of intimacy with Hume, receiving the inspiration always given to us by a like-minded friend who nearly agrees but often differs.

His criticism and eventual rejection of the theory may therefore be said to come from the inside of the School. He had unique opportunities for knowing both its teachers and its doctrines; and his own Theory of Moral Sentiments was built up from materials which the School had prepared for him. His book appeared in 1759, and in 1763 Charles Townshend persuaded the author to resign his chair and become travelling tutor to the young Buccleugh, Townshend's step-son.

In this way Adam Smith owed to his first book the travel and leisure which enabled him to perfect his second, the *Wealth of Nations*, 1776. It has needed all the fame of the second to keep alive the memory of the first, which founded no school, and is usually passed over with the faint praise due to the author's reputation. Yet Burke[2] welcomed its theory as "in all its essential parts just";

and it was treated by Lessing with respect, though not agreement, in the *Laocoon*.

Readers of the *Wealth of Nations*, who have the curiosity to go back to the *Moral Sentiments*, might naturally expect to find in it an ethical counterpart of that industrial division of labour, so prominent in the greater book; and, hearing from his biographers that the author was steeped in Greek Philosophy, they might look for Platonic justice and Aristotelian ἔργον and ἀρετή, function and excellence, as in the Ethics,[3] or something about the development of the best faculties and an appeal to the motto "Unto every one his work".

They would be disappointed. The Greek influence is there, often when scarce suspected; but on the whole our author is content to follow the lines and use the language, almost foreign to us now, of the British philosophers of the eighteenth century, getting his cues from Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. The pillars of the reigning philosophy were soon to be threatened by the Samson of Königsberg.[4] Fifty years ago the Kantian Thomas Hill Green, after an exhaustive analysis, found that Hume's ethical theory explained at the best, not Virtue, but Respectability, the temper of a man "who, without definite expectation of ulterior gain, seeks to stand well with his neighbours". This respectability is treated as a "fixed quantity", as "the morality of the average man in his least exalted moments" in the world as it is. Edward Caird would say that we are here

dealing with the actual achievement rather than with the principle at the bottom of it. Adam Smith is not expressly mentioned in Green's analysis; but he and his theory of Sympathy are briefly arraigned and dismissed in *Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life*. To Green and Caird, Kant and Hegel were the modern Plato and Aristotle. It seemed to them as impossible to build an Ethics surely on the unsure metaphysical foundations of Locke and Hume as to build it in Greece on the philosophies before Socrates. If morality is only respectability, the question of a philosophical basis need hardly arise. If the moral philosopher takes us farther than respectability [5] it must arise. "Such a criticism of moral interests [says Green] as is not based on a strict theory of moral good may be called a theory of moral sentiments." So again: "What is called 'moral sentiments' is merely a weaker form of that interest in social well-being, which, when wrought into a man's habits and strong enough to determine action, we call virtue. So far as this interest is brought into play on the mere survey of action, and serves merely to determine an approbation or disapprobation, it is called moral sentiment"; its forms are to be classified on the same principle as those of virtue—"that is, with relation to the social function to which they correspond".

Does Adam Smith stand under the same condemnation as Hume? In the *Wealth of Nations* he might be allowed to postulate, as indeed

he practically does, no higher standard than Respectability.

But does he give us nothing more in the *Moral Sentiments*? Dugald Stewart, his admirer and biographer, admits it: "I acknowledge that this [mutual sympathy] may account for a man's assuming the appearance of virtue, and I believe [with Beattie] that something of this sort is the real foundation of good breeding in polished society; but in the important concerns of life I apprehend there is something more"; right and wrong, "ought" and "ought not", are not explained, and Adam Smith, he says, became more and more conscious of this as time went on.[6]

Stewart was referring to the large changes made in the sixth edition, the last published during the author's lifetime. But many passages, even in the first edition, show how much nearer he came than Hume to a full view of the problems of modern ethics, however short he was of a solution. An economist would remember the contrast of Ricardo and Malthus, the former with the harder head, the latter with the larger views. There is some such contrast between Hume and Adam Smith.

An attempt has already been made to describe the ethical views of Hume. What, for his part, did Adam Smith set out as his?

His first bare title for his book in the first three editions was *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Perhaps

prompted by critics, he altered this [7] into a programme: "*The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, or an essay towards an analysis of the principles by which men naturally judge concerning the conduct and character, first of their neighbours and afterwards of themselves."

In the Essay on the External Senses, probably ten years older than the *Moral Sentiments*, he had spoken of "that fellow-feeling which Nature has for the wisest purposes implanted in man, not only towards all other men, but (though no doubt in a much weaker degree) towards all other animals. Having destined him to be the governing animal in this little world, it seems to have been her benevolent intention to inspire him with some degree of respect even for the meanest and weakest of his subjects."

Even in men it is not Reason unless Feeling has Reason in it, and to our author it has not. Happily he confines his ethics to rational animals. As Green says of Hume in like case, he is dealing "with a fixed quantity", a statical problem or "actual achievement", whereas in the *Wealth of Nations* he deals with a dynamical problem, the results of tireless industrial ambition as the motive force of a progressive society.

Moral Sentiment is taken for analysis in all its parts, assumed unchanging for the purpose in hand. In Adam Smith's college lectures[8], Moral Philosophy, significantly, came after a course in Natural Theology, and before a course in Natural

Jurisprudence, followed in its turn by the study of the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Till 1759 he must have been giving the general outline of the *Moral Sentiments* to his students year by year; but (Stewart tells us) the publication having provided a text-book, he left the subject alone, and devoted more time to Jurisprudence and Political Economy. In the *Lectures*[9] of 1763 there is a passage where he frankly refers his students to his book. After saying that the poor, even when they expect no benefit from the rich, "have a strong propensity to pay them respect", he adds: "This principle is fully explained in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, where it is shown that it arises from our sympathy with our superiors being greater than that with our equals or inferiors; we admire their happy situation, enter into it with pleasure, and endeavour to promote it."

The students were as a rule thoughtful, if not highly instructed lads, under twenty, preparing for the Presbyterian ministry. He had pleasant recollections of them. "Where the masters really perform their duty, there are no examples, I believe, that the greater part of the students ever neglect theirs. No discipline is ever requisite to force attendance upon lectures which are really worth the attending, as is well known wherever such lectures are given." [10]

Still, it was not possible, without some change, to turn lectures that were suited for such lads into a volume suited for all and sundry. He trans-

formed the phraseology so thoroughly as to leave little distinctively Scotch. He and Hume were not alone in needing to watch their English lest they should be betrayed into Scotch.

Hume writes to him from London (April 12, 1759) that bishops are buying the book eagerly. It went through five new editions as one volume, becoming two [11] in the year of his death, 1790, largely amended and expanded. Some of the expansions had been prepared long before, but some are obviously the fruit of age. He is a little didactic, for example, on Vanity,[12] though it is excellent preaching of its kind.

To the part on Custom, found in the earlier editions, he adds one on the Character of Virtue, dealing with Prudence, Benevolence, Self-Command. In the historical conclusion, Systems of Moral Philosophy, he introduces a long passage on Suicide, and he no longer pillories Rochefoucauld with Mandeville under "licentious systems". Earlier, on the Sense of Duty, he introduces the fine episode of Calas, associated with a good deed of Voltaire.

He substitutes a passage on Tartarus and Elysium for a passage on Atonement, which had kept its place in the book even in the fifth edition. But the Other World plays as great a part as before. The author stands by his theory as first given, with most of the repetitions and purple patches.[13]

The repetitions may suggest a lecture; but the

general style is not that of a lecturer pacing his platform and occasionally consulting his notes, rather of an essayist at his desk with his books about him. To get the argument we must penetrate many embellishments. He has himself remarked how much the beauty of an expression depends upon its conciseness.[14] The concise "Smithian" style is to be found in the *Essays* and in the *Wealth of Nations*, not often in the *Moral Sentiments*.

The argument is to this effect. Sympathy is one of the "original passions" or "propensities" [15] of our nature. We judge of our neighbour's feelings by our own; we put ourselves in his place, not by our senses, for they cannot give one man another's feelings, but by our imagination. We try to reproduce for ourselves his situation, that we may fancy how we should feel in his place. Indeed, we consider how "an impartial spectator" [16] would expect us both to feel when both are so placed, and how such a one would judge our sentiments, whether they were "appropriate" to the cause exciting them or were in excess or defect of this "propriety". If our sympathy with our neighbour is to be so complete as to mean approbation of him, we must have come to a common meeting-ground, or (to take our author's metaphor from his favourite art) we must have come to a concord. He must have tuned down his high pitch, and I must have tuned up my low one, to "make one music". Take the example of fortitude in distress. The distressed man must

try to moderate his grief and I must try to feel more of it. Or take the example of resentment.[17] We never have by sympathy the full measure of the sufferer's feeling of resentment. We expect him to have a certain degree of it in self-defence, and we can rise to that amount of feeling. But if he shows boisterous emotion we cannot go with it; he must tune it down till we reach the pitch of concord; then we approve of him. This concord is Propriety in the moral sentiments. It is essential that we should not only reach it, but be conscious of reaching it, or our sympathy does not amount to approbation. Our author admits that this concord does not take us the whole way to Virtue. Virtue appears when not an ordinary but an unusual effort has been made in the tuning down or the tuning up, when the distressed person, for example, shows more fortitude or the bystander more feeling than could ever have been expected.

This, we might think, takes us beyond "respectability", in the disparaging sense. So we read that, "To be amiable,[18] to be respectable, to be the proper object of esteem, is by every well-disposed mind more valued than all the ease and security which love, respect, and esteem can procure us." Our author has always a forbearance for the ordinary frail man, and devotes a special chapter to "the amiable and respectable virtues" in distinction from the noble, saintly, or heroic, which he seldom expects to encounter. He seems to recognize that the majority of men will be

morally and intellectually commonplace, and good outward conduct is all we can expect of them.

But even in commonplace morality Propriety is only the first requisite; there is, besides, the question of Merit or Demerit (Part II). When we speak of the Propriety of feelings we are looking at the causes and motives of them. Merit or demerit comes into view when we look at the effects of the feelings and at the acts arising from them; we see good or ill desert according to the beneficial or mischievous tendency of those acts. "Whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude appears to deserve reward,[19] and whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve punishment." Propriety in the motives must be assumed a *conditio sine quâ non*; without it the good tendency may lose all merit. A benefit conferred from bad motives does not awake our sympathetic gratitude. A sympathetic resentment at the hurtfulness of an action ceases or stops short of full sympathy if the sufferer brought it on himself. The sense of merit comes really from an indirect sympathy. There are here in the judgment of Merit two distinct emotions—a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those who benefit by his actions. Similarly with demerit: we have an "indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer". "Revenge,[20] the excess of resentment, appears to be the most detestable

of all the passions." "We are not at present examining upon what principles a perfect being would approve of the punishment of bad actions, but upon what principles so weak and imperfect a creature as man actually and in fact approves of it." As amended, therefore, the definitions run so: "Actions of a beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, seem alone to require reward, because such alone are the approved objects of gratitude or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spectator. Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment, because such alone are the approved objects of resentment or excite the sympathetic resentment of the spectator." When, besides the good motive, there is success in achievement of benefit,[21] there will be greater gratitude, though there ought not to be a sense of greater merit than when there is good intention with failure. Knowing there will be the greater gratitude we are the more impelled to make our beneficent intentions successful.

But beneficence is free and cannot among equals be extorted by force. It is otherwise with the virtue of Justice[22]—the avoidance of the infliction of damage and hurt to our neighbour. This is no doubt a mere negative virtue, secured sometimes by sitting still and doing nothing. But it is of definite strict obligation, and may be secured by force. Indeed, for the safety of society, it will be said, this must be. Obvious utility

reinforces humanity. Justice supports the whole edifice of society. It is by it that "man who can subsist only in society was fitted by Nature to that situation for which he was made".

It is true that if virtues were supreme among men Government would be unnecessary,[23] and the beauty of the virtues is therefore greater than the beauty coming from the utility of institutions. "Whatever beauty, therefore, can belong to civil government upon account of its utility must in a far superior degree belong to these."

Hume had strongly insisted that justice does not come "naturally", like beneficence, but comes only from utility. Smith insists that, though in the keeping of it as merely negative, there is no great reward, yet in the breaking of it there is occasioned an indignation of the sufferer and sympathetic spectator which will be great or small according to the sacredness of the rights affected; and the violation of the most sacred is a vice of incomparable guilt, leading to "remorse, of all the sentiments which can enter the human breast the most dreadful". The maintenance of justice is founded on a deeper consideration than the interests of society on earth, and we look for a punishment of injustice in another world if it has not come to pass in this one. To avoid unjust actions in our own case we resort to "reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitants of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct". It is "the love of what is honourable

and noble, of the grandeur and dignity and superiority of our own characters"; and it is not felt only by heroes, but by everyone, however humble, who does his part in life.

These are "moral sentiments" far beyond mere respectability. It seems hard to justify them in terms of sympathy, direct or indirect, compounded or uncompounded; but it is at any rate clear that Adam Smith has abandoned Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's Moral Sense and Hume's Utility for the guidance of the Impartial Spectator. Adam Smith has made him a great figure. It is more than the imagination of myself in my neighbour's place, and more than the Stoic isolation of myself by myself. It may be the old idea of the Psalms: "Commune with thine own heart." Sir Thomas Browne [24] speaks of "another man within me that's angry with me, rebukes, commands, and dastards me". Hutcheson,[25] more colourlessly: A person is obliged to an action when "every Spectator or he himself upon Reflection must approve his action." Part of our difficulty in the *Moral Sentiments* is due to terminology. We should not approach the subject now by "sympathy", but should speak of consciousness of identity or common humanity, the idea of a common good as ground of a common obligation; and find ourselves not far from the precept, "What you would that men should do unto you, do unto them." We should perhaps find in the "spectator" only an awkward expression for self-consciousness.[26]

Every man *quâ* reason is the impartial spectator confronting the passions.

Dugald Stewart,[27] who seems puzzled by Adam Smith's idea of the spectator, quotes Shaftesbury's *Advice to an Author*: "When the wise ancients spoke of a demon, genius, or angel to whom we are committed from the moment of our birth, they meant no more than enigmatically to declare that we have each of us a patient in ourselves, that we are properly our own subjects of practice, and that we then become due practitioners when by virtue of an intimate recess [or retreat into ourselves] we can discover a certain duplicity of soul and divide ourselves into two parties; according as this recess was deep and intimate, and the dual number practically formed in us, we were supposed by the ancients to advance in morals and true wisdom."

Stewart could have pointed to passages in the *Moral Sentiments*[28] like this one: "It is evident that in all such cases [when I try to examine my own conduct] I divide myself, as it were, into two persons, and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of."

There is a similar stretch of "imagination" in another passage where the author says that Sympathy is not a selfish principle, it is not self-love, for in entering into another's place by sympathy I am really changing persons and

becoming the other person. In this way, he says, I may have sympathy with a case that could never by any possibility be mine, from a difference of sex, or with a character in long-past history whom I never saw or could see. I detach myself from myself for the occasion. The idea of the spectator was not confined by him to ethics. In the *Lectures* we read: "Occupation [right of the first holder] seems to be well-founded when the spectator can go along with my possession of the object, and approve me when I defend my possession by force. If I have gathered some wild fruit, it will appear reasonable to the spectator that I should dispose of it as I please."

The most characteristic features of Adam Smith's ethics are supposed to be Sympathy and the Spectator. Propriety, though really more novel, is counted a detail. If the Sympathy was suggested by Polybius,[29] and our author undoubtedly was a reader of Polybius, Hume had found in the same passage of Polybius a plea for self-love rather than sympathy. If the Spectator was suggested by Shaftesbury, he has at least been put to new uses. The mere word occurs frequently in Hume,[30] who was before his friend there, as in the attention to sympathy; he thought to get more out of "pleasure" by extending it through sympathy; but in both cases Adam Smith develops the idea differently and more fully.

The use he makes of the Spectator may have been first inspired by the Nicomachean Ethics

of Aristotle, not forgotten among the *Systems of Moral Philosophy* in the last section of the *Moral Sentiments*. If a great moral philosopher has all the wisdom of his age and a little more, we expect him with all his greatness to owe most of his moral ideals and standards to the current ideals and standards of his own age. We find Aristotle teaching that with most of the virtues (not the Intellectual Virtues, and not Friendship, and hardly Justice) the virtuous man is he who avoids extremes and brings his passions to a mean or middle point—a point determined for him by his own judgment, assisted by the judgment of the typically prudent man, ὁ φρόνιμος, ὁ σπουδαῖος.[31] The notion may have been in Aristotle's case the moulding of a statue artistically, or it may have been simply the general Greek fear of excess. In similar fashion Adam Smith reaches Propriety by a tuning up and a tuning down till we reach concord, the man of typically good ear deciding when we have reached it. "If he is not good, no one is good."

In both variants of the theory the same difficulty arises. We should not know the extremes but by the mean. We should not know either of them but by the guidance of the Prudent Man who knows both. Who, then, trained the Prudent Man and gave him his knowledge? How did he acquire the judgment, tact, sound instinct which we are to learn from him?[32] The Greek answer would be that he was citizen of a good State, and was trained by Greek society, or rather by its institu-

tions; for Socrates actually died for *them* at the hands of the very citizens brought up under them and condemning him in their name.[33] Adam Smith may well have had the same answer in his mind, and it is one not far away from the answer of the philosophies after Kant. They tell us that civilized human society, "relations dear and all the charities of father, son, and brother", fill the empty sheath of the categorical imperative. We are told in the *Moral Sentiments* [34] that morality begins with society, that the field of moral training is first the family, then society, then the State, the range though not the intensity of the sense of duty expanding in a man as he feels himself in the larger after the smaller circles. Adam Smith is the more inclined to this answer as he believes even the society of his own time and the World itself to contain more good than evil, and more happiness than unhappiness. The Creator made the world for our happiness. Adam Smith is against "those whining and melancholy moralists who are perpetually reproaching us with our happiness while so many of our brethren are in misery". "This extreme sympathy with misfortunes which we know nothing about seems altogether absurd and unreasonable. Take the whole earth at an average; for one man who suffers pain or misery you will find twenty in prosperity and joy, or at least in tolerable circumstances. No reason, surely, can be assigned why we should rather weep with the one than rejoice with the

twenty." [35] The world, even as it is, provides a field for moral training; it is "the great school of self-command, the bustle and business of the world". General rules, whether called "laws" of duty or not, are formed and used to this end. Men sometimes try to correct Nature and confine her rewards to the best of men, but with little success, the "natural course of things" being too strong for them. Fortunately happiness is better distributed than wealth, and ambition is usually folly, due to desire of shining, and sometimes desire of a fancied comfort no greater than what is already possessed. We read of "the poor man's son whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition",[36] and who, in order to get the blessings and honours of the rich, submits to "more fatigue of body and more uneasiness of mind than he could have suffered through the whole of his life from want of them". "What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience?" "Wealth and greatness are mere trinkets, of frivolous utility." We might fancy a real change of persons in our author's case. Was this plea for poverty really written by the author of the apology for commercial ambition, and of the encomium on "the progressive state", in the *Wealth of Nations*? Yet the two persons come together. When we might think that, in this passage of the *Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith has spoiled all taste for ambition, we hear that, after all, the illusion is

a happy one. "It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind", and transforms the whole face of the earth. It is, too, "the [world's] bustle and business" that have trained "the man of real constancy and firmness" who keeps his self-control and is always mindful of his inward monitor. He will, we should think, himself represent to others the moral standard.

But our moral standards do not remain alike.[37] The Golden Mean is one thing at Amsterdam and another in Warsaw. Do our Wise Men of various nations carry our principles higher than current rules and current practice? The common standard may contain more than the commonalty of every nation recognize in it; the joint popular wisdom may be greater than that of the component individuals taken severally; and the mind of a nation, so expressed, may be like Aristotle's collective wisdom, something wiser than appears in the citizens separately. It is the "spirit of the laws" which the ordinary citizen is not able to distil out of them for himself but the prudent man distils for him.

The summary given by our author himself near the close of his book, in all editions,[38] is a model of the conciseness he had elsewhere praised but in this book neglected. Our moral approbation of a character, he says, is given when "first, we sympathize with the motives of the agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive

the benefit of his actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act; and last of all, when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine."

Is this really the conclusion of the whole matter? Does Adam Smith provide in this or any other way for a morality that is more than tradition and custom? A rule of mere sympathy might lead us all to act alike; but this would mean a customary morality, which our Prophets are sure sooner or later to find faulty. It is pointed out by T. H. Green that Butler's "Conscience" was described by him as "a faculty of reflex approbation and disapprobation".[39] Adam Smith was working hard, like Bishop Butler, to escape from the infirmities of the same original basis. In later times we proceed rather by ideals of goodness and the notion of development than by the standard of common approbation, and we miss room in the *Moral Sentiments* for the morally progressive state. When it is provided at all, it is provided dogmatically. Our author seems to be judging himself in a remarkable and characteristic passage [40] of the sixth edition of the book, the last opportunity he had for giving his views on the subject. He begins: "The all-wise Author of Nature has, in

this manner, taught man to respect the sentiments and judgments of his brethren, to be more or less pleased when they approve of his conduct, and to be more or less hurt when they disapprove of it. He has made man, if I may say so, the immediate judge of mankind, and has, in this respect, as in many others, created him after His own image, and appointed him His vicegerent upon earth, to superintend the behaviour of his brethren. They are taught by Nature to acknowledge that power and jurisdiction which has thus [*sic*] been conferred upon him, to be more or less humbled and mortified when they have incurred His censure, and to be more or less elated when they have obtained His applause."

So far he seems to proceed by the logic of an English moralist of the eighteenth century, through Propriety to Merit and Duty. The next step is taken without full logical authority, however creditable it is to his heart. He goes on: "But, though man has, in this manner, been rendered the immediate judge of mankind, he has been rendered so only in the first instance; and an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct. The jurisdictions of those two tribunals are founded upon principles which, though in some respects resembling and akin, are, however, in reality

different and distinct. The jurisdiction of the man without is founded altogether in the desire of actual praise and in the aversion to actual blame. The jurisdiction of the man within is founded altogether in the desire of praiseworthiness and in the aversion to blameworthiness, in the desire of being good as well as seeming good, in the desire of possessing those qualities and performing those actions which we love and admire in other people, and in the dread of possessing those qualities and performing those actions which we hate and despise in other people. If the man without should applaud us, either for actions which we have not performed or for motives which had no influence upon us, the man within can immediately humble that pride and elevation of mind which such groundless acclamations might otherwise occasion by telling us that, as we know we do not deserve them, we render ourselves despicable by accepting them." If the man within is brow-beaten by the man without [the man in the street], there is always an appeal to the "all-seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be deceived, and whose judgments can never be perverted". There follows an eloquent passage which gives us Browning's *Rabbi Ben Ezra* in prose, with few touches omitted, and pointing in Browning's way to another world redressing the balance of this one. Adam Smith gives abundant references throughout, not only to French literature, but to the Bible and Greek Philosophy. Is

he unconsciously following Plato's example and writing a myth when he has come to the end of logic? Like Plato, he will not on such matters vouch for details, but like Plato he is confident that "something of the kind" is true.

Adam Smith's Glasgow students could have supplied missing links in the argument from his lectures on Natural Theology, which probably followed Hutcheson's. Hutcheson in his *System* deals with the existence and attributes of Deity. Accordingly there is a section in the *Moral Sentiments*: [41] "Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity." Adam Smith's lectures on the subject may have been among the papers destroyed by his own orders at the time of his approaching death. This might only show that he did not regard them as at all original, or that he thought them unfinished in form.

It is fair to say that he makes some attempt to bridge the gap, in the book itself.[42]

In editions before the sixth, in the chapter on Duty, we read: "But though this tribunal within our own breast be thus the supreme arbiter of all our actions . . . yet if we inquire into the origin of its institution, its jurisdiction we shall find is in a great measure derived from the authority of that very tribunal [man the immediate judge of mankind] whose decisions it so often and so justly reverses. When we first come into the world,

from the natural desire to please, we accustom ourselves to consider what behaviour is likely to be agreeable to every person we converse with, to our parents, to our masters, to our companions. We address ourselves to individuals, and for some time fondly pursue the impossible and absurd project of gaining the good will and approbation of everybody. We are soon taught by experience, however, that this universal approbation is altogether unattainable. As soon as we come to have more important interests to manage, we find that by pleasing one man we almost certainly disoblige another, and that by humouring an individual we may often irritate a whole people. The fairest and most equitable conduct must frequently obstruct the interests or thwart the inclinations of particular persons who will seldom have candour enough to enter into the propriety of our motives, or to see that this conduct, how disagreeable soever to them, is perfectly suitable to our situation. In order to defend ourselves from such partial judgments we soon learn to set up in our own minds a judge between ourselves and those we live with. We conceive ourselves as acting in the presence of a person quite candid and equitable, of one who has no particular relation either to ourselves or to those whose interests are affected by our conduct, who is neither father nor brother nor friend either to them or to us, but is merely a man in general, an impartial spectator who considers our conduct with the same indifference

with which we regard that of other people. If, when we place ourselves in the situation of such a person, our own actions appear to us under an agreeable aspect, if we feel that such a spectator cannot avoid entering into all the motives which influenced us, whatever may be the judgments of the world, we must still be pleased with our own behaviour and regard ourselves as the just and proper objects of approbation." Weak and vain folk may be mortified by censure and elated by applause: "This inmate of the breast, this abstract man, the representative of mankind and substitute of the Deity, whom Nature has constituted the supreme judge of all their actions, is seldom appealed to by them; they are contented with the decision of the inferior tribunal."

In Kantian language,[43] having found the "impartial spectator" a useful regulative idea, he converts it into a constitutive one. To say that one thing becomes another "by degrees" ("We soon learn", etc.) is not to explain the change unless some necessity for the degrees is shown. It may be the same sort of justification as that by which Hegel leads us from Law into Morality, the notion of a Will identical with the Law. But Adam Smith is leading us from a lower to a higher stage within Morality itself; he thinks that, to attain the highest morality, we pass beyond the judgments of society, from which, indeed, the moral law is our refuge. In spite of his disclaimer of Stoicism,[44] this is not far from the last refuge

of the Stoic, his own soul, which enabled him to "care as little for the Roman Empire as the Roman Empire cared for him". Stoicism is rejected as too high for the ordinary man. Though the stoical reliance on Providence ("a still nobler principle, trust in Providence") is commended, the Stoics are blamed for bringing it too directly and too continually into everyday life.

But how does the ordinary man live a good life without those sublime supports? Adam Smith tells us that the ordinary man has the sense of duty, resting on general rules of conduct. "Our continual observations upon the conduct of others insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules [45] concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided." "The general rule is formed by finding out from experience that all actions of a certain kind or circumstanced [sic] in a certain manner [46] are approved of." On the other hand, this judgment of others only comes in to support our own original experience; a man's detestation of an inhuman murder arises spontaneously. "The general rule which he might afterwards form would be founded upon the detestation which he felt necessarily arise in his own breast at the thought of this and every other particular action of the same kind." In spite of his disclaimer of Hutcheson, this is not far from the doctrine of a moral sense. He goes on to say that we are the stronger for knowing that others think as we do. The general rules thus formed are

taken as having a higher authority than the particulars from which they are collected. With ordinary men the knowledge of the existence of the rules may quicken them when they are morally dead. For the superior men they may have greater weight than the data or dicta of the particular high or humble authorities contributing to what is after all a popular code. The principle at the bottom of the achievement may be higher than the achievement itself. But we are not assured that this generalizing from somewhat meagre data takes us beyond mere respectability and groundless applause or censure. "For a wise man he [Chatham] was too much guided by general maxims" was a sage saying of Burke. The dilemma of the morally disappointed man, so well described by Adam Smith in the passage quoted, is analogous to that of the judge in Aristotle called upon to decide in cases where law as a hard general rule conflicts from its very generality with rightfulness, and a new source of judgment appears in Equity.[47] So with "extenuating circumstances". Bacon says that the Court of Chancery "holds the Praetorian Power for mitigating the rigour of law in case of extremity by the conscience of a good man". From customary manners we may conceive ourselves passing into deeper morals [48] by means of Aristotle's Prudent Man, who is one with what is best in the general rules, has mastered them, and thereby seen a little beyond them, showing in his life a living embodiment of the spirit of

them. He and his followers are the men "of the happiest mould", distinguished from "the bulk of mankind", creatures "formed of coarse clay". We may consider Adam Smith himself to have so risen above ordinary standards when he writes: "When two nations are at variance, the citizen of each pays little regard to the sentiments which foreign nations may entertain concerning his conduct. His whole ambition is to obtain the approbation of his own fellow-citizens; and, as they are all animated by the same hostile passions which animate himself, he can never please them so much as by enraging and offending their enemies. The partial spectator is at hand; the impartial one [the neutral nation] at a great distance. In war and negotiation, therefore, the laws of justice are very seldom observed. Truth and fair dealing are almost totally disregarded." Though always a patriot,[49] Adam Smith had an inkling of international law, in the track of Grotius.

Hume does not go so far as his friend: "As nature has implanted in everyone a superior affection to his own country, we never expect any regard to distant nations where the smallest competition arises. Not to mention that, while every man consults the good of his own community, we are sensible that the general interest of mankind is [thus] better promoted than by any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species, whence no beneficial action could ever result, for

want of a duly limited object on which they could exert themselves."

The two friends were not always agreed. Hume was above jealousy, knew his friend's powers, and rejoiced in his growing fame. But was he really an admirer of the *Moral Sentiments*? His welcome ("Euge! belle!") of the *Wealth of Nations* is far heartier than his reception of the earlier book. The sneer at the bishops was perhaps also a reflection on his friend. Not that he disliked the praise of himself [50] as a philosopher not only deep but eloquent, any more than the similar praise of him as "by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian". He would have given back praise for praise. But his friend's position involved a theology and teleology alien to Hume. Readers of the biographies of both men will remember how faithfully on his friend's death in 1776 (August 25th) Adam Smith fulfilled the executor's duty of publishing Hume's autobiography, adding testimony to him with a full heart "as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit". They will remember also the obstinate refusal of Adam Smith to perform the same office to the *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, written in 1751, and held back by the author very reluctantly. Three years after his death, after many parleyings among the executors, they were published by Hume's nephew David, without name of editor or publisher.[51]

Hume's *Natural History of Religion* (1757) had rendered to Theism a lip-homage which was withheld in the *Dialogues*.

At the end of the *Moral Sentiments* there is a history of Theories. There is nothing there or elsewhere in Adam Smith quite corresponding to a "Natural History" of Morals, in Hume's sense of the terms. We are told, however, in the *Wealth of Nations* [52] that ethics arose under the Greeks when "common connecting principles" were sought for the explanation of morals as for other phenomena. "In every age and country of the world men must have attended to the characters, designs, and actions of one another, and many reputable rules and maxims for the conduct of human life must have been laid down and approved by common consent." Then with writing came the recorded maxims of proverbial philosophy. The earliest philosophy was no doubt an endeavour after Physics, but after that something of the same kind would be attempted in Morals. "The maxims of common life were arranged in some methodical order, and connected together by a few common principles in the same manner as they [men] had attempted to arrange and connect the phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles is what is properly called moral philosophy." This sketch is his nearest approach to what his biographer, Stewart, would call Theoretical or Conjectural or (after Hume)

Natural History. Hume had attempted it for Religion, and Adam Smith thought of attempting this and something more for Jurisprudence and Government (see conclusion of *Moral Sentiments* and Preface to the sixth edition). Coming to written history, he evidently found more to his mind in Greek Philosophy than in medieval.[53] The Greek programme is, as a matter of fact, the programme of the *Moral Sentiments*. "Wherein consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, considered not only as an individual, but as the member of a family, of a State, and of the great society of mankind, was the object which the ancient moral philosophy proposed to investigate. . . . The duties of human life were treated of as subservient to the happiness and perfection of human life. But when moral as well as natural philosophy came to be taught only as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come." Adam Smith is far from considering them as so subservient; but in the *Moral Sentiments* he shows himself constantly mindful of the Other World,[54] especially as a consolation to those whose resolute virtue seems to pass unrewarded in this life. For his full ethical views we must go to his ethical book, and not to the *Wealth of Nations*; and, as already said, there is no sign of any essential change in 1790 of the ethical views of 1759. The subject of faith and of morals is only introduced at all in the *Wealth of Nations* to give

the author an opportunity of showing the bad effects of Endowments, as bad, he thinks, in Churches as in Universities.[55] In the *Dialogues on Natural Religion* Hume takes the same view of them as his friend; but in his *History of England* he says they have the good effect of keeping the clergy quiet and free from enthusiasm.

Adam Smith rejects this view. Without Church establishments, he thinks, the concessions which the sects would find it "convenient and agreeable to make to one another might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion free from every admixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see established" but will never see established by positive law.[56]

This would be "the religion common to all good men". It might even be Kant's "religion within the bounds of mere reason".

We are here more concerned with our author's history of the "Systems of Moral Philosophy" as contained in the *Moral Sentiments.*

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER IX

Adam Smith: His Theory.

1. Adam Smith (1723–1790) was three years at Glasgow University, 1737–1740. Hutcheson was one of his Professors. He went with the Snell Exhibition to Balliol College, Oxford, in 1740; returned to Scotland in 1746; lectured at

Edinburgh in 1748 and 1749; and became Professor at Glasgow, first of Logic, 1751, then (to his better satisfaction) of Moral Philosophy, 1752 till 1763.

See *Life of Adam Smith*, by John Rae, 1895, pp. 146, 147, who (on his page 11) makes the remark about the discipleship.

2. Burke: In the *Annual Register*, 1759, p. 484, a review of the book. See Rae, p. 145.

Lessing: *Laocoon*, chap. iv (1766).

3. Aristotle: *Ethics*, ii. 4. (5).

4. Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781.

Green (Thomas Hill): *Introduction* to Hume's *Human Nature* (ed. Green and Grose), ii. p. 70.

Popular Philosophy, *North British Review*, March 1868, pp. 147, 149. (*Works* of Green, iii. pp. 108, 111.)

Caird (Edward): *Philosophy of Kant*, second edition, 1889, vol. ii, p. 173.

"Kant and Hegel." See Caird's *Hegel*, Philosophical Classics, 1883, p. 223.

5. "Further than respectability." See Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, § 148; Green, Political Obligation, *Works*, ii. pp. 337, 552. The quotation in the text is from Green.

For an approach to the idea of "mere respectability" in a disparaging sense, see *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, vol. i, p. 204, where the man who is "barely innocent" is barely commended.

6. Dugald Stewart: *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*, Edinburgh, 1828, vol. i, pp. 312, 313.

7. "Altered this"—in the fourth edition, 1774.

"External Senses"—*Essays*, edition 1795, p. 199. Cf. *Moral Sentiments*, fifth edition, p. 166; sixth edition, i. p. 237.

8. "College lectures." See *Moral Sentiments*, last chapter in all editions, compared with Preface to sixth edition.

Compare also Rae's *Life*, p. 54; Stewart's Preface to *Adam Smith's Essays*, 1795, pp. xvii, l.

9. "In the Lectures"—*Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms*, 1763, *from Notes of a Student*, edited by Professor

Edwin Cannan (Clarendon Press, 1896). The reference to the *Moral Sentiments* is on p. 9.

10. *Wealth of Nations*, Book V, chap. i. Education of Youth, p. 343, second edition, MacCulloch.

11. Rae is mistaken here (p. 141), and not only here. For the text and emendations there is no editor so good as Dr. Walther Eckstein, of Vienna. See his translation into German (Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1926, two volumes) entitled: *Adam Smith. Theorie der Ethischen Gefühle.* He has also written on *Adam Smith als Rechtsphilosoph*, 1927. Adam Smith's own account of the alterations in his book is given in an "Advertisement" to the sixth edition as follows: "The reader will find the principal alterations which I have made in this New Edition in the last chapter of the third Section of Part First; and in the four first chapters of Part Third. Part Sixth, as it stands in this New Edition, is altogether new. In Part Seventh I have brought together the greater part of the different passages concerning the Stoical Philosophy, which, in the former Editions, had been scattered about in different parts of the work. I have likewise endeavoured to explain more fully, and examine more distinctly, some of the doctrines of that famous sect. In the fourth and last section of the same Part I have thrown together a few additional observations concerning the duty and principle of veracity. There are, besides, in other parts of the work, a few other alterations and corrections of no great moment."

12. "On vanity", sixth edition, ii. p. 278.

"Sense of duty", sixth edition, i. pp. 302, 303 (Calas).

"Tartarus", *ibid.*, pp. 228, 229. Contra, fifth edition, 1781, pp. 157-60. Sir John Sinclair (in Sinclair's *Life*, i. p. 40; compare Rae, p. 429) declared that the author left out the passage on Atonement as "unnecessary and misplaced". If the motive were not simply to gain space, Adam Smith may have desired to avoid the appearance of extreme orthodoxy; and when the alteration was observed it was deplored by

the straitest. On the other hand the passage stood in 1781 as it stood in 1759. By a curious accident, this is the only passage in Adam Smith's books of which the manuscript has been preserved. See Rae, pp. 428–9.

13. Dr. Eckstein (Introduction, p. xxxvi) pointed out that the essay on *The First Formation of Languages* was added first in the third edition, 1767, and not, as even Dugald Stewart says (in *Life of Adam Smith*, 1795, xii, 1811, p. 46), in the second, 1761. The insertion seemed to need a defence and perhaps received it in sixth edition, ii. p. 384. See *infra*, p. 247. Süssmilch printed an essay on the subject in 1766. It was a favourite topic with Rousseau.

14. *Essay on Languages. Moral Sentiments*, third edition, 1767, p. 475; fifth edition, 1790, p. 548. Lord Buchan alleged (in 1793) that the Glasgow Literary Society "gave origin" both to the revised *Moral Sentiments* and to this *Essay* (David Murray: "R. and A. Foulis", 1913, page 38.)

15. "Propensities"—a favourite expression of the school. We read of the Epicurean "propensity to account for all appearances from as few principles as possible". *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, p. 452; sixth edition, ii. p. 281.

In the *Wealth of Nations*, I. ii. p. 62, the division of labour is deduced from "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another"; and Hume, in the *Natural History of Religion*, speaks of a "propensity in human nature which leads into a system" (p. 496 of 4to, 1758, section iii, first paragraph).

16. "Impartial Spectator", etc.: first edition, pp. 59, 60; sixth edition, i. pp. 23 *seq.* Cf. *Essays*, ed. 1795, on Imitative Arts, Part II, pp. 172 *seq.*, for his love of music.

17. In the *Lectures* of 1763, p. 153, we are told: "Resentment is on the whole a very indiscriminating principle and pays little attention to the disposition of the mind" [of the provoking assailant]. Better in *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, i. p. 187, long note. (Merit and Demerit, Part II, section i.)

18. "To be amiable", etc.: first edition, p. 449; sixth edition, ii. p. 278. Cf. sixth edition, i. pp. 106, 202, and the

chapter on the amiable and respectable virtues, fifth edition, p. 30; sixth edition, i. p. 44.

19. "Deserve reward", etc.: first edition, p. 439; sixth edition, ii. p. 267.

His words are: "Beneficent actions have in them another quality by which they appear not only to deserve approbation but recompense."

20. "Revenge": sixth edition, i. p. 188 note. There is a visible influence of Butler in a passage on the weak mercy to the guilty that means cruelty to the innocent. First edition, p. 196; cf. p. 172; sixth edition, vol. i, p. 221. Cf. sixth edition, i. p. 193.

21. "Success in achievement of benefit." Sixth edition, i. p. 268; cf. p. 234.

22. Part II, section ii, in all editions.

23. "Government would be unnecessary." First edition, p. 357; sixth edition, i. p. 474.

See *supra*, and compare Professor Muirhead on *Aristotle's Ethics* (1900), p. 174.

24. *Religio Medici*, ii. § 7, *circa* 1643.

25. Hutcheson, *Passions*, ed. 1730, p. 229.

26. See Caird, *Kant*, vol. ii, pp. 213, 214.

Jas. Mackintosh, *Life* (second edition), ii. p. 349, writes, quite in the manner of Shaftesbury: "I often feel a distaste for myself; I am sure I should not esteem my own character in another person."

Tennyson's "Comfort in division of the records of the mind" does not help us here, proceeding as it does longitudinally! (Locksley Hall). Dramatic appeals of heroes to themselves, in all literature, simply bring out the duality of self-consciousness.

27. Dugald Stewart: *Active and Moral Powers*, 1828, vol. i, p. 314.

28. *Moral Sentiments*, fifth edition, p. 202, on Duty; first edition, pp. 495, 496; sixth edition, ii. pp. 329, 330; cf. i. p. 182.

For the "spectator" see the *Lectures* of 1763, p. 108; and compare Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers*, vol. ii, p. 317, a passage which gives interesting confirmation of the Student's notes. "Some later philosophers [later than Locke and Grotius] have founded the right of property on the general sympathy of mankind with the *reasonable* expectation [italics in text] which the occupant has formed of enjoying unmolested the object he has got possession of, or of which he was the first discoverer; and on the indignation felt by the impartial spectator when he sees this reasonable expectation disappointed. This theory (which I have been assured from the best authority was adopted by Mr. Smith in his lectures on jurisprudence) seems to have been suggested by a passage in Dr. Hutcheson's *Moral Philosophy*, in which he says that 'it is immoral, when we can support ourselves otherwise, to defeat any innocent design of another; and that on this immorality is founded the regard we owe to the claims of the first occupant'." (A somewhat compressed version of *System*, Vol. I, Book II, chap. v, pp. 317, 318 note; cf. p. 254.) From Stewart's *Life of Adam Smith* (Biographical Memoir for the Edinburgh Royal Society), 1811, p. 12 note, it appears that the "best authority" was John Millar, Professor of Law.

29. Polybius, *History*, Book VI, section 4.

See Hume, *Principles*, "Why Utility Pleases" (p. 425 of edition 1758).

30. "Spectator" in Hume, e.g. *Principles* (edition 1758), p. 469. In Hutcheson *e.g. Passions*, pp. 209, 262 *seq.*

31. See Professor J. H. Muirhead, *Aristotle's Ethics*, pp. 92, 93.

32. In sixth edition, ii. p. 65, Adam Smith says that Prudence, "combined with other virtues", makes the noblest of characters; imprudence with other vices the worst. Without saying that his Prudence translates *φρόνησις*, we may say that prudence is essential to the *φρόνιμος*.

Bradley prefers the plural *φρόνιμοι*, *Ethical Studies*, p. 180.

33. Muirhead, *loc. cit.*, pp. 93, 94. Compare Plato's *Crito* and *Matthew* v. 17: "Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the Prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil."

34. *Moral Sentiments*, e.g. sixth edition, i. pp. 213, 348, 355; cf. pp. 221, 265, 415.

35. A new passage in sixth edition, i. pp. 341–3. Compare ii. p. 139, and first edition, p. 89.

"School of self-command": sixth edition, i. p. 359.

"Natural course of things": fifth edition, p. 241; sixth edition, i. pp. 420 *seq.*

36. "Poor man's son": sixth edition, i. pp. 456-8, but cf. p. 464.

"What can be added", etc.: sixth edition, i. p. 107. Leslie Stephen (*English Thought*, ii. p. 72) thinks that this is a reminiscence of Pope's *Essay on Man*, iv. p. 80. It may be of Swift's seventh *Sermon*, "On the Poor Man's Contentment", though it has more of the flavour of Pope.

37. Standards differ: fifth edition, p. 312; sixth edition, ii. beginning Influence of Custom.

38. Summary in all editions. In sixth edition it is in Part VII, section iii, Of Systems of Moral Philosophy, pp. 355, 356.

39. T. H. Green, *Works*, vol. iii, p. 100 ("Popular Philosophy in its relation to Life").

40. *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, vol. i, pp. 320 *seq.*

41. *Ibid.* First edition p. 273, sixth ed. vol. i, p. 402. Cf. vol. i, p. 413. "Those vicegerents of God within us."

"Papers destroyed": Rae, p. 434.

42. "In editions before the sixth"—in the chapter on Duty (e.g. fifth edition, pp. 206 ff.), of which only the substance is kept in the sixth edition, vol. i, p. 395, etc.

"Man the immediate judge of mankind": fifth edition, p. 204; cf. pp. 207, 208.

Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, ii. p. 57, speaks of God as "a witness and spectator of human life".

43. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Antinomy VIII.

Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, § 104.

44. "Stoicism": sixth edition, ii. pp. 261–4; first edition, p. 136, at less length. Cf. Caird, Roman Element in Civilization, *North British Review*, June 1866, p. 269.

45. "General Rules": fifth edition, pp. 223–5; sixth edition, i. pp. 393, 395, 396, 397.

46. "In a certain manner." Cf. Hume, *supra*. The certain kind and manner are really the problem.

"Circumstanced" occurs in Burke, speech of March 22, 1775. "General maxims" (of Chatham) in speech of April 19, 1774.

47. ἐπιείκεια. *Ethics*, v. 14 (10).

"Extenuating circumstances." Green, *Works*, ii. p. 499, Political Obligation.

"Conscience of a good man." Bacon, *Henry VII*.

48. "Deeper morals", etc. See fifth edition, p. 231; sixth edition, i. p. 382, Part III, chap. i.

49. Patriotism. See, e.g., first edition, p. 98.

International law. See the *Lectures* of 1763, pp. 1–7 (Natural Jurisprudence), and *Moral Sentiments*, conclusion, in all editions. Hume, *Principles*, section v. Why Utility pleases, p. 430 of edition 1758.

For the limits of the claims of the Nation and claims of Humanity, see Mr. J. A. Hobson, *Wealth and Life* (1929), p. 396.

50. Hume praised. See *Moral Sentiments*, Part IV, section i, on Utility. See also *Wealth of Nations*, V. i. article iii.

51. London, 1779. The whole story is given in Rae, chap. xix, and Birkbeck Hill's *Letters of Hume to Strahan* (Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 330, 364. The subject is further discussed in the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, vol. i, article 3 (on the Moral Sentiments), July 1926, from which this book has been allowed to borrow, somewhat freely, throughout.

52. History and scheme of ethical study. *Wealth of Nations*, V. i. section ii, on Education of youth.

Cf. Stewart's edition of Adam Smith's *Essays*, p. xlii; conclusion of *Moral Sentiments* in all editions, and Preface to sixth edition.

53. Hume's model was rather the Roman, as in Cicero.

54. "The other world." *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, vol. i, p. 303.

55. Endowments. Hume, quoted with some freedom, in *Wealth of Nations*, V. i. art. iii. The passage is in Hume's *History of England* for the year 1521, reign of Henry VIII, vol. iii, chap. iii, pp. 116, 117 of 4to edition 1767. Contra, *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, p. 252.

56. "Common to all good men"—or all wise men, if we believe the first Lord Shaftesbury as quoted by Toland. See J. M. Robertson, *Pioneer Humanists*, p. 199. The passage of our author is in the *Wealth of Nations*, Book V, section iii: "Of the expense of the institutions for the instruction of people of all ages."

CHAPTER X

ADAM SMITH: HISTORIAN AND CRITIC

THE strictly ethical part [1] of the *Moral Sentiments* ends with a history "Of the systems of moral philosophy". As the *Wealth of Nations* deals with civilized man and uses the Noble Savage only for occasional illustration, so the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* confines its studies to the moral principles of the civilized man, inquiring what they are and why they are so, and what various theories have been made about them among civilized nations, ancient and modern.

Our author judges the successive moral philosophies by their answers to two important questions: What is the nature of Virtue? What is the faculty or principle by which virtue is approved and vice blamed? [2]

According to the leading ancient philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epictetus[3]—the nature of virtue, says our author, is "propriety" of conduct, "the suitableness of the affection to the object which excites it". With them he ranks Samuel Clarke and Wollaston, of his own century.

Another class of systems would make virtue consist in prudence or, even if we consult Epicurus, in pleasure. A third placed it in benevolence, and to this third class belonged the later Eclectics or Platonists, and, among moderns, Cudworth, Henry More, John Smith, of Cambridge. "But of all the

patrons of this system, ancient or modern, the late Dr. Hutcheson [4] was undoubtedly, beyond all comparison, the most acute, the most distinct, the most philosophical, and, what is of the greatest consequence of all, the soberest and most judicious."

His system has a peculiar tendency "to nourish and support in the human heart the noblest and most agreeable of all affections". Adam Smith was glad to praise Hutcheson, just as in the *Wealth of Nations* he was glad to praise the French Economists, whose system "never has done, and probably never will do, any harm in any part of the world". His tribute to Hutcheson might well be the warmer of the two, for he had himself been bred and fed on Hutcheson, and he was only an independent ally of the Economists. But as he differed somewhat from the latter concerning the nature and causes of the *Wealth of Nations*, so he parted company with his old professor over the nature of virtue and over the faculty of perceiving it.

Like Butler, though not wholly for his reasons, Adam Smith sees in virtue much more than benevolence. Without going so far as Hume in the matter of Talents,[5] he says that Hutcheson's system (among other drawbacks) does not explain why we approve "the inferior virtues of prudence, vigilance, circumspection, temperance, constancy, firmness", "the habits of economy, industry, discretion, attention, and application of thought", which have the self-interested motives [6] Hutcheson

threatens to cast out altogether. Hutcheson attends too exclusively to beneficent tendency, and too little to "propriety", or suitableness to the exciting causes. The other extreme is Mandeville's, who in his "licentious system" explains all by self-love. Hume's explanation by utility can be taken as an explanation by propriety, for the useful tendency of a virtue depends on the degree of the affection, its "moderation", therefore its correspondence with the object.

The medieval philosophers who magnified benevolence with Hutcheson found in it as they thought a way of bringing God and man together ("Love I gave thee with Myself to love"). Adam Smith mentions this view with respect, but does not enlarge on it. He may have remembered the difficulty pointed out by Hume[7]—a difficulty not easily overcome by Smith's own system.

He answers by anticipation Abraham Tucker [8] and William Paley: "That system which places virtue in obedience to the will of the deity may be counted either among those which make it consist in prudence or among those which make it consist in propriety."[9] It is the first if it is made a matter of rewards and punishments in the other world. Hume's system was not of this sort, and he differed from Adam Smith only in making "utility and not sympathy, or the correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural and original measure" of the "proper degree of all the affections".

Adam Smith concludes the first part of his short history with a section on Licentious Systems, from which in the sixth edition he strikes out Rochefoucauld.

He comes to the second part—the answers to the questions of the "principle of approbation". The first was of far more practical importance,[10] but this second is of the "greatest importance in speculation". It is so for our present study.

According to our author there are three main theories of the source of approbation. The first, including that of Hobbes, Pufendorf, Mandeville, derived it from self-love, deducing from self-love even the interest we take in the welfare of society and our preference of order to disorder, ancient or modern. Those philosophers were (he believes) groping after his own view [11] of "that indirect sympathy which we feel with the gratitude or resentment of those who received the benefit or suffered the damage"—a sentiment, he says, which is not really self-love at all.

The doctrine of Hobbes explained morality away as mere self-preservation and despairing obedience to Force and the civil magistrate. Happily it stirred up philosophers to devise a better theory of the source of morality. Some of them explained it as Reason,[12] and this, our author says, is true "in some respects". Cudworth was right in arguing it could not come from Law, for Law itself implied it. Such philosophers were right in supposing it came from "conformity to

reason" in regard to its general rules, but, as Hutcheson showed, wrong in supposing the "first perceptions" to be so derived; these can be only "the object of immediate sense and feeling". "Pleasure and pain are the great objects of desire and aversion, but these are distinguished, not by reason, but by immediate sense and feeling. If virtue, therefore, be desirable for its own sake, and if vice be in the same manner the object of aversion, it cannot be reason which originally distinguishes these different qualities, but immediate sense and feeling." Hutcheson's proof of this, he says, is quite convincing.

But Hutcheson, having excluded self-love and reason, thinks himself bound to suppose the principle of approbation to be a Moral Sense, a faculty hitherto unrecognized among men, "a few philosophers excepted".[13] After this meagre recognition of Shaftesbury Adam Smith goes on:

"This new power of perception he [Hutcheson] called a moral sense, and supposed it to be somewhat analogous to the external senses. As the bodies around us, by affecting these in a certain manner, appear to possess the different qualities of sound, taste, odour, colour, so the various affections of the human mind, by touching this particular faculty in a certain manner, appear to possess the different qualities of amiable and odious, of virtuous and vicious, of right and wrong."

Stated freely, his version of Hutcheson's account of

the Moral Sense is as follows: "We are conscious of acts and affections; and, besides the mere existence of them, we perceive something that makes them agreeable or disagreeable to us "in a certain manner." And such a peculiar kind of agreeableness or disagreeableness leads us to count the actions and affections praiseworthy or blameworthy. Hume speaks very often as if simple agreeableness or disagreeableness made the virtue or the vice; Hutcheson lays more stress on the "certain manner"; it is not ordinary feelings of that kind, but quite peculiar ones. Self-love does not explain them, and reason does not. We must suppose a special sense. As sense of smell does not give us sounds, but smells; sense of hearing not smells, but sounds; sense of sight neither, but colours, light and shade, the moral sense gives us, as it were, the mental light or shade. It is, however, entirely internal,[14] and is analogous, not so much to the direct external sense, giving us sounds or sights, as to the reflex internal sense, giving us harmony in hearing or beauty in vision. Hutcheson supposes, in the case of the moral sense, the whole process internal. We perceive the action and affection, and then by reflection (by the "reflex sense") perceive its moral quality. When the quality concerned is not quite the same as the moral, but equally "internal", Hutcheson finds for it another sense,[15] of a reflex nature, e.g. Public Sense, Sense of Honour, Sense of Ridicule.

One difficulty,[16] says Adam Smith, strikes us at once: the sense in other cases is not the sensation; and yet, while we do not call vision dark or light, or the faculty of taste sweet or bitter, or hearing itself discordant or harmonious, we do (in spite of Hutcheson) call a man's moral sense good or bad, and praise or blame him for it. We treat it, too, as something that can be trained. In fact, we approve or disapprove the approval or disapproval itself; and, if we can put ourselves in another man's place for this purpose, why not adopt this sympathy as the best test for all moral purposes whatever? Why invent a new name and faculty? There is nothing gained by appealing to common usage, which calls resentment a "sense" of injury and gratitude a "sense" of benefits received. Resentment and gratitude are unlike a general "sense of right and wrong"; they are *sui generis*, and everywhere retain the qualitative character justifying their familiar names as particular emotions. The names of good and bad are not so bound; they are applied now to one emotion now to another according to circumstances; and our horror for cruelty, for example, has no resemblance to our contempt for cowardice. These, Edward Caird would say, are some of the difficulties we meet when we "attribute to Sense a critical function".

There is a passage of the *Moral Sentiments*[17] (made interesting otherwise by the obvious debt to it of Robert Burns) where Adam Smith speaks

as if he would like to have believed in the Moral Sense if he could. "So partial are the views of mankind with regard to the propriety of their own conduct, both at the time of action and after it; and so difficult is it for them to view it in the light in which any indifferent spectator would consider it. But if it was by a peculiar faculty, such as the moral sense is supposed to be, that they judged of their own conduct, if they were endued with a particular power of perception, which distinguished the beauty or deformity of passions and affections, as their own passions would be more immediately exposed to the view of this faculty, it would judge with more accuracy concerning them than concerning those of other men, of which it had only a more distant prospect. This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human life. If we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us, or in which they would see us if they knew all, a reformation would generally be unavoidable. We could not otherwise endure the sight."

Our author thinks that "Nature", by guiding us to the formation of "certain general rules", has provided a remedy; and the rules are drawn up by "our continual observations upon the conduct of others". They are "ultimately founded upon experience of what in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of", not by

virtue of a general rule, but by an instinctive approval or disapproval in a particular case.[18]

The criticisms of a later age would be that there is certainly in the civilized ordinary man a perception of good and evil, which seems from our familiarity with it to be immediate and instinctive; but it is no more so than our use of our native language or our erect position or vision of distance. The so-called Moral Sense tells us what we know already, and the question is how we came by it. If its general rules do not exclude reason, neither need our first perceptions, though, being first, they would be shallow and imperfect, relying on a tentative reasoning from part to part. The *Intellectual Intuition* of Schelling [19] was analogous to the sensuous intuition of the artist and entirely alien to this tentative process. For a view of the whole system of the Universe this may be necessary, or at least not *prima facie* absurd. But for the wayfaring man on the Earth there seems a more excellent way, the seeking of "a permanent well-being" for himself "in which the permanent well-being of others is included",[20] an element without which human history ceases to be human. If it is not itself virtue to identify ourselves with society and its mixed maxims of conduct, it is at least every man's usual introduction to virtue. Adam Smith himself has traced the first stages of this development in rambling hints [21] spread over his book at intervals. He does not say, what seems the truth, that the Moral Sense comes into

being at the end of this course of training; he contents himself with arguing, against Hutcheson and Hume, that it does not enter full-panoplied at the beginning of the same. He thinks to displace it altogether in favour of his own scheme, which, in fact, is meant to produce it, in its own way, at the end.

In his final stabs at the theory of Hutcheson he is almost jocular. The sense supposed to give us discrimination is taunted with its new unfamiliar name. There are some other new-comers, but it is newest of all. The word "approbation" has but recently come in for ethical uses, and it is applied to many lower uses. "The word conscience [22] does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to its directions. When love, hatred, joy, sorrow, gratitude, resentment, with so many other passions which are all supposed to be the subjects of this principle, have made themselves considerable enough to get titles to know them by, is it not surprising that the sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so little heeded that, a few philosophers excepted, nobody has yet thought it worth while to bestow a name upon it?" Then follows his neat little summary of his own view of the subject.

If Hume reformed the Moral Sense theory

indifferently well, Adam Smith reformed it altogether; his language about it is not very far removed from contempt. It is curious that he places Hume much nearer himself than he places Hutcheson. We should not gather from him that Hume did not wholly reject the theory of a Moral Sense. We gather that he had preceded Adam Smith in availing himself of Sympathy as a partial explanation of the moral problem, and that he exaggerated the influence of Utility.

Adam Smith's chapter on "the effect of Utility upon the sentiment of Approbation" was evidently suggested by the Essay of Hume's, "Why Utility pleases." To Adam Smith the main reason of the pleasing is aesthetical, and, though his two sections about it are not inferior in ethical reflections to the best in his book, it is the beauty bestowed by the appearance of utility that strikes him more than the utility itself, whether in the "productions of Art" [23] or in the characters and actions of men. "The same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases had been so struck with this view of things as to resolve our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility." No doubt, says Adam Smith, the usefulness is there; so it is in a chest of drawers; but it is not the first ground of moral approval, and often does not strike the ordinary man at all. What, perhaps, told most against Hume's

view in Adam Smith's judgment was the possibility it afforded of entirely dispensing with the Spectator; a solitary man [24] can get the whole benefit, such as it is. Therefore virtue, Adam Smith seems to say, is not essential to utility, nor utility to virtue, for our author is of opinion that the solitary man never reaches the highest ethical heights.

In this disclaimer of Utility he agrees with Kant. Professor Oncken,[25] of Bern, made a brave attempt in his *Smith and Kant* to show a close agreement between the two men, especially in Ethics and Political Philosophy. The verbal coincidences are often remarkable, and as Kant quotes the *Wealth of Nations* he may conceivably have known the *Moral Sentiments.*

Nevertheless, though both philosophers believe in God, freedom, and immortality, they reach the belief in very different ways, and the contrasts seem as striking as the resemblances. The very title of one of Kant's books, the *Metaphysic of Ethics*, would have horrified Adam Smith, who hated metaphysics.[26] "Nothing but obscurity and uncertainty", "subtleties and sophisms", are to be found in metaphysics; and the "cobweb science of ontology" is even worse. The references in the *Essays* are more temperate, and the "Considerations concerning the first formation of Languages" refer to metaphysics quite calmly. "Number" is an "abstract and metaphysical" idea. "Events" may be divided into their "meta-

physical elements" with corresponding words for them. "The word I" is "extremely metaphysical and abstract". But in later life he had evidently ceased to use "metaphysical" merely for "abstract", and associated it with medieval theories which had become more and more repulsive to him as life went on.

Oncken's quotations will seem to most of us insufficient proof that Adam Smith gave no higher place to Sympathy than Kant would have done. That sympathy can only be the means of communication—a way of conveying a message, not the message itself—is a criticism that touches Adam Smith, not Kant. By itself it may not be a fatal criticism. That sympathy enables us to judge of our own character through that of others would be a natural interpretation of the second title of the *Moral Sentiments*. Given as a full account of the aim of the book, it is misleading, or at least not exhaustive. Our author himself seems aware now and then that the word sympathy is not free from ambiguity. It may mean (1) a simple reflection without judgment; (2) it may mean approbation; and in Smith's book frequently does so. Thomas Brown[27] remarks that, if sympathy is like a mirror, it can only give us the reflected object—ourselves. It might be replied that the reflection need not be that of the fool in the brook, or of "the habitual novel-reader looking at the fictitious life which is the reflex of his own". Human beings may reflect each other

to better purpose than soulless objects, and our author seems to think that their reflection of each other may change their first differing ideas into one idea held in common. To vary the metaphor, sympathy is only a conductor or transmitter; but, he thinks, it can conduct us in the region of ethics almost everywhere, and transform what it transmits. This is a different atmosphere from that of the Practical Reason. The question would at once (as above said) present itself: What test or warrant have we for the moral value of ideas so reached? Why should the other man be more right than myself?

The nearest approach to the idea of the Categorical Imperative is perhaps the idea of the sovereign rule of the moral faculties over other faculties.[28] There is scanty trace in Adam Smith of Kant's postulate that men are ends in themselves, though there is a striking claim for the inviolableness of the individual. In our author the Will is usually "heteronomous". The question of will and freedom and necessity, discussed by Hume under *Passions*, does not seem to be considered at all by Adam Smith. Choice and will are taken for granted; we can do or forbear to do whenever occasion calls us. There is no conception, to separate Smith from Hume, of self, or even of a "permanent possibility of sensation", though this, too, at times seems taken for granted. Adam Smith seems to assume that men, within the limits of their (inward and outward) oppor-

tunities and resources, can create their own character for better or for worse. As that is done, according to him, by the following of general rules, which are admittedly of the reason, it is not a determination by feeling, but implies a power in man to follow rules instead of being controlled by passing impulses; it implies that reason is not the slave of the passions. Kant was not content with this negative result, which indeed is not always avowed.

In regard to the macrocosm (a favourite phrase in those days) the Physico-theological or Design argument, not accepted by Kant as sufficient, seems to have been the chief basis of Adam Smith's theism. Teleology is a ruling idea everywhere in his works. In the *Wealth of Nations* it becomes an unconscious altruism, if such a thing be possible.

Remarkable coincidences in expression may mean only that both men were aware of the sublimity of their subject. Persons far away from each other in time or space have held the same language about the law of duty, from Hebrew prophets to German philosophers, without having the same, if any, philosophical clue to its origin. What Adam Smith had learned from Judaea and Attica remained with him, and, like Bishop Butler, he found it hard to state or interpret the lessons in terms of the reigning philosophy. He did not leave out very much; but he did not show warrant for all he put in.

Note on Robert Burns (1759–1796)

Adam Smith writes in 1759: "If we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us, or in which they would see us if they knew all, a reformation would generally be unavoidable."

Burns, who was born in that very year 1759, wrote in the new edition of his *Works*, published in 1787 (Allan Cunningham: *Life and Works of Robert Burns*, second edition, 1835, vol. i. p. 141, cf. p. 48):

> Oh, wad some power the giftie gie us
> To see oursel's as others see us!
> It wad frae monie a blunder free us
> And foolish notion:
> What airs in dress an' gait wad lea'e us,
> And e'en Devotion!

J. R. MacCulloch quotes (in his edition of the *Wealth of Nations*, 1863, xii) a letter of Burns to Graham of Fintry, May 13, 1789, printed in Chambers' *Life of Burns*, 1851, vol. iv, p. 329: "Marshall in his *Yorkshire*, and particularly that extraordinary man Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*, find my leisure employment enough. I could not have given any mere man credit for half the intelligence Mr. Smith discovers in his book. I would covet much to have his ideas respecting the present state of some quarters of the world that are, or have been, the scenes of considerable revolutions, since his book was written." There is something on those

revolutions in sixth edition *Moral Sentiments*, vol. ii, pp. 106, 107, 108. John Rae tells us (*Life of Adam Smith*, p. 402) that Burns took with him to Edinburgh in 1787 a letter of introduction from Mrs. Dunlop; but Adam Smith had gone to London, and the two never met.

Burns defended the poem, which is addressed To a Louse, simply "because of the moral with which the poem concludes" (Cunningham, *loc. cit.*, p. 41), and says nothing about the source of the moral. But the *Moral Sentiments* is in the list of his library published soon after his death. Also, in a London catalogue (of Mr. Frank Sabin) in 1893, p. 6, there is the following entry: "31. Burns (Robert). *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, by Adam Smith, 2 vols, sm. 8vo, old calf, London 1790." On the flyleaf, in the autograph of Burns, is written: "To Robert Riddell, Esq., of Glenriddell, this book is presented by Robert Burns.

> Had I another Friend more truly mine
> More lov'd, more trusted, this had ne'er been thine.
> R. B."

There is no date to this inscription. Riddell added his own name and various notes. The fate of the book is not known to the present Mr. Sabin; it may have crossed the seas. But there seems no doubt of the debt of Burns to Adam Smith.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER X

ADAM SMITH: HISTORIAN AND CRITIC.

1. *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, pp. 413–551; fifth edition, pp. 195–399.

2. Eckstein points out the different use of the word "principle" now and in the eighteenth century. It often meant in the latter *Grundkräfte* as well as *Grundsätze*, the forces themselves and not the theory of them. (*Eth. Gefühle*, vol. i, p. xxviii.)

3. Socrates is just mentioned (sixth edition, ii. p. 279; first edition, p. 450).

4. Praise of Hutcheson. *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, pp. 457, 463; sixth edition, ii. pp. 286, 293.

Praise of French Economists. *Wealth of Nations*, IV. ix. Compare Rae, p. 216.

5. Talents. See *supra* (Hume) and *infra* (*Appendix*).

6. Self-interest. *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, pp. 464, 466; sixth edition, ii. pp. 294, 296; cf. p. 302.

Mandeville: *ibid.*, first edition, p. 474; sixth edition, ii. p. 305.

Hume: *ibid.*, first edition, p. 468; sixth edition, ii. p. 299; cf. ii. p. 327.

Medieval views: *ibid.*, first edition, pp. 456, 466, 486; sixth edition, ii. p. 297.

7. "Difficulty pointed out by Hume" in the letter to Hutcheson, *supra*, 102 ff. Does goodness mean the same thing with God as with men?

8. Abraham Tucker ("Edward Search"): *Light of Nature Pursued*, 1767; William Paley: *Moral and Political Philosophy*, 1785. The quotation in the text is from *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, p. 467; sixth edition, ii. pp. 298, 299.

9. First edition, p. 469; sixth edition, ii. p. 300.

10. First edition, p. 491; sixth edition, ii. p. 324.

11. "Groping" after his view: *ibid.*, first edition, pp. 495, 496; sixth edition, ii. pp. 329, 330.

12. Reason: first edition, p. 501; cf. 500; sixth edition, ii. p. 336; cf. p. 334. First perceptions from immediate sense and feeling: first edition, p. 503; sixth edition, ii. p. 338.

13. "A few philosophers excepted": first edition, p. 518; sixth edition, ii. p. 355. Butler's adherence might account for the plural.

"In a certain manner", etc.: first edition, pp. 507 *seq.*; sixth edition, ii. pp. 341 *seq.* The early *Essays* of Adam Smith, printed by Dugald Stewart in 1795, include one on the External Senses, pp. 197–244. It does not help us here. The Essay on the Imitative Arts has some small coincidences of thought and phrase, pp. 137, 155. Cf. pp. 204, 207, 240.

14. "Entirely Internal." Perhaps we might say that the external deals with a really external object, the internal only with a quasi-external; but it is not clear that beauty or harmony is the datum of a sense at all or to be reckoned even half-external.

15. "Another sense": first edition, p. 509; sixth edition, ii. p. 345. Hume remarks this multiplication of senses in the case of Justice, where he turns it into a *reductio ad absurdum* (*supra*, and *Principles*, 1758, p. 418).

16. "One difficulty": first edition, p. 510; sixth edition, ii. pp. 347 *seq.* Cf. first edition, pp. 351 *seq.*; sixth edition, ii. pp. 349–52.

17. First edition, p. 264; sixth edition, i. pp. 392, 393.

See Note on Robert Burns.

18. "In a particular case": first edition, p. 266; sixth edition, i. p. 395.

19. Edward Caird, *Hegel* (1883), p. 54, where it is said that the organ of philosophy is to Schelling "an intellectual intuition, analogous to the sensuous intuition of the artist, but entirely opposed to reflection", which reasons from part to part without at once grasping the whole. For Schelling's "Transcendental Idealism", where the phrase "intellectual

intuition" occurs, see Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, iii. pp. 591, 592, especially p. 596 (vol. xv. of edition 1844).

20. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Clarendon Press, 1883), p. 212.

21. "Rambling hints." For example, in *Moral Sentiments*, i. pp. 278, 279, 347, 370, 468; ii. (Part V, on Custom) pp. 69–112. For Hegel's account, see *Philosophy and Political Economy* (Library of Philosophy), pp. 307 *seq.*

22. Conscience—its "Influence and Authority"—gets a large chapter to itself in *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, i. pp. 331–81. The quotation in the text is from vol. ii. 355.

23. Compare Llewellyn Smith, *Art Production*, 1924, p. 23.

24. "A solitary", etc.: first edition, p. 369; sixth edition, i. pp. 487, 488.

25. Dr. August Oncken, as he then was in Vienna, *Smith und Kant* (Leipzig, 1877). See especially pp. 100, 101.

26. *Wealth of Nations*, V. i. *Essays* (edition 1795), pp. 117, 118. *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, ii. Formation of Languages, pp. 412, 419, etc.

27. Professor Thomas Brown (1778–1820), colleague and successor of Dugald Stewart in the Chair of Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh. *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (Tait, Edinburgh, 1828), Lecture LXXXI, p. 545.

On the mirror, compare *Moral Sentiments*, fifth edition, pp. 199, 200, in the chapter on the Sense of Duty, sixth edition, i. p. 281. The simile is in Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, i. pp. 195, 199, but without the double reflection.

Cf. T. H. Green, Fiction in Modern Times, Prize Essay, 1862, p. 24. *Works*, iii. p. 38.

28. Fifth edition, chapter on Sense of Duty, p. 235. Cf. sixth edition, i. p. 270 (inviolableness).

CHAPTER X

ADAM SMITH: UNDER CRITICISM WITH HUTCHESON

He did not show warrant for all he put in. This may help to explain why, with its striking merits, his *Moral Sentiments* made no new beginning in moral philosophy. In Economics we have been sometimes told to go "back to Adam Smith"; the cry has not been raised in Ethics. He was not, like Kant, awakened by Hume from his dogmatic slumbers; he found Locke's foundations solid enough for his purposes. In morals he saw no third alternative but his own to the selfish and benevolent systems.[1] Bentham was to ignore his alternative and present simply a choice between the Moral Sense and Utility, each as a sole principle. Bentham's system was as destitute as Adam Smith's of a metaphysical basis such as Kant's. Kant placed Reason in the position of legislator, prescribing pursuit of a good that had features quite other than a succession of pleasures; the end was prescribed, not from without, but from within.

Jeremy Bentham is not to be reckoned among the serious critics of the theory of a Moral Sense. It is true that the said theory comes first [2] in a famous list of the moral philosophies with which that eccentric author disagreed: "One man says he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what

is right and what is wrong, and that it is called a moral sense; and then he goes to work at his ease and says such a thing is right and such a thing is wrong—why? Because my moral sense tells me it is." "One account may serve for all of them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself." In other words, the principle of utility, which served Bentham so well in law, is to serve also in morals, and it is not unfitly described as an "external standard" in view of its reliance on outward consequences.[3]

There is no detailed criticism of predecessors, but a series of ejaculations. To the claim of superiority implied in these it may be answered that a purely external standard will carry us no farther than Respectability, and, even more than most of the theories of a Moral Sense, will leave large tracts of our latter-day moral world unexplained. Paley [4] objects to the ethical writings of Grotius and Pufendorf as of "too forensic a cast to answer precisely the design of a system of ethics—the direction of private consciences in the general conduct of human life". But Paley adopted the same "external standard" as Bentham, and, along with Tucker, may be said to stand to Bentham as Locke to Hume. His "utility", even assisted by his "general rules", would not have led us

beyond Respectability if he had not "conjoined ethics with Christian Theology"; and the conjunction can be made with any ethical theory, however shallow.

As Professor Muirhead points out, Cudworth and Wollaston[5] were tending in the direction of Kant. But they did not lay down the Kantian foundation. Cudworth, at least, introduced theology too soon. God is to him as much an intuition as the moral sense to Hutcheson. Abraham Tucker's utilitarianism is made Universal or Social by his Theology; God lays down our chief end for us.[6] Tucker still holds by Locke. There is a pleasing passage in what Tucker calls his "Vision", when "from one place there came out the arm which held me, and from another a longish neck with a head upon it, having a meagre lank-jawed face, very like the prints I have seen before some editions of Locke's works. It looked upon me stedfastly with a mild and benign aspect." "I had a particular share in his favour." Among other things Locke tells him "we follow virtue for its own sake—that is, for the secret complacence of mind constantly attending it". Tucker for his part tells Locke that "the whole body of sound reasoners in the nation I came from, of which [body] I should be proud to be admitted an unworthy member, derives from you". And Locke answers, from his astral body, that he looks on Tucker as his child.

Even on the principles of Locke, theological utilitarianism excludes the moral sense while it

obtrudes its own theological element. It is true that theology enters into Adam Smith's system also, but he is anxious not to obtrude it anywhere and everywhere. It stands in place of metaphysics as a basis for the virtues that go beyond respectability; but we are expressly warned against importing it at any and every time into ordinary life. Of the Stoics he says, in effect, that they turn the contemplation of divine providence into the business of our lives, whereas it is intended as a consolation in extremity.[7] It is as if he said that nothing is more real than the sun, but we must not blind ourselves by gazing upon it continually. He would keep ethics entirely human. We are to be moral from love of virtue, not from religious motives. It is a matter for man's self-guidance, with each man's *alter ego*, the impartial spectator, to direct his steps.

Brought up under Locke, our author is really taking us beyond Locke, and beyond the canon of agreeable and disagreeable feeling with which Hume is content. Stewart seems perfectly right; as life went on, Adam Smith became aware that he was going farther than he had planned, and was holding up higher ideals than his system could explain under the most strained interpretation of it. As he had himself said of Mandeville,[8] he was "groping" after something better than his own original theory.

A theory drawn up in all seriousness by Adam Smith and found adequate by Edmund Burke

cannot be treated lightly as obviously futile. Times, men, and philosophies, however, have changed much; they were changing then; and there are features in the theory of which the weakness is more evident to plain folk now than to the acutest critics of those days.

Probably the first objection that occurs to a modern reader is that of Thomas Brown, of Edinburgh, already quoted. Sympathy, as Adam Smith himself says, is a mirror; and a mirror does not give us something new; it gives us only ourselves. Indeed (we might add), it gives us *less* than ourselves; the metaphor is treacherous. But if the theory is a good deal more than an attempt to simplify the problem by repeating the examples of it, it is confessedly a doubling [9] of the parts played by the actor on the world's stage; and we wonder why, since he was on this track, Adam Smith did not frankly adopt the idea of Shaftesbury (which Dugald Stewart thought to be possibly in his mind) that a man can double his part without going out of himself into an Other at all. It seems to us no more satisfactory to found a system on the maxim "See ourselves as others see us" than to found one on the maxim "Do as you would be done by". Both are good working maxims of conduct; neither seems well adapted for a system [10] which is to give the beginning and end of morality.

Indeed, Adam Smith himself sometimes supposes the one and the same self at once judge and culprit. It is one, but not indivisible. With far better know-

ledge, the judge in this case is more severe than he would be to his neighbour; and it is not clear why an action found praiseworthy or blameworthy *in* an Other or *by* an Other should not be found so by the Agent himself at his own tribunal, with himself as the *alter ego*.

"What the judge is in law in his judicial capacity, all men are in their moral relations", is a summing up of the paragraph where Hegel describes the transition from law to morality, in his Philosophy of Right.[11]

Adam Smith proceeds:[12] "To direct the judgments of this inmate [man within the breast] is the great purpose of all systems of morality." This would mean that we educate the conscience provisionally, by the rules of morality. In what we may call the higher office of this man within the breast he is described as brought near to "the all-seeing Judge of the world".

We know that the moral furniture of the civilized man everywhere, even in the twentieth century, includes something of this kind, a Worship of what to each of us is the Highest—in short, our Religion. A fuller comprehensive theory of morals would try to explain where such a persistent feature should be placed in the system, and, if possible, how it came there at all. Adam Smith, at least, in the *Moral Sentiments* is content to take it for granted, and rightly or wrongly it occurs in his scheme. To put a very concrete personal matter a little abstractly, we might say that, as our views

of the Highest or Supreme Being differ, our highest moral sanctions will of necessity differ also.

The final result of the process (with its four steps) described in the Summary is a moral approbation which, a critic will remark, involves not only feeling but observation—observation of conformity to general rules, and observation of the beauty of the useful tendencies of actions.

This training of the judgment is described in the alternative title of the *Moral Sentiments* as follows: "The Theory of Moral Sentiments or the principles by which men naturally judge concerning the conduct and character, first of their neighbours and afterwards of themselves." We might almost represent this as an education of Conscience; and our author devotes, in his sixth edition, a new chapter to the "Influence and Authority of Conscience". He is not afraid to use the word, though he usually prefers to describe the thing. We are educated by a survey of the good actions of our neighbours. Good actions, a critic will allow, must certainly be consistent with any true theory, unless the theory itself is supposed to determine and not merely reveal the goodness of them.

But as was said already, reflection in the manner of a mirror, where we behold as in a glass, gives not the whole man, but much less. A photograph of the successive steps in our judgment of another man would not yield an exhaustive or complete theory. Yet it is all we get in this Summary.

Hume would make the judgment depend on the whole bent of character, and this demand is echoed by Adam Smith in his "scheme of life".[13] We speak slightingly of conventional morality; we get nothing more in the Summary; but even if our "moral substance" comes in a sense from our moral surroundings, there seems no reason why we should not begin the interpretation of them at home, with ourselves, by ourselves. It is, after all, my own conduct that not only concerns me most but can be criticized by me to best advantage, and invites my first study.

When Adam Smith takes us to the man within the breast he is going beyond my neighbour and his own Summary into the whole region covered by his Alternative Title. Even in the Summary itself he is going beyond Locke, Hume, and Hutcheson, for he is going beyond Feeling into Judgment.

What he calls "sympathizing" with the agent is perhaps conceived by him as a feeling; but from what follows it has the attributes of a judgment, "pronouncing lastly on each deed". Judging, however, is an active function; Edward Caird would call it a "critical function", not Sense or Feeling. In the Essay on Language,[14] Adam Smith admits that Relations are never the "objects" of the external senses. But the critic will say, surely judgment is nothing if not a relation. As Adam Smith has rejected for his moral test the Moral Sense of Hutcheson, which was an internal sense, and puts forward no substitute, this moral test of

his seems to be cast out of the pale of the senses altogether; yet it is at this point there would have been a loophole for the Moral Sense, if anywhere in the four steps of the Summary. If we "sympathize with the motives of the agent" we are in fact approving of them as good, and the approval can only (by what is left to us of the argument) be instinctive. Kant [15] would say the approver is "half good" already.

Instead of saying that the sympathy has here surreptitiously availed itself of the moral sense, we might say that both of them have surreptitiously introduced an element into feeling that does not belong to it—the element of judgment.

Thomas Reid [16] has no hesitation in attributing judgment to sense, and finds no difficulty in upholding the Moral Sense in spite of Adam Smith. Indeed, Sir William Hamilton blames Reid in this very connection for speaking of "judgments of the senses" instead of "the judgments of which the senses give the materials".[17] Reid says, "By our moral faculty we have both the original conception of right and wrong in conduct, of merit and demerit, and the original judgments that this conduct is right, that is wrong", thus attributing to a sense both conception and judgment. If we do not explain the second, or judgment, by saying it comes after the first or conception, neither do we explain the first by saying it comes before the second.

Adam Smith talks of other kinds of judgment

when he is moving in the region of the harder moral problems, and the "spectator" is as it were on his trial to show his fitness for guiding us. "The Author of Nature" has "made man the immediate judge of mankind".[18] But there is a stage beyond this where we find the "demigod within the breast" judging, not from regard to mankind, but by appeal to the all-seeing Judge of the world and His unerring tribunal. Even in his first stage the spectator consults "rules" of customary morality, in the making of which there is an admitted action of reason,[19] but in the second stage he moves still farther away from the world of mere sensation, and is beyond the rules.

It is not surprising that Oncken should have suggested anticipation of Kant; there was coincidence of like-minded men.

Kant, for his part, thinks Hutcheson [20] more worthy of his criticism than Adam Smith. We shall find that he has thought it worth while to put the Moral Sense out of the way; and Adam Smith's Sympathy has not received this attention at his hands.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER XI

ADAM SMITH: UNDER CRITICISM WITH HUTCHESON.

1. *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, p. 516; sixth edition, ii. p. 353.

2. Bentham. Born 1748, died 1832. The passage is in his *Morals and Legislation* (first published 1789), chap. ii, § xiv note, in Clarendon Press edition, 1876, p. 17.

3. So Wilson and Fowler, *Principles of Morals*, 1886, p. 104.

4. William Paley (1743–1805), Preface to *Moral and Political Philosophy*, 1785. Cf. Book II, chap. iv, p. 14.

5. *Mind*, 1927, "The Cambridge Platonists", pp. 158 *seq.*, 326 *seq.*; ethics, pp. 335–41.

6. Abraham Tucker (1705–1774). "Vision", in his *Light of Nature Pursued.* By Edward Search, Esq.", 1768, vol. ii, chap. xxiii, pp 125 *seq.*

7. "Consolation in extremity": sixth edition, ii. p. 263. Cf. first edition, pp. 288, 289.

8. *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, pp. 495, 497; sixth edition, ii. pp. 329, 331.

9. "Doubling of the parts." Not as by Gibbon's Gennadius, who defended in Florence the union of the Eastern Church with the Western, and denounced it at Constantinople. A perplexed historian thereupon pronounced that there were two bishops of the name. "But" (says Gibbon, chap. lxviii, p. 227, note), "Renaudot has restored the identity of his person and the duplicity of his character." Compare above p. 181.

10. "Adapted for a system." Cf. *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, p. 305; sixth edition, i. p. 337. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 225. Kant, ed. Hartenstein, iv. p. 278, note.

"At once judge and culprit." *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, i. p. 182.

11. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, § 107. See Library of Philosophy, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, p. 305.

12. Sixth edition, ii. p. 265. Cf. on Conscience, sixth edition, i. p. 331.

13. "Scheme of life": first edition, p. 303. This, like other pages, is wrongly headed "Merit and Demerit"; it should be headed "Sense of Duty".

Cf. Green, *Prolegomena*, pp. 244, 245.

14. Sixth edition, ii. p. 419.

15. Kant, *Practical Reason*, 1788, in Hartenstein's edition of *Works*, vol. v, pp. 41, 42.

16. Thomas Reid (1709–1796), Adam Smith's successor at Glasgow, published his *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*, 1764; *Intellectual Powers*, 1785; *Active Powers*, 1788. It is in the last that he deals with our author, without naming him. It was an affected politeness in those days not to name a contemporary but to describe him to us, in a more or less complimentary manner.

Sir James Steuart, preferring Hutcheson's Moral Sense to Beattie's Common Sense, makes polite allusion to Adam Smith without naming either him or his book. "Even sympathy, though too much confined in its influence, and perhaps too far stretched in a theory which has been built upon it, is to me more taking than the new doctrine. If sympathy be too much confined, common sense is too far extended." *Observations on Beattie*, 1771, in Steuart's *Works*, edited by his son, General Steuart, 1805, vol. vi, pp. 34, 35.

In Reid's case identification was easy. On p. 557 of the *Active Powers* (in Hamilton's *Reid*, vol. ii, sixth edition, 1863) the words are "a very ingenious author", and on p. 665 the same with the addition "in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*". Dr. Eckstein (*Adam Smith's Theorie der ethischen Gefühle*, vol. i, Einleitung, xv) would explain the avoidance of Hume's name by his friend in another manner; but the general practice might cover the case. The said practice sometimes left a real doubt about the person meant. For an example, see Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 197. (Does Butler refer to Hutcheson, who is not named?)

17. Hamilton's *Reid*, ii. pp. 589, 590; cf. pp. 533 *seq.* and i. pp. 479, 480.

18. *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, i. pp. 321 *seq.* Professor Limentani distinguishes the two phases or stages, in the conception of the spectator, as Heterovaluation and Autovaluation (*Morale della Simpatia*, Formaggini, Genoa, 1914, p. 111). Heteronomous and Autonomous had been already appropriated by Kant to something else, e.g. in *Practical Reason*, 1788, § 8, p. 35, Hartenstein, vol. v.

19. *Moral Sentiments*, first edition, pp. 276, 501; sixth edition, i. p. 405, ii. pp. 265, 336.

20. Hutcheson thought his Moral Sense could be trained to reach the heroic virtues. He says in *System*, vol. i, Book I, chap. ii, p. 72, of a man yielding to great temptation: "He may have no ill will; nay, may have many generous affections, though not of that heroic strength which the moral sense would recommend."

But Adam Smith in his higher flights passes beyond his teacher and is really nearer Kant.

CHAPTER XII

KANT ON THE MORAL SENSE

If the theory of a Moral Sense fared ill at the hands of Hume, its professed defender, it feared still worse at the hands of Hume's assailant, Kant, when he cut out the roots of Locke's system, ethical and metaphysical. To Kant all principles of morality are heteronomous, which do not leave Reason alone in the field of action. So far from being the slave of the passions, only a will that is law to itself, only an autonomous will, can lay down a law at all. All empirical principles, including Hutcheson's, are heteronomous. Happiness is one of the kind. It is so vague an ideal, so differing in you and me, that we can deduce from it no laws, at the utmost only rules, like the rules of health, never quite the same for you and me or any two men. Omniscience alone can say where in the future of his life a man's happiness is to lie, and direct his steps to obtain the maximum of it. Morality, on the contrary, by means of the autonomous will, lays down a law that is the same for all. An action is not moral when it is done from any other motive than respect for this law itself. Our principle must be: "So act that you could turn the maxim or motive of your action into a universal law." Kant sometimes adds "without contradiction", and into a "law of nature".[1]

Stating the same thing in another way, he says that Happiness as an empirical principle is to be rejected: first, from the consideration that to do well and to fare well are very different—goodness is far from always bringing good luck, honesty far from being always the best policy; secondly, because the proposers of it are putting the motives to virtue and the motives to wrong-doing in the same class together, as if *ejusdem generis*, with no difference between them except a difference in figures and calculation, whereas there is a difference in kind.[2] Now the theory of a Moral Sense depends on this principle of Happiness, for it supposes the chief end to be the securing of agreeable feeling. Even if this chief end is not always of personal advantage at the expense of others, but is taken, as it is by Hutcheson, to include the happiness of others, all the rest of the features of the case remain as they were. Kant believes that a Moral Sense was invented to enable those who cannot *think* to help themselves out by *feeling*; but feelings, he says, differ infinitely, and yield us no standard of good and evil.

He admits that the theories of the moral sense are better than those of the selfish systems; they do justice to the dignity of morals by claiming for virtue a direct and immediate testimony of men to its worth apart from personal advantage. This praise does not go as far as Adam Smith's eulogy, but it is worth having as coming from Kant.

The theory which makes Perfection (or development of all the talents) the chief end, might seem, says Kant, to be at the opposite pole from the theory of a moral sense, and it is not empirical but rational, founded on reason and not on sensation. But it, too, launches us on a wide field of vague possibilities, and it really gives us heteronomous motives which covertly postulate the morality to be explained. Though this criticism of Kant's was nominally aimed at Crusius and Wolff, it touches our own Hutcheson, who in the later elaboration of his theory included Perfection as an end of life. Kant says that, if he had to choose between Moral Sense and Perfection, he would prefer Perfection, as bringing us farther away from sensation and nearer to the Will that wills the Good, "not far from the Kingdom of God".

He says another kind word for the men of the moral sense, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*,[3] where he praises them for the conception that the consequences of virtue are always connected with a feeling of peace and pleasure, those of vice with uneasiness and pain. Unfortunately (he adds) there is a circle in the reasoning; the offender in suffering the uneasiness shows that he has already some goodness in him; he who finds pleasure in goodness must be half-way to goodness already.[4] And the theorists seem to him to be striving after the impossible; we cannot deduce a law from a feeling; if we succeeded, we should be arriving at that impossible thing, a "feeling of

a law". Some of the empirical school, he says, would distinguish between lower and higher pleasures, say, pleasures of sense and pleasures of intellect. Kant (in this agreeing with Bentham and disagreeing with Plato and John Mill) "shakes his head and says they are all the same", the same for his argument that feelings are ethically indifferent.[5] "It is one and the same vital force expressing itself in the desires, which is affected by all objects that cause pleasure; the pleasures, therefore, as motives, differ not in kind but in degree." To a man who needs gold for payments, it is all one whether that gold came from the rocks of the mountains or the sands of the river. So if a man were measuring life solely by its number of pleasures he would never ask whether the pleasures come from the understanding or from the senses; only how much pleasure the one object or the other produces, and how long it will last. The idea that the more refined enjoyments are, as pleasures, essentially different from coarse gratifications is on a par with the metaphysic of those untrained speculators who think of matter as reduced to the utmost fineness, and suppose that thus they have bridged over the gulf between a thinking and an extended substance.[6] Hence (he says) we have nothing but praise for Epicurus, who, though he by no means regarded the bodily pleasures as the sole elements of happiness, yet maintained that there is no essential distinction of quality or kind between the most refined and

the coarsest gratifications. Greatest happiness, says Kant, is an ideal of the imagination as opposed to an ideal of reason. Happiness forms a convenient single heading under which to bring all the different objects of desire, all subjective motives of will. Happiness is one thing for one man and another for another, and often changes in the same man with the state of his feelings. Even if all rational beings thought alike about what gives them pleasure or pain, this agreement would have in it no Law, but would be a mere accidental coincidence. Kant may here be alluding to Adam Smith's "sympathy". It would seem to Kant, not a moral, but a physical determination; the action would be induced in the same way as it is by physical (or physiological) coincidence, as when we desire to yawn because others yawn.[7]

Why, then, should we look for a *law* in man at all? We see why when we consider man as knowing himself.[8] We have here, says Kant, something impossible to explain, and yet an undoubted fact, and one that raises us above the perceptions of the senses and separates us from all animals.[9] Now, if we can say "I" only as thus self-conscious, the sensations do not really determine us; we open up to ourselves a prospect of an infinity of "Self-" made ideas and conceptions. If we choose to take the sensations up into this "I" of ours and make them motives, they are no longer mere sensations, mere objects of the sensible world in space and time, but have become motives of my action.

Even so transformed they are not what we want for a moral law. They are not sufficiently our own.

It might seem to some of us that when we take pleasures up into our Self and make motives of them we are giving them the quality which they had for Plato and John Mill even before this transformation; or at least our desires would not be for the pleasures but for the objects to which the pleasures are incidental, and the objects, at least, might be held to differ in quality.

But Kant thinks that, in taking account of the desires and pleasures at all with a view to action, our Self is taking to it what is not itself, for the Self is distinguished by each one of us from its passions, and in making them motives it is *heteronomous*; it is taking its laws from something other than itself. Even when the passions are so qualified and so distinguished, Kant would cast them out as entirely alien, in this more rigorous than either predecessors or successors.

Hume disallowed Reason altogether as a motive; it was the slave of the passions. Kant's successors found it present in the passions, but rather governing them than being their slave. Kant conceives that Reason by itself becomes in morality a motive to itself; and, dealing as it does in universals rather than particulars, it lays down universal laws, with the pure form of law as motive in contrast to the particular desires. Thus autonomy of the Will is at last secured.

If Adam Smith was groping after Kant's ideas,

it was hardly after this one. Perhaps his nearest approach is in the Essay on Language and in the apology (if it be really so) for its appearance at the end of the *Moral Sentiments*. In this last he tells us where Man's great strength lies; one chief sign of it at least is the gift of language—man is a talking animal. He has been dealing with veracity and credulity, and he proceeds to speak of the leaders of men as commanding the belief and trust of the men they lead. The desire, he says, of being in that commanding position, the desire of being trusted by other men and allowed to direct them, is "perhaps the instinct upon which is founded the faculty of speech, the characteristical faculty of human nature. No other animal possesses this faculty, and we cannot discover in any other animal the desire to lead and direct the judgment and conduct of its fellows." There is no savour of Kant here, nor is there much more in the Essay on the Formation of Languages, where language is set down simply to men's need of communicating their common wants. In that Essay the author pronounces languages to be machines, and not altogether good machines. They are, as the word machine implies, artificial; but, unlike our familiar artificial machines, they do not become the better for simplification, but rather the worse.

There is one passage suggesting Kant to those who know Kant's writings, though it is not really in the plane of Kant's thought. "The word 'I' (says the Essay) is a word of a very particular

species. Whatever speaks [whatever has language, and therefore is a man] may denote itself by this personal pronoun. The word "I", therefore, is a general word, capable of being predicated, as the logicians say, of an infinite variety of objects. It differs, however, from all other general words in this respect: that the objects of which it may be predicated do not form any particular species of objects distinguished from all others. The word "I" "always denotes a precise individual, the particular person who then speaks. It may be said to be at once both what the logicians call a singular and what they call a common term, and to join in its signification the seemingly opposite qualities of the most precise individuality and the most extensive generalization." The idea, he adds, is so abstract and metaphysical that it would not occur "to the first formers of languages", any more than to little children. It seems also to have proved too abstract and metaphysical for Adam Smith's own speculations.

On the description in the *Moral Sentiments* a modern critic might remark that language and thought are perhaps inseparable to those that have learned to use language, but to speak of the "instinct" upon which speech is founded is to appeal to a "sense of speech" and add another to Hutcheson's interminable line of senses.[10] It is not consistent with invention, which is a main idea of his older writing, on the First Formation of Languages.

Except in the higher regions of ethics (and it is a great exception), Adam Smith has not freed himself from the assumptions of his predecessors.

Kant found or founded premises which seem to provide a firmer basis for the full height of the moral system, adequate not less to the higher flights than to the trivial round of commonplace duties.

The position may be put (too briefly) in this way. It is consciousness alone that takes the general view (or is συνοπτικός); nothing else makes *relations* possible and holds things together in one view; there is no relation in a feeling. What we call spiritual principles are simply this power of man, of which there is no sign in the beasts, of viewing things together; and the moral conspectus is simply a phase of it. Reason is readmitted, to take a better rôle than slave of the passions—namely, to exercise the critical function once attributed to the fictitious moral sense. We might almost be tempted to say "I am I" is the only moral sense; but the misnomer (in "sense") is too startlingly evident.

When the Self is thus set against the Senses with their several kindred Desires and Passions, it is not equipped with a line of separate faculties corresponding with the corps of separate senses, to be its instruments in criticism and construction. What confronts the corps of senses is the whole spirit of man with powers that may be distinguished but not separated. Among them is the "critical

function" which cannot be conceived apart from reason.

If the theory of a Moral Sense had not fallen to pieces of itself, it would have shared the downfall of the multitudinous faculties of the old psychology; and we need not fear that the reign of multiple senses has returned because psychologists have lately resolved the springs of action into thirteen to sixteen different instincts.[11]

Presumably all theories of "popular philosophy"[12] embraced some facts or they would have taken no hold of even the most frivolous public mind. Even Mandeville,[13] Adam Smith remarks, built on genuine facts. The theory of a Moral Sense could make plausible appeal to the instantaneousness of most moral judgments; deliberation rather than speed is associated with reason, and speed with sense. In rejecting the Moral Sense we are not disputing the instantaneous judgments; we are only holding that the instantaneousness is not instinctive but acquired, like the "historic sense", and the results of deliberation may quite well be used without deliberation, even with fire and passion.

Agreement in rejection does not, of course, unite the rejectors in other respects. The Moral Sense is rejected by those who refuse to pursue inquiries into a metaphysical background, and would treat ethics as something that can be studied by itself. If there be any who still hold by Locke, Berkeley, and his successors, they are confronted with Kant's criticism, which seems to bury that philosophy

beyond revival. Still, when we allow that there must be a metaphysical basis, and that a new alphabet has been prepared for our moral philosophy, we are not at the end of ethics, but at the beginning thereof. We must go beyond the alphabet. Hegel's comment on Berkeley may be applied to the deeper Kantian reconstitution of knowledge and practice. "Without is within"; be it so; Philosophy, including Moral Philosophy, has yet to begin.[14] Even when thus set on its feet ethical theory will need to be consistent with itself and with the facts of the moral world, and if possible embrace them all, as theories like that of the Moral Sense failed to do; it must explain the possibility of both the lower and higher, the commonplace and the sublime in morals.

It is said that without a metaphysical basis we have only a morality of outward behaviour and respectability, worthy of the Scribes and Pharisees denounced in the New Testament. This is no denunciation of respectability itself, but only a protest against its posing as the whole of goodness. We all need it; it is the path of the good neighbour and honest citizen, but we are not to think it is all we need, that "all is well that works quietly". We are to recognize an independent work of reason as a ground for the goodness of the "inward man". We may find ground even for the enthusiasm disliked by Hume and Adam Smith; Adam Smith himself needed it for his "man within the breast". St. Paul, if he had philosophized, might have

used it in describing the struggle of the flesh with the spirit.

A philosophy like Locke's and Hume's stands in the way of "things of the Spirit", making the presumption that whatever is not of the senses is false, and that therefore our inward light, glorified by our fathers and the prophets,[15] is a delusion due to false interpretation of the impressions of sense. On the premises of that school it is hard to see how we come by such ideas at all.

But when we reject that school as leaving such facts unexplained, we must go farther than Kant or we have retrieved only the right of thinking abstractly. Unless we are to be content with abstractions, we need to reclaim for the passions the field from which Kant had driven them; we must interpret them as having Reason in them, like the rest of our world. We are not their slaves. They are not our taskmasters. They may be said to have been our teachers. There is reason in what seems sometimes wholly a work of passion. We answer Plato's own perplexity, "I do not yet know what justice is", by Plato's own expedient, building up a society and state, or following the steps of the upbuilding thereof. The elements of goodness are given to us in our present structures; these structures are to be so moulded as to minister to "perfection", or "perfect freedom", or full development, for every man. We cannot have Aristotle's Prudent Man without the lessons he himself learned from family, society, and state.

Nor can we have Kant's universal legislation from anything except a human reason trained in societies and states. Though man is to be a law to himself, he begins to learn this business as a little child under tutors and governors; it comes to him at first as an external command, and his legislative power is rather a capacity than a faculty. It certainly comes by no instinct of the type of the five senses. There is little or no difference between savage and civilized man in the five senses, but a large difference in the moral perceptions, acquired by reason (we may be sure), because capable of being tracked out by reason after formation, through the "critical function" belonging only to reason. "Moral precepts are precepts of which we see the reason." [16] A critical function can as little belong to sense as law to feeling.

Reasonable beings pass from the care of tutors and governors to the care of searching and trying for themselves the traditional law. As they have themselves grown up from their society, so their society grows up from and with them; "the world is born again in the soul of man". It is the paradox of humanity that society trains a man to go beyond society, and develope his own individual character.[17] They must not only discover and use their best powers, but, as living with others, will strive to make it possible for all men to develope their powers; they must strive to subdue outward conditions to this end, so that these conditions

help it instead of hindering it, this being taken as the main end of all government. The same progress with the same end will mean (without any great straining of the argument) that we "replenish the earth and subdue it", and pass beyond nationality into cosmopolitanism, with a common humanity united in a common cause—the Good of all.

Such an end seems quite as vast and remote as Perfection, but it is less vague. It is less vague than Happiness or Greatest Happiness, unless happiness is explained away into perfection. Ethical theory cannot, indeed, leave out pleasure and happiness. If not aiming at a sum of pleasures, it must, in spite of Kant and the Stoics, regard pain at least as not morally indifferent, pain hindering good actions, as pleasure itself is condemned for doing; and we cannot most of us shake off the idea (used long ago as an argument against the Stoics) that, if pain is no evil, cruelty is no vice.

These are no new ideas. There is more in them of Kant's successors than of Kant himself, and discussion is by no means at an end. The mention of them may serve to show that in rejecting a Moral Sense we are not brought to a halt, but may be entering a more excellent way. The parent idea is progress by guidance of reason, which renders its help from within us, going not only as far as the data of sense, but beyond them. Professor Eddington [18] says that our principles of physical science, pushed as far as we can push

them, lead to an outlook beyond Physics, μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. If this is true for the conquest of the earth, it seems quite as true for the laws of man's life. We should then in one meaning of the term be all "Rational Moralists".

In his famous essay on *Popular Philosophy in its relation to Life*, Green has found the popular philosophies from the Sophists to Locke, and Hume and the *Aufklärung*, or Illumination, of the eighteenth century, to be all of them popular Moral Philosophies,[19] with Metaphysic either assumed or left out. In our day, between Green's time and our present time, the popular philosophy was probably the theory of Development, equally without a metaphysical basis, but having the apparent advantage of drawing ethics and metaphysics together. The present tendency of scientific theory might prepare the way for a basis such as Green contemplated; but such a philosophy is not easy, and cannot therefore be "popular".

The theory of a Moral Sense might well have been popular, for, as Bentham somewhat rudely described it, there was only an alleged perception without a test. However, even to the man in the street the analogy between this perception and that of the five senses was not convincingly evident; and the theory, if it was ever a popular philosophy after Hume, cannot be said to have remained so beyond the eighteenth century. There may have been a prejudice against it as, in strict logic, ratifying things as they are. It has not survived

to our own day in the characteristic form in which it has been described in these pages. In speaking of the demands of our moral sense, modern writers are not assuming any analogy to the five senses. But if the first holders of the theory had not seen an analogy they would not have given the name. Writers like Thomas Reid admitting reason into the moral sense are explaining away the analogy, and are not strictly disciples of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. They have only been considered in these pages in so far as they illustrate by their criticisms the holders of the true faith.

We are not at liberty to identify the theory with Intuitionalism. Perhaps the most virile and eloquent of modern intuitionalists is Dr. James Martineau,[20] and he rejects the Moral Sense. Perhaps the sanest and most equitable of our later Utilitarians is Henry Sidgwick;[21] and he rejects the Moral Sense. We are not at liberty to identify the theory with Intuitionalism, still less with Utilitarianism. We have seen how the doctrine of a Moral Sense slides easily into Utilitarianism in the hands of David Hume, but the distinctiveness of the theory has nearly vanished in the process.[22]

If we put Adam Smith's two questions (1) as to the nature of virtue and other moral distinctions, (2) as to the organ or faculty by which the first may be said to be obtained, we may regard the Moral Sense as mainly, in the philosophers' practice, confined to the second. It is rarely a fount of principles, more often a discernment of

the rightness or wrongness of particular acts. Taking it as the organ of moral perception, we shall probably agree with Adam Smith that, though the plain neighbour and honest citizen needs no theory for his goodness, the right theory matters a great deal to the philosopher. Without right views of the organ of perception we are taking our principles on trust; they may come from "some strong spirit deceiving us".

Sidgwick upholds the contrary view that the knowledge of the ethical organ is no more necessary to the moral philosopher than to the student of mathematics the study of the faculty by which he perceives mathematical truths.[23] He remarks shrewdly that the differences among moral philosophers are no greater than the differences in the moral reasonings of the plain neighbours and honest citizens, who are quite accustomed to contradict themselves and see no harm in the practice. He would avoid debate by using the plural "Methods", conflicting, or at least different principles or points of view, of which he thinks both or all may be reasonably taken, even if one should appear in the long run to be better than the rest. For example, we may reasonably take either Perfection or Happiness as our chief end, and either (*a*) as of the Individual or (*b*) as of Humanity. Hutcheson himself speaks of Greatest Happiness as only one principle out of several, each of them ultimate on occasion, apart from religion.[24]

It would surely be impossible for a philosopher to remain contentedly in doubt which of several "principles" is his ultimate and fundamental, though he may often, as a mere man, fail to solve his doubt. It does not seem safe to go on using an inadequate theory when we have ourselves proved another to be less so.

For our present discussion it is enough to say that, even as an occasional refuge when others fail, the theory of a Moral Sense is without a patron, whether as an organ of perception or as a fount of principles.

One recommendation of the Moral Sense was the supposed rapidity of its deliverances. The course of history seems to point, not to an instinct, but to a power of decision acquired through the moral training given by social institutions, family, society, and state, with tradition as the general name for the transmitted influence. The ground and standard of decision are thus framed for us in things as they are now, largely by what the past has made them. In the interests of progress and greater approach to Perfection, reason needs to exercise its critical function to avoid such a ratification of "things as they are" as will prevent them ever becoming better. "Lord, take away my life, *for* I am not better than my fathers." New words must be added to the moral language when new ideas call for them; we may take Green's simile quite seriously, and regard society as standing to character as language to thought.

We must use the powers bred in us by society to alter that society itself, the thought reacting on the language. That something like this has actually happened can be seen when we compare the moral standard of our own time with that of a century ago. The thoughts of men are widened by no mere process of the suns, if that mean lapse of time, but by criticism, agitation, minorities,—Mill would add, eccentricities. If we complain that the ethics of Hutcheson's time (call it the first half of the eighteenth century) had too little room for our larger and deeper aspirations, we must keep watch on the ethics of the early twentieth century lest that too should cramp expansion. And we do well also to have Banquo's fear that we may lose in seeking to augment. No power will ever give us the gift of seeing ourselves as others will see us a hundred years hence. Though the gains of philosophy seem the most intangible of all gains, they persist, in the minds of men, as imperishably as music or poetry, and their future is equally beyond prediction and beyond arrest.

REFERENCES IN CHAPTER XII

KANT ON THE MORAL SENSE.

1. Autonomy and Heteronomy. Kant (Hartenstein), iv. *Metaphysic of Ethics*, 1785, p. 267 foot; cf. p. 269.

2. Difference in figures, etc. *Ibid.*, p. 290 and note.

Not far from the Kingdom. Mark xii. 34.

Cf. Butler, *supra*, and Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 193.

3. *Practical Reason* (Hartenstein), v. p. 41.

4. Half-way. *Supra* pp. 236, 243.

5. Difference in quality. See Caird's *Kant*, 1889, ii. pp. 179, 180. Kant, *Practical Reason* (Hartenstein), v. pp. 23–6. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1883 (Clarendon Press), p. 169.

"Shakes his head." Plato, *Republic*, viii. 562. See *supra* p. 109.

6. Actually done in a once-famous book, *The Unseen Universe*, anonymous, 1875 (afterwards acknowledged by Tait and Balfour Stewart), chap. iv. Matter and Ether. Especially § 135 ff.

Compare the address of Professor Oliver Lodge in *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, October 1929, especially pp. 533, 534, 543.

7. Kant, *Practical Reason* (Hartenstein), v. p. 27: "Nämlich dass die Handlung durch unsere Neigung uns ebenso unausbleiblich abgenöthigt wurde als das Gähnen wenn wir Andere gähnen sehen." Compare pp. 180, 227 foot, and Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments*, chap. i. in all editions (at beginning).

8. Man as knowing himself—as the twofold person of Shaftesbury's *Soliloquy*.

"Impossible to explain"—in fact an ἀρχή. Kant, *Progress of Metaphysics since Leibnitz* (die Fortschritte der Metaphysik), 1791 (Hartenstein), viii. p. 530. Caird's *Kant*, ii. p. 182 ff.; cf. p. 168.

9. Separating us from all animals. Compare Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, ii. p. 384, the passage quoted above, as possibly an apology for the presence of the essay on the *Formation of Languages*, appended in the third edition, 1767, and all later editions. For the reference to the word "I", see, e.g., sixth edition, vol. ii, p. 443; the whole extends from p. 403 to p. 462.

From the way in which Dugald Stewart speaks of this essay in his Introduction (p. xl) to the *Essays on Philosophical Subjects by the late Adam Smith*, 1795, we might suppose it to have been written before the author ceased to be a professor (1763), and the reference to Rousseau's *Inégalité*, 1753, would give us the earlier limit. From internal evidence, it could hardly

have been written expressly for the *Moral Sentiments*, with which it has very slight connection.

Dugald Stewart (*loc. cit.*) calls it a Dissertation, and it is so called on the title-pages; in the text, less formally, "Considerations on", etc.

10. Hutcheson, *System*, ii. p. 8, tells us that Nature has given us the sagacity to contrive means by speech "to communicate out thoughts". And again (p. 28): "Nature has also implanted a moral feeling in our heart to regulate this power" of speech. The sagacity to contrive means is hardly consistent with a mere sense, though to say that nature does it is neither more nor less dogmatic than to say a moral sense does it.

11. Professor MacDougall comes near to doing this, but does not assert any original or unmodifiable moral senses.

12. The name "Popular Philosophy" was taken by Green from Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, *Werke*, xv, 1844, p. 438: "Allgemeine Popular-philosophie, reflectirender Empirismus", in contrast to the Kantian Metaphysic that displaced it.

13. Mandeville. See *Moral Sentiments*, sixth edition, ii. p. 319.

14. Hutchison Stirling, in his translation of Schwegler's *Handbook of the History of Philosophy* (Edinburgh, 1868), second edition, p. 419. "Without is within", says Berkeley. "Let it be so," says Hegel, "and philosophy has still to begin." This is a free rendering of Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, *Works*, 1844, vol. xv, p. 445: "Was ist denn das Wahre dieser Wahrnehmungen und Vorstellungen, wie vorher der Dinge?" They were "things" before; they are "ideas" now; but what do they come to in either case?

15. Milton, *Paradise Lost*, iii. 51; *Samson Agonistes*, 162. John i. 9. Romans vii. 22. Plato, *Republic*, ii. and i. (end).

Precepts of which we see the reason. Butler, *supra*.

Cf. Sidgwick's *History of Ethics*, p. 195.

16. Green goes so far as to say that "social life is to personality what language is to thought". *Prolegomena*, p. 192, Book III, chap. iv. Cf. Adam Smith, *supra*.

17. "Born again." From Novalis. See Carlyle's *Essays*, vol. ii, p. 88 (ed. Chapman and Hall, 1866). Compare *Faust*, i. line 1619 (Schröer, 1907). "Prächtiger Baue sie wieder, In deinem Busen baue sie auf!"

18. Professor Eddington, quoted by Professor Oliver Lodge, as *supra* (reference 6, *supra*), pp. 516, 517. The words are from Professor Eddington's *Gifford Lectures of* 1927, *On the Nature of the Physical World.* Compare his *Swarthmore Lecture*, 1929, *Science and the Unseen World* (Allen & Unwin, 1929), p. 21: "Physics to-day is not likely to be attracted by a type of explanation of the mind which it would scornfully reject for the ether."

In other words, as Kant digs below the ordinary consciousness, modern science digs below the atom.

19. Hume uses the title *Philosophical Essays concerning the Human Understanding*, 1751, and the first essay, "Of the different species of Philosophy", begins: "Moral Philosophy, or the science of human nature", which in his sequel puts every other species into the background. Compare T. H. Green, *Works*, iii. p. 96, Popular Philosophy: "It is not until it approaches the moral life that it can become popular." See also note 12 *supra.*

20. James Martineau rejects the Moral Sense (*Ethical Theory*, ii. pp. 458, 461, 466. He thinks Shaftesbury had really grown beyond it (p. 467), but with vacillations (p. 468). He remarks a wonderful effect on Channing of the reading of Hutcheson (*ibid.*, p. 478); gives an account of the Moral Sense (pp. 483 *seq.*); thinks little of Hutcheson's psychology (p. 485); finds him doubtful how many internal senses there are (p. 493); and thinks that in the Moral Sense (p. 494) Hutcheson really assumes a "cognitive power" and "mental energy". Hutcheson looks "outward" for guidance (p. 496); gives the sense a "prophetic intuition" of what reason gives more slowly (p. 497); and his Moral Sense would seem to be an outward sense. Martineau himself holds by the "inward spring" (pp. 497–8). Moral Sense, to Hutcheson, means "we

approve it because it is approvable" (p. 514). Hutcheson's distinction of it from benevolence is illusory (pp. 513–16).

21. Henry Sidgwick deals very briefly with Shaftesbury's doctrine of the Moral Sense—it is the crown of Shaftesbury's doctrine, but not essential to his main argument, which Sidgwick finds in the maintaining of such a balance of social and self-regarding affections as is most conducive to the good of the whole species (p. 185; cf. p. 186 middle).

On Hutcheson he is equally brief, and lays more stress on that writer's formulation of the Greatest Happiness than on his exposition of the Moral Sense (pp. 197, 198–200; cf. p. 181). He notices that both Price and Reid introduce the intellectual element and the emotional together (pp. 214, 218), and that Reid's adhesion to the name is hardly an adhesion to the older doctrine identified with the name (pp. 218–19).

22. Hutcheson, *System*, i. p. 255. Private justice, veracity, etc., "are immediately approved without reference to a system" (p. 295). "The right of natural liberty is not only suggested by the selfish parts of our constitution, but by many generous affections and by our own *moral sense* [italics his own], which represents our own voluntary actions as the grand dignity and perfection of our nature" (Book II, chap. v). Hutcheson multiplies "natural rights" in this part of his book as elsewhere the moral senses. The part here played by the moral sense in representing generally a course to be pursued would certainly make it a source of principles, not a mere judge in particular cases. Hume put political philosophy out of the range of ethics. Hutcheson (we saw) is far from doing this. Sidgwick and Green are careful to keep Ethics and Politics together. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, Book I, chaps. i. and ii., especially in second edition. Green, *Political Obligation*, in *Works*, vol. ii, pp. 335 ff.

23. *Supplement*, 1877 (to first edition of *Methods of Ethics*, 1874), Preface, p. viii.

Shrewd remark. *Supplement*, p. 4, and *Methods*, second edition. Cf. also pp. 5 and 6.

Sidgwick hopes that in his "Methods" (plural) he has bridged the gulf between Utilitarian and Intuitionalist. Like Butler, he will not decide absolutely between reasonable self-love and conscience, but leaves both supreme. Hutcheson himself (*Inquiry*, 1725, pp. 177 and 184 in second edition), and his friend Leechman for him in *System*, vol. i, XLIV, speak of Greatest Happiness as only one principle out of three, each of them alike ultimate till Religion steps in to give the casting vote. Hutcheson would avoid this Manichaeism if he could; Sidgwick, if his own dualism is Manichaean, sees nothing but good in it. Butler's doubt was hardly consistent with his strong language about conscience and its supremacy; it was an unremoved perplexity to the last.

24. See also John MacCunn, *Making of Character* (1900); A. Shand, *Foundations of Character* (1914); J. H. Muirhead, *Is There a Moral End?* in *Mind*, 1928, p. 484; J. L. Stocks, *Moral Values* in *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 1929, p. 299 (vol. iv, No. 15).

25. 2 Kings xix. 4.

APPENDIX

CONCERNING NATURAL GIFTS AND GRACES AND THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES SHAFTESBURY ABIDES THE QUESTIONING OF A YOUNG MODERN ADMIRER

SHAFTESBURY. Your paradox, my dear young friend, is nothing new. You will find it in the Son of Sirach,[1] so admired by some in my time: "The life of the fool is worse than death. Seven days do men mourn for him that is dead, but for a fool and an ungodly man all the days of his life." Now, if the fool were not to be blamed for his folly, should we mourn for him because of it any more than for him who has red hair or is short of stature?

ADMIRER. You can always be playful, sir, and, though I find it one of your attractions, more solemn people say that you "dance away" your reputation for depth. You do not in so many words deal with my question in your books, but you cover the ground of it in the first book of your *Characteristics*, and also in the last book, where you speak of "this natural talent which we call Thought", and where you chide the "Half-Thinkers". The qualities that make what you call my paradox are qualities for which a man is, if only in a gentle way, praised or blamed as if

they were in whole or part under his responsibility, though not as the passions are.

SH. "In whole or part"—the question is how much of the whole, how large a part? It is always so with every fault. In this case very much "in part". But take what everyone would call not only fault but crime. Even there the agent would not be found responsible for all that was in him, even if he were found both legally and morally guilty of the crime. His weakness seems to be that, though he himself never created all the causes of his crime, he is responsible for not controlling these causes when they are there in front of him.

A. You are wandering from my point, I do not say from your own, for I do not yet know yours. I should agree with a late and great historian [2] that there is another world for the expiation of guilt (that is, of your man's "crime"), but the wages of folly are payable here below. The faults of folly are immediately punished and therefore do not lie on our conscience. The consequences of folly hampering us at every step are a sufficient punishment of the folly. The other, the great crime, may have brought, not penalty, but profit here below.

SH. I agree with Plato; it is a great drawback to a man that he has not had his punishment.[3] To make a mistake and to do a wrong are quite different, though Solomon sometimes mixes the two up. We can live down mistakes but not sins; regret is not remorse. I love Plato, you see. But

he stays too long on the heights for my delicate lungs. Let us come down to Aristotle, who was perhaps looking at your special point.

A. Yes, he speaks of qualities, such as quickness of wit and shrewdness in counsel, the presence or absence of which do not bring the same sort of praise or blame to a man as the virtues and vices of common life. But those same qualities are notwithstanding called virtues in a man, and the Philosopher devotes the sixth book of his *Ethics* to them. Your friend (if I dare to call him so), Mr. Thomas Hobbes, gives them a chapter, but certainly does not come to my point, and goes off into a study of madness. We do not praise or condemn in the same serious way as we praise truthfulness and condemn lying, praise kindness and condemn cruelty. But we speak of culpable ignorance and surely of hasty judgments.

SH. And surely we condemn inaccuracy. As a virtuoso I laboured to be correct that I might not carelessly allow my "virtue" to lag behind my "knowledge". But if the ancients, Hebrew or Greek, confounded the two, the moderns hold them too severely apart. As you know, I adore Socrates, who kept them together.

A. You are coming to my point. Is it a man's moral duty to take pains, and is the man to be acquitted of wrong-doing who pleads hereditary and invincible carelessness? If we once allow that excuse, the fault will flourish and abound with us for all time. Is not the man praised who takes

pains, endures affliction, and does not simply say he had not the gift? We blame both the ordinary and the gifted man who takes no pains. The capacity for taking pains might be supposed to belong to a human being as such, and be the foundation of both virtues, but only as a capacity, δυνάμει. The duties of the ordinary man usually lie near to him. Has the superior person with larger powers received larger duties, enlarged in proportion to the powers?

SH. It is so, I think, or I should not have written *Characteristics*, where I set down the virtuoso as better than the scholar.[4] The superior person, without owing his powers to himself, lies under the responsibility of the man in the Parable who was entrusted with the Ten Pounds.[5] Yet he is not born with merit ready made; inheritance counts for more, I think, in the intellectual than in the moral virtues; does it count and account for everything there?

A. There might be a *via media*. That a man should die ignorant who had the capacity for knowledge has been declared the greatest of tragedies. He ought, then, to have been "educated"; much can be done by education, though not the miracles once expected of it—always on the assumption that there is something to be educated. We shall then suffer fools gladly in the hope that the folly is curable. May we not suppose that the praise goes to the particular ignorant man who seizes opportunities of rising above ignorance, and

the blame to him who does not seize them? A power to labour is a gift of nature, but we praise the industrious man who not only has the power but uses it.

SH. The problem was tangled enough; I hope you are not tangling it more. The simplest case might be that of ordinary prudence in managing affairs, husbanding the means so well that they go far with little. The Lord commended the unjust steward [6] in respect of his having done wisely. There is no moral judgment passed on that steward. As he had been engaged in outwitting his master, he was presumably not of the children of light.

A. Pardon me. May not the meaning be that, if the children of light would use their heads as well as that child of darkness used his, we should all be the gainers? From this point of view a wise good man would have greater merit than a dull good man who expects gravitation to cease when he goes by. Here, then, we have an intellectual virtue which intensifies the moral virtue.

SH. *Macte "virtute", puer!* If I denied that, I should certainly be sinning against light and the children of light.

A. Without for a moment reflecting, sir, on your philosophical character, I dare to say that your happy disposition leads you to welcome a literary reference quite as joyfully as a philosophical argument, and I recall to your memory a passage in Milton [7] where he praises the Devil. Satan tells

his companions that he proposes to make his way unassisted from hell to earth in defiance of the Highest in heaven—I should say, sir, the boldest venture ever recorded in poetry. His offer was thus received by his fellow devils:

> Nor failed they to express how much they praised,
> That for the general safety he despised
> His own; for neither do the spirits damned
> Lose all their virtue, lest bad men should boast
> Their specious deeds on earth, which glory excites.

You see, Milton leaves them some kind of virtue; and it is surely the moral kind, for it is what you and your first successor consider the very essence thereof. You say in the first volume [8] of the *Characteristics* that "to love the public, to study their good, and to promote the interest of the whole world is surely the height of goodness, and makes a character which we call divine". Satan went far; I do not say he went so far that he aimed at what your successor called the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.

SH. No, his Public Spirit was hardly of the right breed; and Milton says no more than Plato in the first book of the *Republic*, where Plato says even a band of robbers cannot hold together without justice or mutual good faith. We could hardly say that this sort of cohesion for self-preservation consecrates every combination of men for whatever purpose. But I allow it was the soul of goodness in things evil, down below, in Satan's

case, or Puritan Milton would not have brought it out in his favour.

A. You seem to concede my point, sir. I do not want to embroil you with your successors, but the one I mentioned, who was the first to follow you in unreservedly adopting your theory of a Moral Sense, would not have conceded that point. He says, for example, perhaps from recollection of Hobbes, that "A penetrating judgment, a tenacious memory, a quick invention, patience of of labour—these may be called rather natural abilities than moral qualities. We seem to have a natural relish for them distinct from moral approbation. But if we plainly see them maliciously employed, they make the agent more detestable."[9]

SH. The unjust steward was not judged in this severe manner; there was a good in him so far as it went; to denounce him altogether would have been to ignore the virtue that was in him, and this was not done. The same might be said of Satan as judged by Milton.

A. Well, another successor of yours, though an admirer of the first, made a stout fight for the "natural abilities".[10] He thought that, since the name virtue *was* and *is* constantly given to such qualities as knowledge, sagacity, strength of character, the giving or withholding of a place in the ranks of virtues is a matter of mere "verbal dispute". If a man is lucky enough to have such qualities, they please himself and please others, and are useful to society; what more do you expect

of a full-grown Decalogical virtue? If you answer that these qualities do not depend on his will at all, the answer is that neither does Prudence, and Prudence is voted by all to a seat among the virtues, coming at the top of Aristotle's list of them. Yet we only smile to hear a man say, "Go to, I shall be prudent", as if it depended on his Will. The writer of these arguments was so persuaded of their force that he brought them into all his ethical discussions. His dearest friends did not back him up in this, perhaps feeling that he relied too much on Cicero, and forgot that the Ancients lived in the youth of the world and we have learned higher standards than theirs.

SH. Our "virtue", after all, is a Roman and English translation of the Greek word for excellence or perfection of function. Aristotle's ideal includes moral virtue, but goes beyond it.

A. Nowadays if we made perfection the ideal we should be at once told that this favoured a life that lacked benevolence, and might be one of intellectual self-indulgence.

SH. Benevolence figured in my own writings, and, you tell me, figured even more in the writings of my first successor, who was brought to book for it by *his* successors one after another. I know you are referring to Aristotle's belief that the highest good of man must be the development of his highest powers, and, as these must be the powers distinctive of man as compared with the lower animals, the ideal must be intellectual. In

rejecting the intellectual virtues we are flying in the face of Aristotle. I can guess your answer, that the darkness of the Middle Ages is past and the true light now shineth.

A. We put the matter, in our century, two centuries after yours, sir, much rather from the side of the great masses than of the select and elect. The life of study and contemplation could only have been for a few in Greek times; it can only be for a few now: those fitted for it by their hereditary "intellectual virtues"; those freed for it by circumstances, enabling them to have the Greek leisure; those retiring into it after "public employment". No changes will ever make all men alike fitted to develope the one highest human excellence. We are every day making it more possible for those that have powers to come forward and use them. But we cannot pretend to exact from all men the higher intellectual virtues; we could not think of these as universal. An entire world devoted to science and philosophy is not conceivable, perhaps not desirable. Aaron's rod must not be allowed to swallow up all the rest.

SH. Is there any large body of men practising Aristotle's "speculation" or contemplation in your century at all? Are there "super-speculative" men?[11]

A. Oh yes, both in science and in philosophy we have Research, and there is a great deal of it. It is carried on for its own sake, as if truth *were* an end in itself, and then with an eye to the public

advantage, as if truth were *not* an end in itself. It is also carried on for private profit, which would have saddened Aristotle. Yet our selfish stewards very often do wisely for us, and merit the same amount of praise as the one in the parable, who helped himself by helping others, and made the best of both worlds.

SH. I understand, then, that the life of the Scholar, call him the Perfectionist, is still led even in England here and there. Now in my time there was the *virtuoso* (mark the word, it has virtue in it). His devotion extended to the intellectual virtues, and Art had a place in it. I have written that the virtuous and the virtuoso are very nearly the same.

A. Mandeville thought you were altering the whole face of morals, sir, by making cheerfulness an obligation and abolishing the element of self-denial, or reducing it to the vanishing-point.

SH. Did I do that? I had myself experienced suffering, and much of it was for others.

A. There was true nobility in your life, sir, and your service even to moral philosophy has not been enough recognized. The *Soliloquy* has, indeed, received its own, with exaggerations for usury. We had a Prussian statesman of the first rank declaring that he had not two selves but half a dozen. We can understand how a man like Mandeville should misconceive you; he seems to have had no such variety-in-unity in his texture as you, and he counted all qualities evil that

might under some circumstances become so. You were Aristotelian, holding by your Balance and Golden Mean where the passions were concerned.

SH. I can fancy someone arguing that the virtues to which the Mean and Balance apply are the only ones to be called moral. Aristotle did not apply them to the intellectual virtues; therefore it might be argued he considered them non-moral.

A. They have perhaps less of the element of restraint, only the rules of plain living with a view to high thinking; but the concentration of the scientific man, or the philosopher, usually means that, like Paul, he keeps under his body and brings it into subjection. He deserves at least as much praise as the unjust steward, and we can praise him without compromising our Decalogue. On the whole we should advise him, as we should have advised the unjust steward, to follow the decalogue like other people, and add his intellectual virtues to the rest of the virtues, surely worthy of all acceptation.

SH. I found that the aesthetical decalogue was in correspondence with the ethical; and I have set it down emphatically that a philosopher must be a good man.

A. Your first successor did the same, only a little less daintily than you. Art did not mean so much to him as to you, in spite of the title of his first book. He spent no time on frontispieces.

But, like you, he thought he found a Sense guiding us both in Art and in Morals. What becomes of your Sense, moral or otherwise, if we agree to admit the intellectual virtues? A Sense fits them as ill as the Mean and the Balance, a fact not unobserved by your first successor. The next after him found he did not need it for Justice, since Justice was artificial, and therefore itself the fruit of intellectual virtue, man's cleverness, with no rightful place in the decalogue at all. His hold on your Moral Sense was very slight; he evidently thought in his heart that the idea of utility which prompted the invention of justice might be supposed to prompt the "invention" of the other virtues, so that, as old Socrates said, all virtue would be knowledge.

SH. All virtues intellectual virtues! I acknowledge now that your paradox was a real paradox. If you only mean that moral virtues are of the mind, not of the body, I grant it to you. But you will find that my principles do not lead to the conclusion to which I believe some have come, that virtue is nothing but right reason, and therefore wholly intellectual. Unfortunately, as Hamlet says, we do our work here below, not only with reason, but with a machine called the body, and a large part of our moral virtue consists in the control thereof. The intellectual virtues themselves are like sweet bells jangled when there is not *mens sana in corpore sano*, and we judge all men mercifully in regard to all their aberrations when

we know they were having trouble from the machine.

A. You have not given me your full mind on their relative positions. Though I pleaded for the recognition of the intellectual among the virtues I did not claim equality. Will you let me suggest that where the possible control of the will is greatest there is most of the moral virtue, and, where it is least, least? I cannot say with your second successor that the Will makes no difference; I cannot give one man praise for having an ear for music and another man blame who has no ear for it. In the same way artistic talents are not merits but gifts. But there is a moral virtue in bringing out those talents to full development, say in spite of obstacles. The old "perseverance" is not only an intellectual virtue but a moral one.

SH. Let us say those gifts are virtues when conjoined with the moral ones, or else your Satan of Milton might put in a claim to more than Milton allows.

A. Agreed, but, when so conjoined, the intellectual make a contribution of their own; they improve the quality and add to the strength and power of resistance. The training which made Cromwell's Ironsides equal to the gentlemen of honour was an intellectual addition to their Puritan virtue. If evil is wrought by want of thought as well as want of heart, as one of our later poets has said, then that is not quite true

which another poet, not quite so late, has written for our instruction: "The heart's aye the part aye that makes us right or wrong"—a quotation with the dangerous charm of a half-truth.[12]

SH. To praise our hearts we must not lose our heads. I wrote:[13] "It is not a head merely, but a heart and resolution which must complete the philosopher." *Pectus theologum facit. Pectus philosophum facit.* I said "not merely" and I said "complete". I meant that both are wanted, heart and head. Your first poet was nearer the truth than the second.

A. It has been wittily said,[14] sir, that the head cannot join the heart respecting Mary Stuart, nor can the heart follow the head about Elizabeth. What judgment would have followed a union of the two in that "Great Cause"?

SH. I answer: that is *res judicata*, but as princes have more latitude than lawyers the case might have been decided differently. Human nature is "not perfect or absolutely successful, though rightly tending, and moved by proper and just principles".[15]

A. A good Puritan might consult his Old Testament and say that the heavens are the Lord's, but the earth He hath given to the children of men to subdue it. Is this conquest meant by your right tending? Hitherto the conquest has had more to do with the head and the strong arm than the heart; more to do with the talents and intellect than with the moral virtues. Your own

maxims would lead us to peace with all men. To use your own phrase, "not merely", the head would be enough for that; we should need moral goodness, not merely cleverness, science, and efficiency.

SH. You admit that the last three cannot be left out. It is only by accident that the two kinds of virtues can prosper separately. Sir Matthew Hale,[16] a contemporary of mine, writes, "I well knew a person that had not capacity enough to deduce anything of curiosity *per processum rationalem*; yet by accidental dealing with water and some canes did arrive to a most admirable excellence in some mechanical works of that nature, though he never had the wit to give a reason of his performance of them."

A. I agree, sir, we need the conjunction; and I doubt whether Hale's idiot could be said to have either the one virtue or the other. It is the Newtons that will give us strength to conquer the earth. "All the talents" will secure it for us; but we need "all the virtues" to conquer human jealousies and antipathies so that the conquest of the earth shall be used for the good of all the earth's inhabitants. The second is really the harder problem of the two; but perhaps the stars in their courses are fighting for us. We get unintended help. Perhaps the truth in Hale's story is this: that men, in no respects idiots, carried out a change that benefited everybody when they only intended to benefit themselves. Trade and com-

merce, in themselves selfish, have so drawn the world of men together that a real framework, something like a body, has been provided. Civilized men might make "the whole world one city" in a better sense than it was under imperial Rome.[17] To make it really One we need the conscious moral principles, requiring one spirit in all men; this is the moral side. But we need also "diversities of gifts", which is the side of the intellectual virtues. It is not only in things of the spirit that many are called and few are chosen. In the vulgar phrase, we cannot give all men "brains" in the sense of high intellect, any more than we can make them all athletes. But surely every man has a best talent, an intellectual virtue, or capacity of it, if he can be persuaded to use it, so that his unlikeness may fit ours? As to praise or blame, if that matters, you will probably say, sir, with the smile I know so well from your books, that, if he does not use it, he will be blamed; if he does use it, he is not to be praised, for the action is its own reward.

SH. You are making me more severe than the parable. I should praise the steward myself, and, if I were challenged for saying "Well done", I should answer that I was praising the moral, not the intellectual, element in the action. Will that content you?

A. The distinction is scholastic. I should say you were praising the result of the two combined, knowing well that you are not always serious in your paradoxes.

[After a Pause]

Sh. I can be serious with serious people who are taking me seriously. I can even come near to talking Metaphysics, which are nothing if not serious. You may not have read what I have written, for example, in the *Moralists* upon Personality, Self, Identity? [18]

A. Indeed I have, and admit the seriousness. But you love to wear the appearance of gaiety, and, as you were never a Professor, you never speak as from a Chair, except, perhaps, in the *Inquiry*. You talk without restraint, and your easy talking has the drawbacks of easy talking.

Sh. You are right to except the *Inquiry*. In that first writing I surely tried to exhibit the virtue of precision, so far as it is in your notion a virtue, and so far as it is a natural gift with me, at all.

A. Observe, sir, you are falling into banter already. But I take you at your word. We were speaking of an action where you discovered a blending of good and bad—to wit, the action of the Unjust Steward in the Parable. What of a man quite Just in motive, willing the Good with his whole heart and finding it to part itself before his eyes into two Goods, of which he is to choose the more good? This is not the best of all possible worlds or we should not be striving to make it better.

Sh. Nor am I the best of all possible men or I should not be trying to make myself better.

Which is the higher obligation? That to myself or that to the world? Is that your puzzle when you speak of the two goods? There is surely a venerable presumption that Virtue is One, and therefore that your two obligations can be reduced to one. I tried to overcome some such difficulties by my idea of a Balancing of elements, an inward constitution, harmony and economy or Cosmos within us.[19]

A. Your first successor, sir, used the same kind of metaphor, but took another way than yours to produce the harmony and system. You, sir, are virtuous as the virtuoso is virtuous, with Perfection most in your thoughts. He, on the contrary, is virtuous as the good neighbour is virtuous; benevolence and works of charity have the chief attraction for him; he helped preachers with their sermons and never spared his own pocket.

SH. I made ample reservations in favour of Benevolence.

A. So did he in favour of Perfection, name and thing. You do not so often use the name as he did, but the idea of the thing is there, even more than with him.

SH. I cover both: "Good for good's sake without any further regards."

A. You cover both, but they seem two different notions of the Good, and we do not obliterate their difference by putting them both under the cover of the same general term. The question is,

whether the good of perfection or the good of benevolence is to be king over us as in a monarchy, or are we to live under two kings? Is Good divided? Which is the higher—to crucify ourselves for our neighbours or to labour to be perfect "even as our Father in heaven is perfect"? This is really a hard puzzle, though in practice the world gains, whichever answer is given.

SH. Are not the Seraphim that love reckoned superior to the Cherubim that know?

A. Both of them bend over the Ark and no precedence is shown. Dante speaks of black cherubs in hell and Milton tells us of seraphim cannonading the cherubim in the great rebellion.

SH. *Deorum injuriae diis curae.*[20] Let me know how your own nut was cracked by your best philosophers. You say you have them.

A. They may not be better than yours, sir, but they live two centuries after yours and have problems that seem harder than those emerging in your time, whether it be that our world is bigger or that we have better glasses now and see more of it. We find that we cannot any of us master all studies at once, even those of us who aspire to be virtuosi and Fellows of the Royal Society. The human powers are not equal to this great world. Even though we divide our tasks, the more we search out, the more seems to lie behind for our further search and research.

SH. Our great Royal Society, born just before me, was not overwhelmed with problems. If all

stories are true, it had to forage for them in the early years.

A. Nowadays the problems come, not single spies, but in battalions. So the scientific men despair of omniscience even in their own chosen sciences. Judge, then, how hard it must be for even a Shaftesbury to be at one and the same time master in his science and ardent philanthropist of the old school. The seventh of your title, my lord, in the early part of the century after yours, though noble in philanthropy, made no mark in science or even in virtuosity.

SH. He followed good for its own sake; and I am proud of him, even if you have nothing more to tell.

A. I have this case in my mind. Suppose a man to feel it in him to be either or both, when both would seem impossible. The question weighing on my spirits is whether or not philanthropy, which your successor preached and your descendant practised so well, should turn the scale and determine the career. Is a man always the more good for choosing the philanthropy, as against another who has chosen science or art?

SH. You mean that neither of the two can any longer be a mere hobby, as science was sometimes in my century, and possibly philanthropy in yours. Either must engage the whole of life and be the Whole Duty of Man; you are really asking if the alternatives are exclusive alternatives —may either be chosen or is one put forward as

the better. But conflicting vices do not destroy human identity; and there seems no reason why conflicting virtues should do injury at all.[21]

A. It used to be thought by everybody except Heraclitus that conflict and contradiction are ills to be removed. Our late philosophers boldly make them a principle of good, indeed, the vital principle of all progress and development.

SH. To a youth in need of moral guidance there would be small comfort in the zigzag of contradictions; he would like to be guided in a straight line. The problem might take the shape you describe in those who have passed beyond the youthful stage of life when control of the passions gives more than enough to do.

A. The author of the *Characteristics* has been accused of thinking all men like himself, with no strong coarse passions in him forsooth, but always able to view life placidly, like Cephalus in the *Republic* of Plato: "In age we have escaped from a mad and furious master." [22] Yet you yourself never reached old age; you wrote on moral philosophy when you were only "in the middle of the journey of life".

SH. I presented the young man confronted with the Choice of Hercules. I was then myself not in the middle of life, but close to the end of it. Tell me how your later philosophers, perhaps taking the young man's victory for granted, deal with the mature man facing two rival claimants for supreme goodness. You might make a pendant

to my Choice of Hercules, and call it the Choice of Solomon, who is said to have chosen Wisdom. A choice between two good leaders might perplex a man without injuring the spirit of him. He is supposed to be willing to follow reason.

A. One of our brightest poets has told us how he should do that. "Because right is right, to follow right were wisdom, in the scorn of consequence." That was written of the Judgment of Paris, an unlike figure to Hercules, with a worse choice. But I feel sure you agree with the writer. He was some time our Mr. Bays; and you will be glad to know that our present Mr. Bays is a virtuoso, well worthy of the name and proud to wear it. Our philosophers, if they do not wear the name, write on the subjects. One of the brightest and best of them dealt with my dilemma a few years ago, and made folks think about it all over again. He does not take the matter so lightly as you do. He says it is a conflict between self-assertion and self-sacrifice. These are not at one with each other; yet there is no self-assertion which does not include a regard for others; and there is no self-sacrifice which cancels the self altogether. It is the essence of all finite beings (he says) to be self-contradictory even in their virtues.

SH. I am not quite at home; but let him go on.

A. He goes on almost in your own style, sir, though not so lucidly: "The Whole is furthered most by the self-seeking of its parts, for in these

alone the whole can appear and be real." I must tell you that he is our English Spinoza,[23] and the subject of his book is "Appearance and Reality". His next sentence is: "And the part again is individually bettered—bettered by its action for the Whole, since thus it gains the supply of that common substance which is necessary to fill it."

SH. I might have written the first sentence myself. I am not so sure about the second.

A. Still less, perhaps, about the next: "This general coincidence is only general; and assuredly there are points at which it ceases. And here self-assertion and self-sacrifice begin to diverge, and each to acquire its distinctive character. Each of these modes of action realizes the Self, and realizes that which is higher, and they are equally virtuous and right."

SH. But where does the comfort or guidance come in?

A. Listen; it is beginning: "That he [a finite individual] should be compelled to follow two ideals of perfection which diverge appears natural and necessary", since, as a finite being, he is self-contradictory. "And each of these pursuits in general and in the abstract is equally good. It is only the particular conditions which in each case can decide between them."

SH. If the words have their common meaning, the decision by "particular conditions" should mean that we are left to Aristotle's Prudent Man or to my Moral Sense. The responsibility is thrown

on the individual himself. Indeed, to my mind, nothing on earth will relieve him of that, he being a man—that is to say, a free spirit. He may either reason it out now or decide by previous reasonings offhand. Our decision now, if indeed we find one, as to the relative claims of the two rival chief ends, may help someone in future to an apparently offhand decision, in your philosopher's "particular conditions".

A. Hear further his whole case, and remember that he uses "self-assertion" for the effort after perfection, and "self-sacrifice" for benevolence: "The ends set by self-assertion and self-sacrifice are each alike unattainable. The individual never can in himself become an harmonious system", though you, sir, thought differently. "And in the wider ideal to which he devotes himself [in philanthropy] no matter how thoroughly, he never can find complete self-realization."

SH. He is going into mysteries. The first plain meaning is that ideals cease to be ideal when realized.

A. I quite expected you to pounce on our philosopher's "particular conditions". In an earlier book he had made more of them, in a chapter on "My Station and its Duties", a title borrowed from your successor. He gave the idea that the agent owes most of his moral instruction to his surroundings.

SH. I should have added that on my principles the decision which of two ends was preferable

would be reached by a balancing of good consequences—which of the two pursuits would secure the larger surplus of Good to the world of men, myself included, and not mere pleasures or enjoyments.

A. No, he never means the last. I should like to point out that when you add "myself included" you are touching on a matter on which I have still a word to say. A man knows more about himself than about any other men, and can be more certain whether advantages are gained or missed in his own case than in theirs.

SH. Otherwise, if I may quote from my *Soliloquy*,[24] we might say the house is turning when it is only that I am giddy. Kindly resolve the discord for me by means of your later superior philosophy. The pitch is perhaps too high for me; and I shall understand your language better than his, without, I hope, losing hold of his mysteries altogether.

A. In the period of human life when sensuality is most aggressive, it is usually the "particular conditions" that must decide a choice of careers. Even there the question is raised: To what end should I control myself—why control my passions in favour of my spirit and reason? and the answer forced on most men is: In order that I may become a good citizen like the best of those around me, recognizing that there is nothing perfectly good but a good man—a better phrase than "a good will", as one of my friends has truly remarked.

Those who only imitate the conduct of the good men are merely "respectable"; and you and I should both admit that they fall short of the whole human inheritance. Anyone not content with the outward resemblance asks himself what is his man's work in the world, so far as the need of daily bread allows him any range of choice in the matter. Our philosopher seems to have chiefly in mind the picked athletes of morals, who have left the first struggles behind them. It matters more to these elect than to the others which of the two highest mundane aims they should deliberately keep in view as the better. Is it to be their own development or the public welfare? Consider the two things as separable, which, strictly speaking, by his own admission, they are not.

SH. You told me he regarded both as perishable.

A. In his metaphysics they are so, for if supposed infinite they pass into the infinite; "We lose ourselves in light". There is no contradiction in a "finite individual" striving after the highest ends; but when he has attained them they are no longer ends and he is no longer finite. The older philosopher, he who talked of the good will (and lived at the end of your eighteenth century, sir), made man's immortality depend on his striving, and perpetual failure in striving after the perfectly good will. On the later theory asymptotic approximation might have saved him; to attain and be already perfect would have ruined him.

It would have ruined St. Paul, and it was well that he postulated his own imperfection.

SH. Spinoza [25] in my time protested against the description of life as a *meditatio mortis*, a practice for death. But if fulfilled goodness is to extinguish the good man, the phrase was true in spite of Spinoza. I suppose this would apply to both of your alternative ends. I am still waiting for your decision about these—which is the gold, which is the silver.

A. A more material metaphor than Cherubim and Seraphim, but less in the clouds and throwing some light on grounds of choice. Both gold and silver are honourably distinguished from the other metals as the Precious Metals; and so may our own two alternatives be ranked above other ends in earthly life, gain, glory, or self-indulgence. If I follow your metaphor, I am led, by the nearly unanimous vote for monometallism in my time, to choose one of the two, as the more honourable of the two honourables.

SH. You are coming to the point. By all means use metaphors. Be sparing of metaphysic; it is as little to my mind as Spinoza's mathematics.

A. When we look closely at the two we find that the ruling feature of the one is the individual, of the other society. I should call the individual the more constant element. Your Spinoza said: Nature makes individuals, not nations. The individual, it is true, depends on society, *legibus et moribus*, for the growth of his spirit and its

morality; but neither his spirit nor his morality leaves him when he passes out of society. They leave him only, on our philosopher's theory, when he has attained and is already perfect. A solitary man might blamelessly resign himself to the development of his own researches and his own powers.

SH. I know that a man can wean himself from Society, with or without a capital letter. I have done it myself.

A. Yes, we can "think away" our neighbours, but not ourselves.

SH. Similar questions arise in Religion. Must every devout man be a missionary and preach to his neighbours? May he not without reproach devote himself to contemplation and study or the writing of good books?

A. The supreme worth of the individual soul is a tenet, not only of saints, prophets, and missionaries, but of many philosophers. Man is "a reed that thinks"; thinking makes the reed into the Club of your Hercules. If this is not rhetoric, it gives additional prowess to the men that do most thinking; they are making most use of that power which is most distinctively human and from which religion itself comes. And its tasks are not lighter than those of philanthropy; both are unwearied in well-doing. Science, when all is said, exacts far harder exertions of mental labour than philanthropy; and in science or art no body of men, even of scientific men or artists, can do what

the individual can do; here at least Nature creates only individuals.

SH. You are treading on dangerous ground. What of the saying: "The greatest of these is Charity"?

A. My answer is that Paul's "charity" is neither philanthropy nor public spirit, and he says himself it is not almsgiving. It is not a career, but, like its next of kin, faith and hope, should animate men in every career, in science and art, quite as much as in philanthropy.

SH. I knew from our conversation that you were not the man to confuse benevolence with almsgiving, really the humblest form of it, nor to forget that even our artists and scientific men, like other folk, live, move, and have their being in society, and were trained by its laws and arts and morals and habits of business and daily work.

A. This all affects them; but there is a natural human temptation to rank that influence too high. They also live and move and have their being in what we call Outward Nature, animate and inanimate, depending thereon for air, food, and bodily support and comforts. Yet man, "the finite individual", is as little identified with nature as with society, as little with society as with nature. Though to the world he is an insignificant inappreciable part, to himself he is the whole world.[26] The Self is the Hamlet that cannot be left out of the human drama. He cannot in extremity say, "what touches us ourself shall be

last served"; he must regard his own integrity and life, whatever be his career and work.

SH. I shall not insult you by reminding you that he "must die to live" according to our highest codes of spiritual teaching.

A. I had not forgotten, but would remark that the last two words "to live" are essential; it is not suicide that is commended to us, and self-sacrifice always keeps hold of the higher self. "Desert you? Not to save my soul" is a fine sentiment in a story. But what should it profit a missionary to save a whole world of heathen and lose his own soul? Paul "could wish" himself accursed to save his people, but stopped in time,[27] seeing what it meant as plainly as any philosopher. To give your life is not to give your soul, which you have no right to give.

SH. From all which "I conclude that you have concluded" in favour of "self-assertion"; man (you are saying) is made for society,[28] but it must not swallow him up and ask for more. You have drawn the conversation away from Gifts and Graces and Intellectual Virtues, and you have pursued the vein rather of my *Moralists* than of my *Inquiry*. I do not regret the diversion. It reminds me that towards the end of my life I magnified friendship. It was a precious boon to studious men like me, uniting the advantages of society and solitude. The crowd has little to give to a man who thinks little of the world's pride, pomp, and pageantry, and "having righter models

in his eye becomes in truth the architect of his own life and fortune".[29]

A. My dear lord, you are quoting yourself, and I am able to cap the quotation from one of your own private letters, which it was no wrong to make public as it did you nothing but credit. When you were only two years past the meridian of life, you wrote yourself down one of those who "preferred tranquillity and a little study and a few friends to all other advantages of life". I claim you on my side from such letters to friends, and from knowledge of your way of life more than from the text of your books. As belonging to a later century, I take the last word, and tell you that you are not forgotten yet; nor shall be, so long as reasonable men still meet to hold discourse of reason on the things of the spirit.

REFERENCES IN APPENDIX

1. Ecclesiasticus xxii. 12. But Gibbon writes, in his *Letters*, i. p. 27, edition Prothero, of a youth serving in the Hampshire Militia with him in 1762: "The virtues of his heart make amends for his having none of the head."

2. Acton, *French Revolution*, xv (Catastrophe). Contra, Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister*, Lehrjahre, II. xii. "Alle Schuld rächt sich auf Erden."

3. *Gorgias*, 527.

4. "Ten Pounds": Luke xix.

5. *Characteristics*, i. p. 333.

6. "Unjust steward": Luke xvi.

7. *Paradise Lost*, ii. 480. Compare Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, vol. ii (Inquiry, II, § 4 of Book I), p. 39: "There being few even of the horridest villains who have not something of virtue", etc. But he does not go so far as Milton.

8. *Characteristics*, i. p. 37.

9. *Inquiry*, p. 186.

10. Hume, *Human Nature*, ii. p. 362.

11. *Characteristics*, i. p. 292.

12. Hood, *Lady's Dream*. Burns, *Epistle to Davie*.

13. *Characteristics*, iii. p. 161.

14. Sir John Malcolm in *Life of Mackintosh*, ii. p. 126.

15. *Characteristics*, ii. p. 321 (Moralists).

16. Hale, *Origination of Mankind*, 1677, p. 154. "Works of that nature" are chemical discoveries.

17. "Urbem fecisti quod prius Orbis erat." Claudius Rutilius Namatianus, *Itinerarium, sive De Reditu Suo, circa* A.D. 416, p. 112 of the edition Keene and Armstrong (Geo. Bell, 1907), line 66. So in Teubner's edition, 1870.

18. *Moralists* in *Characteristics*, ii. pp. 351, 352.

He is nearest the professor in the *Inquiry*, which is a treatise, not a dialogue. Hume was the only one of his Scottish successors to write in dialogue, and he was not a professor. There is a defence of dialogue in Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, i. p. 70. Wit and Humour, Part I, section iv.

19. *Inquiry* in *Characteristics*, ii. pp. 130, 134 *seq.* Cf. pp. 104, 105, 141 ("overbalancing"). Dante, *Inferno*, xxvii. 113: un de' neri cherubini. Milton, *Paradise Lost*, vi. 579.

20. Wrongs done to Heaven are Heaven's affair.

21. *Moralists* in *Characteristics*, ii. p. 351. We cannot simply assign all the moral virtues to Benevolence, and all the intellectual to Perfection.

22. *Republic*, i. 329.

23. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, in *Library of Philosophy*, 1893, p. 418. His earlier book was *Ethical Studies*, 1876; second edition (posthumous), 1927.

"English Spinoza." Spinoza is described by Erdmann as

"eine rein theoretische Natur, wie sie vielleicht nie wieder existiert hat". *Geschichte der Philosophie*, § 272, 11, of vol. ii, of second edition (Berlin, 1870), p. 68. "Spinoza's nature was purely speculative to an extent that is probably unique" is the English translation of Erdmann, in *Library of Philosophy*, vol. ii. Modern, 1890, p. 82.

24. *Soliloquy* in *Characteristics*, i. p. 322: "Pitch too high", *Characteristics*, ii. pp. 403, 404: "You take this in too high a key, above my reach. If you would have me accompany you, pray lower this strain a little."

"Free Spirit." *Characteristics* iii. Misc., pp. 297 *seq.* on Liberty, § 5, chap. iii.

25. Spinoza: "Sapientia non mortis sed vitae meditatio." *Ethics*, Part IV, Propos. lxvii (p. 377 of vol. i, edition Bruder, 1843).

"Nature makes individuals": "nationes non creat sed individua." *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, chap. vii, § 93 (Bruder, vol. iii, p. 239).

26. Adam Smith, *Moral Sentiments* (not in first edition), second edition, p. 141, and thereafter. Sixth edition, vol. i, p. 206, Part II, chap. ii. Sense of Justice: "Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the rest of mankind he is a most insignificant part of it."

27. Romans ix. 3. Charity: 1 Cor. xiii. 13.

28. *Inquiry* in *Characteristics*, ii. section i.

29. *Moralists* in *Characteristics*, ii. p. 427.

"Tranquillity and a little study." Rand, p. 393 (date 1708); and *supra* (chap. i. Shaftesbury). "Friendship", *Char.* I. 98 note.

These amenities are not at present to be had for the asking by all children of Adam. The topic of the Equality of Opportunities is too large to be pursued here. It was opened, but no more than opened, in an Address on the *Intellectual Virtues* given by the writer of this book in 1893, and printed by Messrs. Macmillan in the following year.

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